

MEMORIJA Edition: Book I

The siege of Sarajevo

1992 - 1995



Shelling, Sniping, and War Crimes in Sarajevo Municipalities
under the Control of Serbian Political and Military Authorities
- Judicially Established Facts -

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
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The siege
of Sarajevo



Radovan Karadžić, President of Republika Srpska and Commander-in-Chief of its Armed Forces in the newspaper Srpski Borac on August 2, 1995 (ICTY Judgement, page 1895/6)

“Before the war we were aware that if it happens, it will start in Sarajevo. We decided that if we want to win, we have to stay in Sarajevo. The strategic idea was to prevent the independent Bosnian state from functioning, whereas, on the other hand, our state would function. [...] Sarajevo is of special importance to us because of combat, strategic and tactical reasons. [...] Sarajevo is, as you know it, related to our survival, to the survival of our state, and I suppose that if the Muslim entity survives in Sarajevo, Sarajevo will be a melting point of cultures [...]. If the Muslims don't accept the peaceful transformation of the city into two entities, Sarajevo will suffer the fate of Beirut, where working hours are until noon and gunfire in the afternoon. [...] We need every inch in Serbian Sarajevo, we even claim rightson the centre of Sarajevo, say, the entire left bank of Miljacka River.”

Ratko Mladić, Colonel-General, Commander of the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska, at the 16th Session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, May 12, 1992 (ICTY Judgement, page 2310)

“When we start fighting over Sarajevo, we must not say before the international public [...] ‘We are going to shut down your water and power supply’ [...] And we have to put a ring around the dragon's head of Sarajevo this very moment, and only those whom we let out should be allowed out [...] We should not say: we will destroy Sarajevo, we need Sarajevo. We are not going to say that we are going to destroy the power supply pylons or turn off the water supply, no, because that would get America out of its seat, but [...] one day there is no water at all in Sarajevo. What is it, we do not know, damage, we should fix it, no, we will fix it, slowly. [...] Therefore, we have to wisely tell the world, it was they who were shooting, hit the transmission line and the power went off, they were shooting at the water supply facilities, there was a power cut at such and such a place, we are doing our best repairing this, that is what diplomacy is.”

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ABBREVIATIONS

Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina	ABiH
Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina	ARBiH
Autonomous Region of Krajina	ARK
Bosnia and Herzegovina	BiH
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia	ICTY
Joint Criminal Enterprise	JCE
Ministry of Internal Affairs	MOI
Public Security Service	PSS
Sarajevo Romanija Corps	SRK
State Security Service	SSS
Territorial Defense Forces	TO
Army of the Republika Srpska	VRS
Republika Srpska	RS
Headquarters of the Army of Republika Srpska	HQ VRS
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina	FBiH
United Nations	UN
Yugoslav People's Army	JNA

INTRODUCTION

Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), is located in a valley, stretching from east to west along both sides of the Miljacka River. To the north and south, it is surrounded by hills and mountains from which you can see the streets and distinctive features of the city. Before the war, Sarajevo consisted of ten municipalities: Stari Grad, Centar, Novo Sarajevo, Novi Grad, Ilidža, Vogošća, Pale, Ilijaš, Hadžići, and Trnovo.

According to the 1991 census, Sarajevo had 527,049 inhabitants. It was known as a multi-confessional city with a long history of religious and cultural tolerance.¹ Serbs made up the majority of the population, around 69 %, in the municipalities of Pale, Ilijaš, and Ilidža, whereas in municipality of Novo Sarajevo, the number of Serb and Muslim inhabitants were approximately equal.²

The siege of Sarajevo, which was the longest siege of a capital city in modern history, began with the erection of barricades and checkpoints, the seizure of military equipment, and the occupation of strategic facilities. The international airport was blocked off by the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and suburbs in the east and west of the city were also occupied. There were attacks on the Personnel Training Center for the Republic of BiH's Ministry of Internal Affairs in Vraca, as well as on the central tram depot and the historic Old Town.

The introduction of the Trial Chamber's Judgement in the case against Stanislav Galić, commander of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps (SRK) of the VRS, states:

"The Prosecution states that siege of Sarajevo, to use the established term, was an episode of such notoriety in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia that one must go back to World War II to find a parallel in European history. Not since then had a professional army conducted a campaign of unrelenting violence against the inhabitants of a European city so as to reduce them to a state of medieval deprivation in which they were in constant fear of death. In the period covered in this Indictment, there was nowhere safe for a Sarajevan, not at home, at school, in a hospital, from deliberate attack."³

1 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić: Judgment VOLUME III of V", November 2017, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/mladic/tjug/en/171122-3of5_1.pdf, p. 1212.

2 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić", November 2006, <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/acjug/en/gal-acjud061130.pdf>, p. 67-68.

3 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić", November 2006, <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj031205-1.htm>, p 1.

During the siege from May 1992 to November 1995, the Serbian political elite and military forces, beginning with the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, as members of the Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE), carried out a campaign of deliberate shelling and sniping with the primary purpose of terrorizing the citizens of Sarajevo. In the course of this campaign, thousands of men and women of all ages were killed and severely maimed, including children. Furthermore, this violence left Sarajevans with deep and permanent scars of psychological trauma.

It has been established that the Crisis Headquarters, members of the paramilitary formations of the Territorial Defense (TO), the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MOI) and the Army of the Republika Srpska (VRS) committed crimes during their takeover of power, in the course of implementing a collusive plan for a comprehensive joint criminal enterprise. The goal of this enterprise was the permanent removal of Muslims and Croats from the Sarajevo municipalities of Novo Sarajevo, Novi Grad, Ilidža, Vogošća, Ilijaš, Pale, Trnovo and Hadžići. These municipalities are included in the indictments of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), along with other municipalities in Eastern BiH, the Autonomous Region of Krajina (ARK) and other territories.

“While the Chamber finds differences in each of the Municipalities, it is satisfied that there was a generally similar pattern of co-ordinated violence during and after the take-over of these Municipalities and in detention facilities throughout. Indeed, in twenty municipalities in Eastern BiH, the ARK, and the Sarajevo area, and in detention facilities therein, Serb Forces committed acts of murder, persecution, and forcible displacement, which resulted in a vast number of Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat victims.”⁴

These are the words of the Trial Chamber Judgement in the case of Prosecutor vs. Radovan Karadžić. Karadžić was the President of the three-member Presidency of the RS from its establishment on May 12, 1992 until December 17, 1992, after which he served as the sole President of the RS and the supreme commander of its armed forces until July 1996.

Crimes against humanity, war crimes against civilians, and war crimes against prisoners of war were committed in the Sarajevo municipalities of Novo Sarajevo, Novi Grad, Ilidža, Pale, Vogošća, Ilijaš, and Hadžići. Civilians, including women and children, were imprisoned in various facilities such as the Hadžići Culture and Sport Center, in the garage of the Municipal Assembly building, the Kula prison, the Bunker Camp, “Planjo’s house,” the Sonja Retirement Home, “Naka’s Garage” in Vogošća, the facility of the former Digitron Buje company, the Šoping building in Grbavica, and the sports hall in Pale.

⁴ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: Judgement - Four volumes compiled, VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 955.

The ICTY sentenced seven former members of the Serbian political and military leadership for crimes committed during the comprehensive JCE in the Sarajevo municipalities of Novo Sarajevo, Novi Grad, Ilidža, Pale, Vogošća, Ilijaš, Trnovo and Hadžići, as well as in the JCE which included the sniping and shelling campaign aimed at terrorizing Sarajevo civilians. Given that some of these individuals were convicted of genocide and other crimes committed in BiH, the perpetrators were sentenced to a total of 122 years in prison and two life sentences.

The judiciary in Bosnia and Herzegovina did not prosecute those responsible for the crimes committed during the sniping and shelling campaign until May 2022, when 29 people were sentenced to 232 years and six months in prison for crimes in Sarajevo municipalities that were under the control of Serbian forces.

The ICTY and the courts in Bosnia and Herzegovina have sentenced 36 people to a total of 354 years and six months in prison and two life sentences for crimes committed in the Sarajevo municipalities that were under the control of the Bosnian Serbs.

This publication provides a detailed description of the strategic and operational activities of RS political and military structures, based on the facts established by the ICTY and courts of BiH. These activities include the sniping and daily shelling of Sarajevo, and the terrorizing, wounding, and murder of its citizens. We focus on the crimes committed against Muslims and Croats in the municipalities of Novo Sarajevo, Novi Grad, Ilidža, Vogošća, Ilijaš, Hadžići, Trnovo, and Pale. We identify those who have been convicted of war crimes as of May 2022, and highlight allegations related to two JCE’s undertaken by Serbian political and military forces. This publication has been produced with the help of the Post-Conflict Research Center (PCRC), to whom we are expressly grateful.

THE SHELLING AND SNIPERING CAMPAIGN (1992 - 1993)

By mid-May of 1992, the front lines in Sarajevo had been established after several weeks of intensive fighting. Members of so-called “Members of Serbian irregular units” had the city completely surrounded, restricting movement to, from, and around Sarajevo. From the surrounding hills, they shelled the city constantly with heavy artillery and sniper rifles provided by the JNA, including parts of the city inhabited by civilians.⁵

⁵ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/mladic/tjug/en/171122-2of5_1.pdf, p. 1124.



There was especially intense shelling on **13 and 14 May 1992**. As described in the ICTY judgement against VRS Main Staff Commander, General Ratko Mladić: “The area of Hrid-Jarčedoli was also targeted from the direction of Borije, Trebević, and Lapišnica with all available weapons and artillery, causing extensive material damage and wounding three persons, including one child.”⁶ According to Fire Brigade Commander Mesud Jusufović, several buildings caught fire as a result of enemy shelling on this day, including the Bosnalijek building on Jukićeva Street.

The judgement against Mladić goes on to quote an annex to the report published by the UN Commission of Experts on 27 May 1994, which records the deaths of 40 individuals in Sarajevo on 14 May, 1992.⁷

On the same day, John Wilson, the head of UN military observers, concluded that several thousand shells had fallen on the city. The continuous shelling resulted in a significant increase in civilian casualties, as well as the cessation of economic activities which exacerbated shortages of food, medicine, and essential supplies.⁸

According to Bakir Nakaš, the Director of the State Hospital, the heaviest targeting of the Hospital was between **13 and 16 May 1992**, when the hospital was hit by about 40 shells. “The patients’ rooms on the south side of the hospital were no longer usable,” Nakaš said.⁹

In the **second half of May 1992**, the SRK fired an average of several hundred shells a day at Sarajevo. The violence continued through the **end of May and beginning of June 1992**, with various artillery weapons fired from various positions. Food became scarce, markets were empty, and humanitarian operations were very limited.¹⁰

On 27 May 1992, a mortar shell fired from an SRK position on Mount Trebević fell on Vase Miškina Street, killing several people and injuring at least 100 more, including two minors. All of the victims were civilians, and some of them had been waiting in line for bread.

“According to a Bosnia-Herzegovina MUP [MOI] investigative file, on 27 May 1992, at 9:55 a.m., an 82-millimetre mortar shell was fired, landing in a pedestrian precinct in front of a shop called Planika and a shop called Elektrotehna, between house numbers 5, and 12 in Vase Miškina Street. The explosion caused extensive material damage to surrounding

⁶ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić: VOLUME II of V”, November 2017, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/mladic/tjug/en/171122-2of5_1.pdf, p. 1115.

⁷ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić: VOLUME II of V”, November 2017, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/mladic/tjug/en/171122-2of5_1.pdf, p. 1115.

⁸ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1344/5.

⁹ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević”, December 2007, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragomir_milosevic/tjug/en/071212.pdf, p. 53.

¹⁰ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1347.

buildings, slightly or seriously wounded 112 civilians, and killed 17 civilians as they were waiting in line for bread or passing by,” reads the Mladić verdict.¹¹

In a radio broadcast on the night of **28 May 1992**, Mladić called for the targeting of “Velešići, Baščaršija on both sides, as well as the Presidency.”

According to the ICTY judgement against Karadžić, “**On 28 May 1992**, Mladić ordered Vukašinović to fire a salvo at Baščaršija, as well as on Velešići and Pofalići, and added “there is not much Serb population there. In the same conversation, Mladić ordered Vukašinović to continue firing “so that they can not sleep, that we roll out their minds.”¹²

On 6 June 1992, Mladić issued Directive No. 1, stating that the VRS “received the task to use offensive actions with restricted aim in order to improve operationally-tactical position in the wide area of Sarajevo’ and ordered the SRK to ‘mop up or cleanse parts of Sarajevo’ and further to ‘mop up or cleanse Mojnilo, Dobrinja, Butmir and Sokolović Kolonija of remaining groups [...] [and] de-block the Sarajevo-Trnovo and Pale-Zlatište communication.”¹³

July, August, and September 1992

Shelling and sniping attacks continued throughout the summer of 1992, and humanitarian aid did not arrive.

“**On 29 June**, the Sarajevo airport in Butmir, which up until that point had been under the control of the Bosnian Serbs, was handed over to UNPROFOR, to be used by UNPROFOR,” according to the Karadžić judgement.¹⁴

On 17 July 1992, representatives of the three parties to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including Karadžić, signed an agreement in London on a 14-day ceasefire.

On 22 July 1992, Mladić issued Directive No. 2, ordering his units to respect the 14-day truce but remain ready for combat. Then on **3 August 1992**, he issued Directive No. 3 which ordered the units to hold Sarajevo in a tight blockade.

¹¹ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić: VOLUME II of V”, November 2017, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/mladic/tjug/en/171122-2of5_1.pdf, p. 1116/7.

¹² United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. in 1594/5.

¹³ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić: VOLUME IV of V”, November 2017, <https://ucr.irmct.org/LegalRef/CMSDocStore/Public/BCS/Judgement/NotIndexable/IT-09-92/JUD275R0000636713.pdf>, p. 2291.

¹⁴ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1347/8.

The Mladić judgement states, “In August 1992, Mladić issued Directive No. 3, under the code name ‘Bosna - 92’, in which he ordered the SRK to keep the positions reached in Sarajevo and to ‘tighten the siege of Sarajevo’. One of the operation’s objectives was to ‘prevent the breaking of the blockade of Sarajevo and the penetration of ‘Ustaša’ forces from Croatia and Central Bosnia towards the corridors in Posavina, Eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina.”¹⁵

In mid-September 1992, the shelling of Sarajevo continued indiscriminately.

October, November, and December 1992

The UN reported on 8 October that “the mood of people in Sarajevo has reached the lowest level since **April 1992** due to the continued shelling and lack of utilities.”¹⁶

Humanitarian aid started arriving in Sarajevo only in **the middle of October 1992**, and it was far less than was needed to meet the basic needs of the population.

According to the verdict against Stanislav Galić, Eldar Hafizović was wounded **on 24 October 1992**, on Junaka Square in Dobrinja. He was with his grandmother on a fifth-floor balcony cooking on a grill when a tank shell exploded about 1.5 meters away, injuring his right hand as well as his right knee. The balcony faced Gavrića Brdo, a position held by the SRK, where Hafizović had seen tanks before.¹⁷

Doctor Nakaš testified that the southern facade of the hospital, which faced the SRK-held territories of Vrace and Trebevic, was exposed to the most artillery. Some 85 to 90 percent of hits were on that side.

“Nakaš recalled that, **in October 1992**, a large bullet from an anti-aircraft gun injured his secretary in her office,” states the Galić judgement.¹⁸

At the **end of October**, a major attack was launched by the “Bosnian Serbs from the north and south of the centre of Sarajevo; the first few rounds caught people in the open and caused a number of casualties.”¹⁹

Hussein Alija Abdel-Razeka, the commander of UNPROFOR’s Sarajevo Sector in the period

¹⁵ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić: VOLUME IV of V”, November 2017, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/mladic/tjug/en/171122-4of5_1.pdf, p. 2292.

¹⁶ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1349.

¹⁷ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić”, December 2003, <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj031205e.pdf>, p. 149.

¹⁸ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić”, December 2003, <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj031205e.pdf>, p. 91.

¹⁹ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1349.



from 21 August 1992, to 20 February 1993, assessed Sarajevo as a dangerous city upon his arrival, noting the constant shelling and sniper fire as well as the lack of infrastructure and communal services.²⁰ He described heavy shelling between August and October of 1992, while November was relatively calm.

Protected witness AJ testified that on the afternoon of **7 November 1992**, she was walking home from a neighbor's house, dressed in civilian clothing. As she passed between two buildings near Darovalaca Krvi Street, she heard a shot from the direction of Grbavica. "A bullet struck her in the hip. She was taken to a first-aid station and later hospitalized. According to the witness the gunfire originated in Grbavica," the judgement against Galić reads.²¹

On 19 November 1992, Mladić issued Directive No. 4, by which he ordered the SRK to "keep Sarajevo and Igman in a complete blockade and tighten the ring." In December 1992, during the battle for Otes, the shelling of Sarajevo and its surroundings intensified.

Pyers Tucker, a military aide to UNPROFOR Commander General Philippe Morillon, stated that the worst and most continuous shelling of Sarajevo since the start of the war occurred between **1 and 10 December 1992**. Although they were concentrated in Otes and Stup in the western part of Sarajevo, the SRK also shelled the central parts of the city in order to break the will and resistance of the citizens.

According to Tucker, more than 1,500 rounds of explosives were fired per day at that time. The fight for Otes involved house to house fighting, supported by Bosnian Serb infantry and artillery.²²

On 7 December 1992, the SRK occupied Otes and parts of Stup. **On 13 December**, three-year-old Anisa Pita was shot and wounded in the right leg on the porch of her residence in Širokača by a shot fired from the SRK-controlled area of Baba Stijena.

"Both parents inspected their daughter and found that she had been injured above the knee of her right leg by a bullet which had subsequently exited the girl's body. With the help of his brother, Ekrem Pita carried his daughter to a clinic in Stari Grad where her wounds were bandaged. Anisa Pita was then taken to the orthopaedic department of Koševo hospital for further treatment."²³

20 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1349.

21 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić", December 2003, <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj031205e.pdf>, p. 86.

22 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1548.

23 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić", December 2003, <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj031205e.pdf>, p. 226.

Witness John Ashton, who had arrived in Sarajevo as a photographer that July, said that he witnessed a mortar attack in Novo Sarajevo **in December 1992** in which a woman was killed and several others were wounded. He also witnessed the shelling of the post office building housing UNPROFOR representatives that month, and a shelling in which three people were killed and two were wounded while they were carrying freshly-chopped wood.²⁴

At midnight on both Catholic Christmas Eve (24 December) in 1992 and Orthodox Christmas (7 January) in 1993, SRK units opened a twenty-minute barrage of fire at random civilian targets.²⁵ The shelling continued throughout January of 1993, including in the municipality of Stari Grad, where a shell hit a line of civilians waiting for water, killing several.

Protected witness KDZ450 said that an average of 1,200 shells fell per day during this period. From **the end of 1992 to the beginning of 1993**, witness Ashton said that the State Hospital was shelled every day from Mount Trebević, including with anti-aircraft weapons.²⁶

January, February and March 1993

January and February of 1993 were extremely cold, with severe shortages of electricity, gas, oil, and not to mention morale among Sarajevo residents. In an effort to escape the deprivation in the city at this time, hundreds of civilians attempted to cross the airport to Butmir and Mt. Igman each night, during which they were shot at by Bosnian Serbs, and often killed or injured.²⁷

Hafizović was wounded for the second time **on 13 January 1993** when he gathered with other young people in a ground-floor apartment of a building in Dobrinja. At the time of the incident, the witness and his friends were using a gas lamp because it was late at night and there was no electricity. According to the Galić judgement:

"Hafizović remembered hearing a loud explosion and realised that he was injured in the head and bleeding. He ran out into the street crying out for help and heard SRK soldiers shouting from nearby confrontation lines: 'Hey, you Balijas, how many of you did we kill this time?' Hafizović recalled that fragments from a 82 mm mortar shell were recovered by neighbours after the incident, but did not know where the shell had been fired from."²⁸

24 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić", December 2003, <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj031205e.pdf>, p. 77.

25 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1497.

26 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić", December 2003, <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj031205e.pdf>, p. 90.

27 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1352.

28 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić", December 2003, <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj031205e.pdf>, p. 150.



In February 1993, Ashton witnessed an SRK tank fire three shells around the Holiday Inn near the museum, where there had previously been no military hostilities. He said that civilians were in the street, and French and Ukrainian UNPROFOR troops were stationed by some metal barriers.²⁹

While international forces were trying to establish a ceasefire and the so-called “blue route” for the unhindered movement of civilians and humanitarian aid, **on 21 March 1993**, SRK units shelled the whole of Sarajevo, firing 2,400 shells on the city.³⁰

²⁹ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić”, December 2003, <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj031205e.pdf>, p. 84.

³⁰ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1344.

April, May, and June 1993

A nine-year-old girl was wounded while playing in front of her house in Sedrenik **on 17 April 1993**. According to the judgement against Karadžić, the bullet hit the girl in “the area of [her] shoulder blade [...] went through [her] body and ended up in the wall” behind her. Later that day, the girl was transported in a car to a hospital in Sarajevo with the help of neighbors. A shot was fired at the car as it pulled away from the girl’s house, hitting it in the back.³¹

On 6 May 1993, the UN Security Council declared Sarajevo a protected zone, along with Tuzla, Žepa, Goražde, Bihać, and Srebrenica, which meant an immediate ceasefire. However, during his testimony at the ICTY, Galić claims that **on 15 May 1993**, the Army of the Republic of BiH (ARBiH) carried out several attacks. The SRK units responded, but with some restraint, because the settlement from which the attack came was densely populated. On the same day, Galić ordered units of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps to allow humanitarian convoys to pass unhindered.³²

David Harland, a UNPROFOR civil affairs officer and later a political advisor to the commander of the UNPROFOR Command in Sarajevo, arrived in Sarajevo in June 1993. He later testified that Sarajevo was a haunted, empty city with burned vehicles in the streets, anti-sniper barricades made of containers, the constant sound of gunfire in the background, and buildings riddled with shelling and artillery fire.³³

On 1 June 1993, two 82mm mortar shells were fired consecutively at about 200 civilians, including women and children, while they were watching a game in the Dobrinja neighborhood. At least ten people were killed and more than a hundred were wounded. In the judgement, it was determined that the shooting was from the position of the VRS, east-southeast of Dobrinja.

A member of the civil defense was the referee of the second game. He recounted that about 10 to 20 minutes after the game started, during a penalty kick, the first shell landed among the players in the center of the field. He was hit by shrapnel and sustained serious injuries in both of his legs and other parts of his body. He saw eleven young men lying on the ground,

31 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1517.

32 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1344.

33 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1355.

eight of whom had been killed on the spot.³⁴

Omer Hadziabdić, who was 15 years old at the time, was watching the match from atop an overturned car when the first shell struck the football field. He heard a very strong explosion and was knocked down. He was wounded in the leg by shrapnel. Nedim Gavranović, who was 12 years old at the time, was standing behind one of the goals when he heard the first explosion and felt a very strong blow. He sustained entry and exit wounds in his right lower leg from the shrapnel.

On 25 June, Mladić issued Directive No. 5, instructing VRS units to thwart the “unblocking of Sarajevo” to be followed by “quick and rigorous operations to liberate the axis Sarajevo-Kijevo village Trnovo village-Rogovo passKalinovik” and the area around Igman and Bjelašnica; the code-name for the operation was “Lukavac ‘93.” Lukavac ‘93 was launched by the SRK, Drina Corps, and Herzegovina Corps, with the SRK engaged in the area of Jahorina-Igman-Bjelašnica axis. The SRK launched attacks with the aim of capturing Mt. Igman, as the connection between Sarajevo and the rest of the BiH went across and underneath Sarajevo airport through to Mt. Igman.³⁵

Witness G testified that **on 25 June 1993**, he was picking lettuce in the garden on his farm in Kobilja Glava when at around 1:20 in the afternoon, he heard gunshots coming from Orahov Brijeg. He lay down for two or three minutes and when he got up, he was shot in the back. Upon receiving a “tremendous blow”, he turned around, collapsed, and lost consciousness.

“Witness K who was visiting Witness G that day saw him lying on the ground, on his back, at a distance of 50 to 100 meters from his house. Witness K ran to assist Witness G who warned her to be careful because he had just been shot. Witness K went to get the assistance of a neighbour and returned with him to take Witness G away. While they were carrying Witness G, they heard intense shooting directed towards them. The three dropped on the ground. The shooting then stopped. They then ran several metres until the shooting restarted. Four or five times, they ran short distances, then fell to the ground to avoid being shot at. Witness K counted 10 to 15 shooting periods in total, and it took them 15 to 20 minutes to carry Witness G to the house. Witness G was then transported to hospital, and hospitalised for a month,” the judgement against Galić described.³⁶

34 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić”, December 2003, <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj031205e.pdf>, p. 151.

35 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1355/6.

36 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić”, December 2003, <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj031205e.pdf>, p. 230.

The judges at Galić's trial were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that witness G was hit from the territory controlled by the SRK, specifically from the vicinity of what was called "Tica's house."

Milada Halili and her husband Sabri Halili testified that at around noon on **27 June 1993**, they were walking with Milada's mother, Almasa Konjhodžić, towards the PTT Inženjering building. As they approached the traffic lights at the intersection of Kranjčevića Street near Marshal Tito Barracks, they heard the sound of gunfire. Milada Halili, who was slightly ahead, ran across the intersection behind a barrier of containers which had been set up to protect against shooting from Grbavica. Frightened by the shot, Almasa lost her balance and fell. Sabri Halili helped her to her feet, and they continued. They had walked ten meters when Almasa was struck by a bullet. Sabri Halili turned to see his mother-in-law laying in a pool blood. The victim was taken to hospital where she died from her injuries.

The majority of the members of the Trial Chamber at the trial of Galić established that Almasa, a civilian, was deliberately targeted and killed by a shot fired from SRK-controlled territory in Grbavica.³⁷

July, August, and September 1993

Munira Zametica, a 48-year-old civilian, was killed on 11 July 1993. She had gone to fetch water at the Dobrinja River and stopped for a while on the northwest side of the bridge, which provided her with shelter from sniper fire that lasted all day. When she gathered enough courage and went to fill her bucket with water, she was hit by a bullet. The victim was lying face down in the river, blood coming out of her mouth. The victim was pulled out of the water and taken to hospital, where she died later that afternoon. In the judgment, it was determined that she was deliberately hit from the direction of the Orthodox church in Dobrinja, which was under the control of SRK units.³⁸

A day later, on **12 July 1993**, a grenade exploded among a group of about 100 civilians who were waiting by the water tank near the communal fountain at number 155 in Aleja B. Bujčić in the residential area of Dobrinja. 13 people were killed and 14 were wounded. Shots were fired from Nedžarići, which was under the control of the VRS.³⁹

During his testimony, Galić said that the ARBiH carried out attacks in order to stop the Lukavica '92 operation. Nevertheless, SRK units managed to establish control over Igman

³⁷ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić", December 2003, <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj031205e.pdf>, p. 94.

³⁸ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1485.

³⁹ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1623.

and Bjelašnica. On **5 August 1993**, after a discussion with international representatives Krajišnik, Plavšić, and Mladić, who objected, Karadžić agreed to withdraw from Igman and the abandoned territory to be controlled by UNPROFOR. There was also an airport in the abandoned territory, which was called the demilitarized zone, but the judgments stated that neither side had honored the agreement to withdraw. The ARBiH remained in the north while the VRS was in the southern part.

Ifeta Šahić was 14 years old in **August 1993** and was living at her sister's house in Kobilja Glava.

"On **5 August 1993**, around noon, she was asked to go and fetch water with her two girlfriends, Sabina Zeković and Vildana Kapur. Šahić testified that there was neither water nor electricity in houses during the conflict, and that the fetching of water was usually done at the nearby river at dawn or dusk, to avoid being detected and shot at. However, on that day, they had not heard any shooting. On their way back, while walking along Stara Cesta Street, and pulling a wheelbarrow loaded with jerry cans of water, Šahić and her friends heard gunshots ahead of them. Bullets stroke the ground around their feet. Šahić saw the flash from a machine gun, the so-called 'death sower,' shooting at them. They ran and sought shelter in an orchard on the left side of the street. Ifeta Šahić and Sabina Zeković lay down on the grass. Vildana Kapur leaned against a tree and was then shot in her left leg."⁴⁰

At the trial of Galić, the Trial Chamber was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the bullet that wounded Vildana Kapur was fired from the territory held by the SRK.

The military commanders agreed to a cease-fire on **11 August 1993**, which allowed the UN to move freely throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the exception of Pale, which was controlled by the Serbs. The judgement against Karadžić states that Galić issued an order to all SRK units not to open fire on Sarajevo "at any cost" and to remove "possible troublemakers" and "soldiers eager for adventure and provocations especially against UNPROFOR" by giving them secondary duties.⁴¹

The SRK command reported that members of the ARBiH were carrying out occasional attacks. The command of the SRK once again reported that the ARBiH was firing on Grbavica and other SRK positions with light weapons and sniper rifles from Sedrenik and other places. SRK units returned fire on Sedrenik, using a 12.7mm anti-aircraft machine gun.⁴²

⁴⁰ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić", December 2003, <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj031205e.pdf>, p. 233.

⁴¹ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1357.

⁴² United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1358.

A day later, on **3 September 1993**, 35-year-old Nafa Tarić and her eight-year-old daughter Elma were wounded by the same bullet in the center of Sarajevo while they were going to get some books from Elma's classmate.

At the time, their neighborhood of Hrasno was relatively peaceful. The mother and daughter held hands as they moved behind metal containers that were placed as protection from snipers operating from Hrasno Hill. There were no soldiers or other possible military targets in the immediate vicinity.

When they emerged from behind the containers, they were hit. A single bullet hit Nafa Tarić's left thigh, then grazed her daughter's hand and penetrated her stomach. They both fell to the ground and managed to crawl away from the place where they were exposed to gunfire. They spent almost two weeks in the hospital. It has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the shots were fired from the position of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and that Elma and her mother were targeted intentionally.⁴³

On **4 September 1993**, Galić reported to the VRS Main Staff that some of the soldiers were exhausted and that "considering that they respond only in exceptional circumstances, the question [...] is, how long can they restrain themselves."⁴⁴

Bajram Sopi explained that on the morning of **7 September 1993**, he and Šaćir Bosnić had gone to an area near a water reservoir in Širokača to collect firewood, as they did regularly. They were busy digging up roots on a hill, some 10 to 15 metres apart from one another, when someone "shot once Šaćir Bosnić and missed him. A second shot was fired and hit Šaćir Bosnić in his right temple. The shooting stopped and some unspecified time thereafter, an ambulance arrived to transport the victim to the hospital, who died as a result of his injury," the judgement against Galić states.⁴⁵

43 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić", December 2003, <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj031205e.pdf>, p. 100/1.

44 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1358.

45 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić", December 2003, <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj031205e.pdf>, p. 228.



October, November, and December 1993

Heavy shelling and sniping continued throughout **October and November 1993**. On **October 27th**, 500 shells fell around the Old Town.⁴⁶

Military observers often reported the SRK open fire at random without any specific target. Thirty-eight-year-old Ramiza Kundo was shot and wounded in the left breast on **2 November 1993**, while she was crossing Briješko Brdo Street (now Bulbulistan Street) in the western part of Sarajevo carrying buckets of water.

On **2 November 1993**, Ramiz Velić was cleaning up garbage on Heroja Square in the Hrasno neighborhood along with other locals. Residents had hung blankets up on a wire to shield the street they from sniper fire. Driving the excavator backwards, Velić moved away from the shield of blankets and was shot in the left hand. He then he jumped out of the vehicle and hid behind one of its tires. The shooting continued and he heard several bullets hit the left side of the vehicle. He was later told that 64 bullet holes had been counted in the excavator.

The Galić judgement states, "The Trial Chamber is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Ramiz Velić, a civilian, was deliberately targeted from SRK-controlled territory in Vrace."⁴⁷

UNPROFOR reported on **3 November 1993** that the Bosnian Serbs were intensifying their obstruction of humanitarian aid delivery to Sarajevo, delaying convoys of food, medicine, and equipment.

The Fatima Gunić School was shelled on **9 November 1993**. The following day, several children were wounded and killed in shelling of the Otoka neighborhood.

On **11 November 1993**, Karadžić issued Directive No. 6 which called for creating the conditions to achieve VRS military objectives, including the "liberation of Sarajevo." One of the SRK's tasks was to maintain the blockade of Sarajevo. In a December 1993 amendment to Directive No. 6, Karadžić ordered his forces to occupy Žuč Hill and the neighborhood of Mojnilo in order to create the best possible position for the division of the city.⁴⁸

Two 122mm artillery shells hit the Ciglana Market on Đure Đakovića Street from the VRS-controlled area of Poljina. Several people were killed and wounded.

⁴⁶ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1576.

⁴⁷ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić", December 2003, <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj031205e.pdf>, p. 105.

⁴⁸ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1359.

On **26 December 1993**, military observers reported increased sniper activity in Sarajevo in which women and children were wounded.

SHELLING AND SNIPERING CAMPAIGN (1994 - 1995)

During 1994 and 1995, the SRK of the VRS intensified their campaign of shelling and sniping in Sarajevo, committing some of the most egregious crimes against civilians. The Markale marketplace, a gathering place for many Sarajevans, was shelled in February 1994 and again in August 1995. Six children were killed in Alipašino Polje while they were playing in front of their building. Sniping at the trams intensified, most often in front of the Holliday Inn and the Marshal Tito barracks. Civilians were hit while riding bicycles, sitting in their apartments, gathering firewood, fetching water, distributing humanitarian aid, and doing many other activities. Depriving the population of food, water, and electricity was a "general feature" of the Bosnian Serb strategy aimed at forcing the Bosnian Muslim government to accept unfavorable terms in a peace agreement.

Colonel Andrey Demurenko, the Chief of Staff of UNPROFOR in Sarajevo from January to December 1995, testified that "if one looks at the human suffering, then it was a case of a full siege, just like in Leningrad during Second World War."⁴⁹

January 1994

In January 1994, Sarajevo continued to be subjected to heavy shelling and sniping, including in residential areas, which led to a large number of civilian casualties.

Sanija Dževlan, a 32-year-old woman, was wounded on **6 January 1994** in Dobrinja while riding her bicycle back from the hospital, where she had been getting medicine for her sick mother. She felt the blow and realized that she had been hit. She managed to stay on the bike and reach her home, where neighbors helped her get back to the hospital.

"The Trial Chamber finds that the witness is credible and her evidence is reliable," the verdict against Galić states.⁵⁰ The Trial Chamber found that Dževlan was shot from the Orthodox Church in the area of Dobrinja IV which was controlled by the SRK.

⁴⁹ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević", December 2007, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragomir_milosevic/tjug/en/071212.pdf, p. 241;

⁵⁰ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić", December 2003, <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj031205e.pdf>, p. 145.



On 11 January 1994, Akif Mukanović was with his wife Hatema and two teenage children on the first floor of an apartment block on 27 Obala Jula in the neighborhood of Hrasno. They were sitting at the dining table with their neighbor, and Hatema had her back to the window. Because there was no electricity, a lit candle was on the table. There was a loud bang, and Hatema said, "I'm finished." She took one step forward, went completely pale, and fainted. Galić's judgement states:

"According to Mukanović, two bullets struck his apartment. One passed through the wooden frame of the left side of the window, looking outward, and wounded his wife in the right shoulder blade, cutting through her aorta and lodging in her body. A second bullet went through the left windowpane, across the dining-room and through the wall into the outside hallway of the building. Hatema Mukanović was taken to the hospital but she did not survive the injury."⁵¹

On 22 January 1994, three shells landed in Alipašino Polje, resulting in the deaths of six children who had been playing in the residential area: Indira Brković, Jasmina Brković, Danijel Jurenić, Mirza Dedović, Nermin Rizvanović, and Admir Subašić.⁵² Six other people, mostly children, were also wounded.

Muhamed Kapetanović, not quite ten years old at the time, lived at 2 Cetinjska Street and was playing with four friends in a parking lot. Another group of children was playing on Klara Cetkin Street. There was no ongoing military activity in the neighbourhood and no soldiers in sight. Suddenly there was a loud explosion, whereupon the children ran for cover. Just before Kapetanović reached the entrance of his building, another shell exploded 10 meters behind the child following Kapetanović. That child was killed and three others were wounded, including Kapetanović, who suffered serious injuries to his leg. Goran Todorović, a 12-year-old boy, ran towards the buildings for cover and just as he started climbing the staircase to his apartment at 6 Klara Cetkin Street, another shell exploded 10 to 15 meters away and wounded him.

A man was walking along Klara Cetkin Street where he lived and heard two explosions at a distance of approximately 100 meters. Before he could take cover, a third shell fell three to five meters to his left. The explosion threw him into the air and seriously wounded him in the face.



⁵¹ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić", December 2003, <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj031205e.pdf>, p. 106.

⁵² United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1360/1.

Refik Aganović, who was in his apartment on the 14th floor of 4 Klara Cetkin Street, heard the “usual” hissing sound of a shell, followed by an explosion, followed by another shell. Aganović opened a west-facing window to see what had happened, when a third explosion in front of the entrance to his block threw him backwards. He rushed downstairs to the entrance where he saw a 13-year-old boy keel over and die. Another younger boy whom Aganović said he tried to assist also died in those moments. Other children, whom the witness did not recognize because they were covered in blood and were missing parts of their bodies, were also killed.⁵³

On 26 January 1994, Galić issued an order in which he outlined a two-stage operation in Sarajevo. In the first stage, the SRK units were ordered to prevent the “de-blocking” of Sarajevo and the linking of ABiH units inside Sarajevo with those outside Sarajevo. This was to be done by engaging in “decisive defence” and improving the SRK’s strategic-tactical position by capturing positions such as Debelo Brdo, Mojmiilo, Grdonj, Hum, and Čolina Kapa. In the second stage, which was to start in the spring of 1994 and last 20-30 days, the SRK was to continue the above activities, prevent any supplies from getting into the city, prevent any medical evacuation, and “liberate the Serb part of the City of Sarajevo.”⁵⁴

February 1994

On 4 February 1994, three mortar shells struck a residential neighbourhood in Dobrinja killing at least eight civilians, including a child, and injuring at least 18 people, including two children.⁵⁵ The first shell exploded against the eastern facade of the apartment block on Oslobodilaca Sarajeva Street and injured Sabahudin Ljuša.

A humanitarian aid delivery truck was unloaded at a warehouse on the west side of 10 Oslobodilaca Sarajeva Street. Ljuša crossed the street to get a broom from the office, where a crowd of people had gathered to collect the humanitarian aid. As the Galić judgement states, “Ljuša was just about to cross the street and return to the warehouse, when he ‘felt a very loud explosion and I realised that something had hit me in the chest.’”⁵⁶

Fata Spahić and three other women left their homes in Švrakino in Novi Grad to go to Dobrinja to trade cigarettes for flour. The trade was to take place at a Dobrinja playground near a

⁵³ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić”, December 2003, <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj031205e.pdf>, p. 130.

⁵⁴ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1361.

⁵⁵ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić”, December 2003, <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj031205e.pdf>, p. 173.

⁵⁶ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić”, December 2003, <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj031205e.pdf>, p. 167.

parking lot off of Oslobodilaca Sarajeva Street. When they arrived, about 20 women and children were gathered there. Before long, the witness heard a whistling sound, followed by the explosion of a shell falling on a nearby apartment block in front of Oslobodilaca Sarajeva Street. She heard cries for help coming from that direction as she and others ran for cover to the entrance of a building where humanitarian aid was being distributed. She returned with the other women to the playground to retrieve their belongings.

“We heard this sound, and as we bent down, the shell landed near us. After a moment she noticed that some of the injured were crawling away from the site, while two of her friends and two boys she did not know were killed or were dying. Spahić herself was injured. An ambulance came and took the injured to a local surgery. From there the witness heard the explosion of a third shell,” recalled Spahić.⁵⁷

⁵⁷ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić”, December 2003, <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj031205e.pdf>, p. 167/8.

photo by Alem Bajramović



A day later, at around noon **on 5 February 1994**, the SRK fired a 120mm grenade from a mortar at the open air Markale Market where a large group of people had gathered. According to the ICTY judgement against Karadžić:

“Relying on the hospital records, which the Chamber accepts were not entirely accurate given the chaotic situation at the time they were compiled, and the technical evidence regarding the lethal effect of mortar shells, the Chamber also finds that the explosion caused by the shell on 5 February 1994 caused the death of at least 67 people and injured over 140.”⁵⁸

In their judgement, the ICTY determined that the Markale Market and the surrounding area was not a legitimate military target and that the casualties caused by the shelling were almost all civilians who were not participants in the hostilities.

According to the adjudicated facts, a 120mm mortar shell was fired at the market from a north-northeast direction or at an azimuth of approximately 18 degrees. The shell could not have been fired from any place on the side of the conflict line under the control of the ABiH. A mortar shell that on 5 February 1994 exploded in the Markale market. It was fired from the territory under the control of the SRK, and there was no reason to consider the market a military target.⁵⁹

As a result of the shelling of Dobrinja and Markale, **on 9 February 1994**, both sides agreed to a ceasefire. This resulted in three peaceful weeks in February, with no casualties recorded until the end of the month.

March 1994

The beginning of March 1994 was an encouraging time for the citizens of Sarajevo. The ceasefire remained in effect, and by the middle of the month, the city trams began to operate. Communal services, such as running water, were restored, as were Sarajevans' hopes for a return to normal life. An agreement was reached **on 17 March 1994** regarding the “blue routes,” which significantly eased the humanitarian situation in Sarajevo.

However, by **19 March**, sniper activity in the city was once again on the rise. According to Adrianus van Baal, Chief of Staff of the UNPROFOR BiH Command at the time, sniper activity resumed during that period despite the ceasefire agreement, and snipers began targeting the Sarajevo trams.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1698.

⁵⁹ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1664/5.

⁶⁰ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1366.

Mensur Jusić recalled a sniper attack carried out **in the spring of 1994** in Vojvode Putnika Street. The witness was returning home from work. As he got off the tram, he heard a loud burst of gunfire and the sound of bullets hitting the asphalt. He ran for cover and saw a young girl crawling to safety. She had been hit by a sniper bullet. The witness picked her up and took her to a shielded passageway between the buildings. According to the Galić judgement, “Jusić testified that the gunfire had originated in Grbavica, across the Bratstvo-Jedinstvo Bridge.”⁶¹

⁶¹ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić”, December 2003, <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj031205e.pdf>, p. 85.

photo by Benisa Bibuljica



Jusić also saw a man fall to the ground after being hit by a bullet on Brodska Street. He was dragged away by people in civilian clothing. Based on his previous experiences, Jusić believes that the bullet was fired from the top of a group of twenty-story buildings in Grbavica.

April, May, and June 1994

In April 1994, sniper operations and mortar attacks continued, and the citizens of Sarajevo faced shortages of gas, water, and electricity.

Ramiz Grabovica drove civilians on a regular bus line between the neighborhoods of Alipašina Most and Dobrinja during the ceasefire. **On 25 May 1994**, when the bus reached its last stop at in the center of Drobrinja at the intersection of Nikole Demonje Street and Omladinskih Brigada Street, he opened three doors for the passengers to enter. He heard one shot fired from the direction of Nedžarići, which was controlled by the SRK. He then saw that two middle-aged women had been injured. The one sitting on the right side of the bus was holding her knee and the other sitting in the opposite side of the aisle was bleeding profusely. Grabovica's account of the experiences reads: "At that moment, I switched on the engine, closed the doors, even though all the other passengers were saying, 'open, open, because the sniper is shooting.' I closed the doors, started, and because the hospital was about a hundred metres away, I went over the sidewalk and through a grassy patch, and I made it to the hospital. The victims, Sehadeta Plivac and Hajra Hafizović, were taken off the bus and remained at the hospital where they received medical assistance."⁶²

An influx of humanitarian aid arrived **on 27 May 1994**, which led to a rapid drop in food prices and the opening of new stores.

On 13 June 1994, Fatima Salčin and her cousin Džemal Maljanović were returning from Dobrinja on foot to Alipašino Polje when a bullet penetrated through the palm of Salčin's right hand. The Trial Chamber in the Galić case concluded that Salčin and Maljanović were civilians and did not pose any military threat. Furthermore, and the majority of the Chamber members concluded that they were deliberately targeted from an area controlled by the SRK.⁶³

At the end of June 1994, humanitarian aid was again cut-off and sniper activity intensified. A tram moving along Zmaja od Bosna Street, the city's central thoroughfare, was hit **on 19 June 1994**, resulting in a large number of casualties.



⁶² United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić", December 2003, <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj031205e.pdf>, p. 145/6.

⁶³ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić", December 2003, <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj031205e.pdf>, p. 119.

Witness M, who was six months pregnant at the time, was on the tram along with her four-year-old son. When the tram approached the intersection of Vojvode Putnika Street and Trščanska Street, Witness M heard a shot and saw that her son, who was sitting by the window, was injured. A man standing next to the tram door and a girl were also injured. Mensur Jusić, who was also in the tram, recalls seeing a woman with a little boy who was covered in blood. He then realized that he himself had been shot in the right leg and noticed that another woman standing to his right was bleeding from her hand. The Galić judgement states, "The two witnesses testified that the tram continued, missing two stops, until it reached a safe place at Pofalići. No further shots were fired. The injured received medical assistance at a nearby emergency clinic."⁶⁴

On 26 June 1994, Sanela Muratović, then 16 years old, was wounded by a bullet while walking in the western part of Sarajevo with 17-year-old Medina Omerović. The two girls were walking to Omerović's apartment at 7 Đure Jakšića Street, on the east side of Lukavička cesta, in the Vojničko Polje settlement of Novi Grad municipality. As they started across the street, uniformed soldiers warned them of incoming sniper fire, so they decided to run. Muratović was shot in her right shoulder from the front.

The Trial Chamber found that the bullet which hit the victim originated from the area near the Institute for the Blind, which was controlled by the SRK.⁶⁵

July and August 1994

Sniper fire was particularly intense **during July and August 1994**, both on trams and in surrounding neighborhoods.

Seid Solak, then 13 years old, was struck by a bullet **on 22 July 1994** in the neighborhood of Čengić Vila.

Witness AG, a 13-year-old boy, and Witness AH, his sister, testified that **on the afternoon of 22 July 1994** they had ventured out with their mother to visit a relative and had stopped to look in the window of shoe store on Miljenka Cvikovića Street in Čengić Villa. Witness AG got off his bicycle and was standing a short distance away when he was shot in the lower abdomen. The bullet tore through the boy's body and shattered the shop window. A group of people came to the family's aid from a nearby restaurant. Witness AG was taken to the emergency room and remained hospitalized for several days.

⁶⁴ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić", December 2003, <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj031205e.pdf>, p. 94/5.

⁶⁵ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić", December 2003, <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj031205e.pdf>, p. 123.



photo by Bernisa Bibuljica



The Trial Chamber in the Galić case finds that the witness AG, a civilian, was wounded by a shot that was deliberately fired at him from the territory of Hrasno Brdo controlled by the SRK.⁶⁶

On the orders of Radovan Karadžić, Bosnian Serb forces closed the Sarajevo airport to convoys delivering humanitarian aid and halted airdrops of humanitarian aid **on 26 July 1994**, citing the smuggling of weapons into the city as the primary reason.⁶⁷

In August 1994, the situation in Sarajevo began to deteriorate as incidents of sniping increased. Following Bosnian Serb soldiers' confiscation of several pieces of heavy artillery from the weapons collection point in Ilidža, NATO responded with airstrikes targeting SRK anti-tank guns. Under the threat of continued strikes, the Bosnian Serbs returned the stolen weapons.

In August 1994, Dragomir Milošević was Stanislav Galić's Chief of Staff from March 1993 until **August 1994**, when he was appointed as the commander of the SRK around Sarajevo. He made decisions on matters such as ammunition supplies, mortar placement, and sniper training, and regularly visited units on the frontline. Judicial judgements confirmed that modified aerial bombs began to be dropped on Sarajevo on the direct orders of Milošević. These bombs had a devastating effect on the city, wounding, killing, and traumatizing its civilian population. The evidence shows that Milošević also ordered the use and positioning of missile launchers.



⁶⁶ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić", December 2003, <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj031205e.pdf>, p. 110.

⁶⁷ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 154.

During his first few days as SRK commander in mid-August 1994, Dragomir Milošević issued an order to bring SRK units to full combat readiness. He ordered the 4th Mixed Artillery Regiment to draw up a fire plan for the areas of Baščaršija and Vrbanja. Evidence presented in the judgement against him reads, “Fire is to be open in compliance with the order of the SRK commander.”⁶⁸

Due to increased sniper fire, the city trams were forced to stop operating **on 12 August 1994**. Two days later, an agreement on the cessation of sniper activity was signed, and with it, both sides agreed to issue an order within the next 24 hours to explicitly prohibit opening fire on military personnel, civilians, and UN personnel. Milošević issued such an order on 18 August 1994, instructing all units to immediately cease the use of sniper fire and other weapons.

According to the Karadžić judgement, “After that agreement was signed, the overall situation improved, as the incidents of sniping stopped almost immediately and their number was reduced from about 100 incidents per week to about 10 per week. This lasted for about a month, and then the number of incidents began to gradually increase again.”⁶⁹

The civilian population began to grow vegetables in parks and private gardens which they then sold in stores at moderate prices. However, there was no progress on the opening of the so-called “blue routes” to the airport, so supplies were mostly transported through the tunnel in Butmir.⁷⁰

September, October, and November 1994

Karadžić agreed to consider the possibility of opening the “blue routes” **on 8 September 1994**, first for civilian traffic, then for humanitarian traffic, and finally for commercial traffic.

By mid-September, Sarajevo had adequate food supplies to meet the needs of its population. However, the judgement states that ARBiH units were attacking Serbs on the Pale – Ilidža road. While SRK units easily repelled the attacks, this resulted in the resumption of the blockade prohibiting convoys from reaching Sarajevo.

Fierce fighting broke out **on 18 September 1994**. The SRK reported that **on 21 September 1994**, the ARBiH began firing on SRK positions with infantry weapons, sniper rifles, and

⁶⁸ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević”, December 2007, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragomir_milosevic/tjug/en/071212.pdf, p. 283.

⁶⁹ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1371.

⁷⁰ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1386.

mortars. The SRK returned fire on the city, and the next day, a civilian and a UN soldier were shot, prompting requests for airstrikes on an SRK tanks. However, the SRK retaliated with an attack on a UNPROFOR tank in which the driver was injured.

At a meeting with UN representatives the following day, Mladić asked for an apology. He told General David Fraser, UNPROFOR Assistant Commander in Sarajevo from April 1994 to May 1995, that without an apology, not a single convoy would pass through Bosnian Serb-held territory. This became the reality on the ground, with all VRS checkpoints closed-off to large vehicles.⁷¹

On 25 September 1994, Mladić informed UNPROFOR through a liaison officer that the safety of planes landing at the Sarajevo airport could not be guaranteed, as a result of which flights to Sarajevo were suspended..

On 6 October 1994, ARBiH carried out an operation on Mt. Igman, passing through the demilitarized zone, during which several SRK soldiers and four nurses there were killed. The SRK retaliated with shelling and sniping. **Two days later**, a tram was hit on Zmaj od Bosna Street, resulting in three casualties.

⁷¹ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1373.



On 8 October 1994, Alma Ćutuna and her husband boarded the tram as the Socijalno stop and rode eastward on Zmaja od Bosne Street, towards the city center. Ćutuna stood facing the middle doors, looking towards Grbavica. A bullet struck her right thigh, severing an artery, and a shard of glass injured the left side of her head. After being declared dead upon arrival at the State Hospital, she was revived, underwent surgery, and recovered. The Milošević judgement states:

“The Trial Chamber is satisfied that the tram was shot at the S-curve on Zmaja od Bosne with machinegun fire and that Alma Ćutuna, a civilian, was hit and seriously injured in her right upper leg. There is no evidence that the shots originated from ABiH-held territory. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that the shots came from the direction of the Metalka Building, which was held by the SRK.”⁷²

On his 14th birthday, Adnan Kasapović was walking with two friends towards the so-called “Vemeks” department store in Vojničko Polje. As he was about to step towards a wall next to the department store, Kasapović was shot. The bullet entered his right shoulder from the front, passed to the left of his lung, and exited through the back of his left shoulder. He died on the way to the hospital.

“On the basis of the evidence of eyewitnesses W-62 and Ermin Krečo, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that on 24 October 1994, Adnan Kasapović, a 14-year-old boy and a civilian, was shot and killed when walking by a passageway in Vojničko Polje. There is no evidence suggesting that the shot originated from ABiH-held territory. The evidence from eyewitnesses and the Prosecution expert Lt. Van der Weijden shows that the shots came from the School of the Blind, a known sniper location of the SRK.”⁷³

On 27 October, Milošević issued a warning to SRK units, stating that the “enemy does not respect any rules or principles of humanity,” and that although the SRK tried to “obey all Geneva conventions until now [...] if the enemy continues in the same way, they will force us that as of today we respond on [sic] every bullet fired [...] by firing at the selected target under the Muslim control in Sarajevo.”⁷⁴ He also informed UNPROFOR that the SRK was introducing new restrictions on the movement of convoys, including the inspection of all convoys crossing the frontline.



⁷² United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević”, December 2007, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragomir_milosevic/tjug/en/071212.pdf, p. 95.

⁷³ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević”, December 2007, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragomir_milosevic/tjug/en/071212.pdf, p. 131/2.

⁷⁴ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1357.

Three shells fell on Livanjska Street in Centar Municipality, **on 8 November 1994**, between 3:15 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. Ismet Alić, who was a boy at the time and was preparing to play football, was injured in the cheek by shrapnel. Two of his friends, Adis Tinjak and Amer Čehajić, were injured in the stomach. Another boy, Dino Blekić, suffered fatal injuries and died in the hospital. Two women, Nena Deljanin and Lejla Hodžić, were also injured and died. A man named Muharem Alađuz sustained minor injuries from shrapnel while he was arranging transportation to the hospital for Razija Šteta, a woman he found injured in the street and who succumbed to her injuries.

“The Trial Chamber finds that at least four civilians were killed and six civilians were seriously injured as a result of the three shells that impacted on Livanjska Street **on 8 November 1994**,” the judgement against Milošević states.⁷⁵

Dženana Sokolović and her seven-year-old son Nermin Divović were shot at a crosswalk on Franje Račkog Street **on 18 November 1994**, while the ceasefire was in force and trams were running. Dženana underwent surgery at the Koševo hospital, however, her son Nermin died en route.⁷⁶

On the morning of 21 November 1994, Hajrudin Hamidić was driving a tram of mostly women, children, and elderly. When the tram reached the intersection between the National Museum and the Holiday Inn around 11:00 a.m., a missile fell, creating a huge explosion. The Milošević judgement states:

“W-54 saw that the windscreen was shattered, the front section of the tram was damaged, all the windows were broken and there was shrapnel inside the tram. Blood was trickling down the face of Hajrudin Hamidić. His glasses had been shattered and he was bleeding profusely.”⁷⁷

⁷⁵ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević”, December 2007, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragomir_milosevic/tjug/en/071212.pdf, p. 156.

⁷⁶ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1443.

⁷⁷ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević”, December 2007, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragomir_milosevic/tjug/en/071212.pdf, p. 91.



photo by Alem Bajramović

When the tram passed the Marshal Tito Barracks, snipers started shooting at the left side of the tram. One woman was wounded.

“The Trial Chamber finds that the tram was hit by a M80 hand-held rocket and that Hajrudin Hamidić, a civilian and the driver of the tram, was seriously injured as a result of this explosion. The Trial Chamber is also satisfied that the tram was fired at with sniper fire immediately after being targeted by the rocket projectile. There is no evidence to suggest that these shots originated from ABiH-held territory. There is no evidence to suggest that the fire was opened from the territory under the control of the ABiH. The sniper fire and the rocket projectile originated from the high-rise buildings at Grbavica which were held by the SRK.”⁷⁸

The situation in Sarajevo continued to deteriorate. There was a “total halt” in the movement of convoys and humanitarian supplies were in short supply, as the arrival of humanitarian flights depended on the good will of the Bosnian Serbs. The population of Sarajevo was being “strangled” by the Bosnian Serbs who wanted to apply as much pressure on the city as possible before the winter set in.⁷⁹

⁷⁸ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević”, December 2007, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragomir_milosevic/tjug/en/071212.pdf, p. 92.

⁷⁹ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1376.

On 22 November 1994, 13-year-old Sanela Dedović was walking towards the school on Saburina Street. As she ran across the intersection to reach Rogina Street, her back was turned to Špicasta Stijena. A bullet ricocheted off the asphalt and exploded, and she was hit in the left ankle by shrapnel. The judgement against Milošević states:

“The Trial Chamber finds that Sanela Dedović, a civilian, was shot and seriously wounded in the ankle by a fragment of a bullet fired from a sniper weapon. There is no evidence indicating that the shot came from ABiH-held territory. The shot originated from the ridge Špicasta Stijena, which was controlled by the SRK.”⁸⁰

On 23 November 1994, the SRK opened fire on a tram moving along Zmaja od Bosne Street, wounding two women, Hafiza Karačić and Sabina Šabanić.

“On the basis of the evidence of eyewitnesses, including Hafiza Karačić and Sabina Šabanić, and the BiH police report, the Trial Chamber finds that the tram was shot at the intersection in front of the Holiday Inn, or shortly thereafter in front of the Marshal Tito Barracks between the two museums. The origin of fire was either the high-rise buildings on Lenjinova Street or the Metalka Building. The Trial Chamber recalls that both locations were held by the SRK.”⁸¹

December 1994

In early December 1994, the SRK shelled the center of Sarajevo with guided missiles. **On 10 December**, Derviša Selmanović was wounded in the knee while carrying wood between her house and the garage in Sedrenik.

“Based on the testimony of Derviša Selmanović, Nedžib Đoza and the On the basis of the evidence of Derviša Selmanović and Nedžib Đozo, the experts and documentary evidence, the Trial Chamber finds that Derviša Selmanović was shot with a machinegun and seriously wounded in her leg when she was in the backyard of a house in Sedrenik, and that the shots came from the SRK-controlled ridge Špicasta Stijena.”⁸²

On 22 December 1994, at approximately 9:10 a.m., two grenades were fired at the flea market in Baščaršija, wounding and killing several people.

The Agreement on the Freedom of Movement of UNPROFOR and UNHCR for the delivery

⁸⁰ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević”, December 2007, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragomir_milosevic/tjug/en/071212.pdf, p. 118.

⁸¹ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević”, December 2007, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragomir_milosevic/tjug/en/071212.pdf, p. 97.

⁸² United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević”, December 2007, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragomir_milosevic/tjug/en/071212.pdf, p. 121.

of humanitarian aid was signed **on 31 December 1994**, which led to the opening of the so-called “blue routes,” including roads to the airport.

January, February, and March 1995

The situation in Sarajevo improved **in January and February 1995**. These months were relatively calm and saw a significant improvement in the humanitarian situation. More than 5,000 citizens used the roads to the airport every day during this period.⁸³

At the end of February 1995 sniper attacks in the city once again increased. Combatants opened fire on a tram moving along Zmaja od Bosna Street, wounding several, including Alma Mulaosmanović and Alija Holjan. The judgement against Dragomir Milošević reads:

“The Trial Chamber is, therefore, satisfied that at least three persons were seriously injured on the tram **on 27 February 1995** by shots originating from SRK-held territory. In light of the fact that there is nothing in the evidence suggesting that the shot could have been fired by anyone other than a member of the SRK, the Trial Chamber concludes that the shots were fired by a member of the SRK.”⁸⁴

⁸³ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1369.

⁸⁴ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević”, December 2007, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragomir_milosevic/tjug/en/071212.pdf, p. 109.



Constant shelling and sniper fire continued throughout **March 1995**. **On 3 March**, another tram was fired upon on Zmaja od Bosne Street. On this occasion, 46-year old Azem Agović and 33-year-old Alen Gičević were injured.

On the same day, in the Sedrenik area, a 14-year-old boy, Tarik Žunić, was shot on his way home from school.

“The Trial Chamber is satisfied that Tarik Žunić, a civilian, was shot and seriously wounded by a machine gun from SRK-held positions at Špicasta Stijena when he was walking on Sedrenik Street and appeared from behind a sheet of canvas.”⁸⁵

On 5 March, Ratko Mladić told the UNPROFOR Commander Rupert Smith that the SRK had stepped up operations around Sarajevo because of Serbian casualties during ARBiH military offensives. Smith understood this as an explicit admission that SRK units were using sniping as a punitive measure rather than for achieving military objectives.⁸⁶

On 8 March 1995, Karadžić signed Directive No. 7, by which he ordered the SRK to prevent the blockade from being lifted from the outside in the absence of a defense. As a result, conditions in Sarajevo worsened with an alarming increase in military activity, including the sniping of civilians, which led to the suspension of tram services. At that time, ABiH snipers in Grbavica killed two girls. As a result, Karadžić closed the so-called ‘blue routes, and the shelling of Sarajevo became even more intense.⁸⁷

The heaviest shelling of Sarajevo occurred **on 12 March 1995**, when the number of victims reached its peak since August 1994.

UNPROFOR Commander in BiH General Rupert Smith said that most of the shelling and sniping in that period was intended to terrorize the general population. After a meeting with Koljević, Smith said that Koljević had openly admitted to him that the Bosnian Serbs’ intention was to bring about the end of the war through military means. Since they lacked manpower, Smith believed they would be relying on heavy fire-power to achieve their objectives.⁸⁸

85 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević”, December 2007, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragomir_milosevic/tjug/en/071212.pdf, p. 131.

86 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1378.

87 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić: VOLUME III of IV”, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 2049.

88 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić: VOLUME III of IV”, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1380.

On 29 March, UNPROFOR reported that the Bosnian Serbs had intensified fire on UN planes at the Sarajevo airport and that flights were suspended from 17 to 24 March as a result.⁸⁹

April and May 1995

April 1995 was particularly difficult for Sarajevans, who continued to be exposed to sniper and mortar attacks. Gas, water, and electricity were scarce. According to the judgements, there were an average of around 1,000 shots fired on the city per day.

Karadžić informed Smith **on 5 April 1995** that they had decided to launch a counterattack and that they would be using weapons that they had not used previously.⁹⁰

On 6 April 1995, Dragomir Milošević ordered the Ilidža Brigade to “immediately prepare a launcher with an aerial bomb and transport the bomb for launching (..) The most profitable target must be selected in Hrasnica or Sokolović Kolonija, where the greatest casualties and material damage would be inflicted.” The next day, a modified aerial bomb hit Hrasnica, killing Ziba Ćustović, wounding three civilians, and causing massive destruction in the civilian quarter where it exploded.⁹¹

On 8 April 1995, the Bosnian Serbs suspended humanitarian flights in violation of the Airport Agreement, claiming that the UN was smuggling weapons to the ABiH. Subsequent attempts to negotiate the reopening of the airport were unsuccessful.⁹²

In mid-April 1995, two members of UNPROFOR were killed by snipers. International negotiations ensued, but the delivery of humanitarian aid by air was halted until the end of the war. The roads to the airport also remained closed, leading to the rapid deterioration of the humanitarian situation **in May 1995**.

On 3 May 1995, 27 year old Šemsa Čovrk was walking towards the main entrance of number 4 Josipa Kraša Street in Dobrinja, holding the hand of her five-year-old son. She was hit in the right side of the abdomen and fell to the ground. They took her to a house across the street from the building, approximately five or six meters away. Not long afterwards, she was transferred to the hospital in Dobrinja for surgery.

89 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić: VOLUME III of IV”, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 150/1.

90 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić: VOLUME III of IV”, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 2004.

91 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Summary of the Judgment of the Trial Chamber in the case against Dragomir Milošević”, December 2007, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragomir_milosevic/tjug/en/071212_Milosevic_Dragan_summary_en.pdf, p. 3.

92 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić: VOLUME III of IV”, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1370/1.

The Milošević judgement concluded that “Šemsa Čovrk, a civilian, was shot and seriously wounded while she was walking on Josipa Kraša Street in Dobrinja C5.”⁹³ Nevertheless, the Trial Chamber was not convinced that the victim was hit from a position in the territory controlled by the SRK.

In response to Serbian mortar attacks on civilian parts of Sarajevo **on 7 and 8 May 1995**, Smith requested that NATO launch airstrikes on Serbian positions, but his request was denied. **On 9 May 1995**, Smith informed Karadžić of the reasons for the airstrike request. Karadžić did not deny targeting civilian sectors of the city.

On 12 May 1995, the ARBiH launched an offensive from the city which was repelled by SRK units.

On 14 May 1995, at around 11:45 p.m., Jasmina Tabaković, a lawyer, was in the bedroom of her apartment, which overlooked Bosnian Serb positions in Dobrinja. She was shot in the chest and died. The bullet pierced the plastic film covering her window, passed through her body, and finally lodged in the wall behind her wardrobe. The judgement against Milošević states:

“The Trial Chamber is satisfied that Jasmina Tabaković, a civilian, was killed by a shot while she was in her bedroom in Dobrinja. The shots came from SRK-held territory in Dobrinja I.”⁹⁴

On 16 May 1995, the SRK shelled the Koševo hospital and its surroundings.⁹⁵

Both sides took heavy weapons from the weapons collection points, which SRK units used to continue their shelling of civilian parts of Sarajevo. **On 24 May 1995**, General Smith issued an ultimatum stating that the SRK either cease their attacks upon the city with heavy weapons or face airstrikes. On the same day, two modified aerial bombs exploded on Safeta Zajka Street and Majdanska Street, killing and wounding several people.⁹⁶ The Milošević judgement states:

“The Trial Chamber accepts the conclusions of the KDZ, including those of W-137, and of Berko Zečević, and finds that a FAB-250 air bomb with fuel-air explosive, propelled by at least three rockets, hit Safeta Zajke Street **on the morning of 24 May 1995**. The Trial Chamber

93 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević”, December 2007, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragomir_milosevic/tjug/en/071212.pdf, p. 138.

94 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević”, December 2007, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragomir_milosevic/tjug/en/071212.pdf, p. 85.

95 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević”, December 2007, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragomir_milosevic/tjug/en/071212.pdf, p. 142.

96 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1382.

is, therefore, satisfied that the modified air bomb was fired from the SRK-controlled area of Lukavica.”⁹⁷

The judgement continues: “Evidence shows that a bomb exploded on Majdanska Street in the afternoon of 24 May 1995. Enes Jašarević testified to hearing the sound of an aeroplane before a projectile impacted inside the transformer station and exploded. The BiH investigation file records that the BiH police found parts of a rocket, shrapnel and parts of an aerial bomb. Similarly, as evidence shows, the KDZ investigation concluded that the projectile was probably a FAB-250 modified air bomb. The Trial Chamber is satisfied that the projectile that exploded on Majdanska Street a FAB-250 modified air bomb.”⁹⁸

The SRK forces failed to hand over their heavy artillery as Smith had demanded, and NATO launched airstrikes targeting their positions **on 25 May 1995**. The Bosnian Serbs responded with continued shelling of Sarajevo and the arrest of a number of UN members throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. They also increased their land blockade of the city, severely restricted the movement of UNPROFOR.

Also **on 25 May 1995**, the VRS Main Staff reported that the ARBiH opened sniper fire in the area of the Vrbanja Bridge and Zlatište and ordered the SRK units to respect the ceasefire. On the same day, two women were wounded when a bus was fired upon in Dobrinja. A day later, another air bomb exploded on Safeta Hadžića Street, injuring several people.⁹⁹

97 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević”, December 2007, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragomir_milosevic/tjug/en/071212.pdf, p. 169.

98 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević”, December 2007, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragomir_milosevic/tjug/en/071212.pdf, p. 173.

99 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1367.



On 26 May 1995, Dragomir Milošević issued an order to SRK units to establish a “full blockade” of UNPROFOR and to disregard UN requests for food and water.¹⁰⁰

That same day, a modified air bomb fell on Safeta Hadžića Street in Novi Grad Municipality. Based on the investigation report and the conclusions of Berko Zečević, the Trial Chamber in the case against Milošević concluded that at least 14 people were lightly wounded and two people were seriously wounded in the shelling, all of whom were civilians.¹⁰¹

An incident which occurred **on 27 May 1995** on the Vrbanja Bridge between members of the UN and SRK soldiers further deepened the crisis. International officials in Sarajevo reported that all operations were “paralyzed” including humanitarian aid.

June, July, and August 1995

UNPROFOR established a route through Igman in order to provide some humanitarian aid to Sarajevo. Until the end of the war, that road was the only viable route for delivering humanitarian aid to Sarajevo. However, the road was also used by the ARBiH forces, which is why SRK units opened fire on vehicles that were moving at night.¹⁰²

On 6 June 1995, the UNHCR reported that a third of Sarajevo’s civilian population, about 100,000 people, was completely dependent on aid and the food supply at the Sarajevo airport would be completely depleted by the following day.

Two days later, representatives of UNPROFOR and UNHCR met with Karadžić and Koljević and managed to reach an agreement on the delivery of humanitarian aid to Sarajevo by land through the Sierra checkpoint.¹⁰³

The month of June 1995 was marked by fighting for other areas, failed negotiations in Geneva, the suspension of humanitarian convoys, and the interruption of gas and electricity supplies. **In mid-June 1995**, the ARBiH began a series of large-scale attacks in an effort to break out of Sarajevo. After some initial success, the attacks were repulsed, resulting in many casualties and the overall worsening of the situation in the city. A number of civilians were killed by the SRK while they were waiting in line for water and in markets. Modified air bombs were also fired.

On 16 June 1995, three modified bombs exploded in different parts of Sarajevo, injuring

100 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1383.

101 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević”, December 2007, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragomir_milosevic/tjug/en/071212.pdf, p. 174.

102 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1386.

103 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1384.

several people.¹⁰⁴ One exploded on Čobanija Street in the evening. Based on witness statements, reports from the Bosnian Police and KDZ, and the medical documentation that was presented during the Milošević case, the Trial Chamber concluded that three civilians were wounded in the explosion, two of which were seriously injured.¹⁰⁵

The second modified aerial bomb fell on Međunarodnog Prijateljstva Square in Alipašino Polje, wounding seven people.

The third modified aerial bomb hit the University Medical Center’s Department of Radiology and Oncology. The Milošević judgement states: “On the basis of the police reports and photographs, the Trial Chamber finds that three or four civilians were injured as a result of the explosion, and that some surrounding buildings were destroyed.”¹⁰⁶

On 17 June 1995, Karadžić declared “a state of war in the zone of responsibility of the SRK.” Its aim was to “enable the full engagement of human and material potential” in defense of the RS and to “take all necessary measures to achieve the defined aims” of defeating the enemy.¹⁰⁷

On 18 June 1995, a mortar shell exploded on the wall next to the water pump at the Simon Bolivar School in Dobrinja. Seven people were killed and around dozen wounded, at least four of which were injured seriously.

The judgement against Milošević reads: “On the basis of the evidence in its totality, the Trial Chamber is unable to conclude that this mortar shell was fired from the territory under the control of the SRK.”¹⁰⁸

On 28 June 1995, a television network building was shelled. An aerial bomb was also dropped on what are today the BosniaRadio building and TV Building. Ibrahim Šalaka was killed in the attack, while around 30 others sustained minor to severe injuries. The Milošević judgement states:

“The Trial Chamber is satisfied that the modified air bomb that hit the TV Building on 28 June 1995 was fired from the area around Ilidža, which, the evidence shows, was SRK-held territory and that it was launched by members of the SRK.”¹⁰⁹

104 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1384.

105 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević”, December 2007, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragomir_milosevic/tjug/en/071212.pdf, p. 189.

106 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević”, December 2007, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragomir_milosevic/tjug/en/071212.pdf, p. 179.

107 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1384.

108 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević”, December 2007, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragomir_milosevic/tjug/en/071212.pdf, p. 192.


109 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević”, December 2007, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragomir_milosevic/tjug/en/071212.pdf, p. 206.

In a report on the situation on the battlefield, Milošević wrote: “The Serbian soldiers are displaying unprecedented heroism, not letting the enemy get closer to their homes and families. The VRS Main Staff commander, Gen. Ratko Mladić, commended the heroism of units in the north-western part of the front, and numerous congratulations also arrived from unit commands and civilian government institutions. Our artillery forces are responding with precision to the Muslim artillery attacks. In one such response on 28 June they hit the BH Radio and Television Centre, the centre of media lies against the just struggle of the Serbian people.”¹¹⁰

The situation in the BiH capital became increasingly desperate and morale was very low. SRK units began to apply a new strategy, tightening the ring around Sarajevo whenever the ARBiH captured a hill outside of the city.¹¹¹

¹¹⁰ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević”, December 2007, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragomir_milosevic/tjug/en/071212.pdf, p. 277/8.

¹¹¹ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV”,



In late June and early July, fierce fighting took place in Sarajevo with SRK units indiscriminately shelling and sniping downtown areas, causing numerous civilian casualties. **On 24 June 1995**, UNPROFOR reported that food convoys had reached Sarajevo for the first time in over four weeks, but they only had enough supplies to meet the needs of 20% of the civilian population.¹¹²

On 28 June 1995, a modified air bomb hit a residential building at 5 Geteova Street. Three people were killed and seven wounded in the explosion. According to the Milošević judgement:

“Remnants of the projectile were retrieved from one of the apartments. Those traces were sent for analysis. The traces were determined to be rocket motors and a plate, which most probably c[a]me from the propellant assembly of a modified FAB-250 aircraft bomb, calibre 325 mm. Based on the trace evidence and the “state of the site”, the azimuth was determined to have been 261 degrees, with a margin of error of 25 degrees, indicating that the projectile was fired from the direction of Ilidža, SRK-held territory.”¹¹³

In July 1995, the situation on the battlefield around Sarajevo was relatively calm because the Bosnian Serbs were focusing their attention on Srebrenica. Within the city itself, however, shelling and sniping at the same pace.

On 1 July 1995, two modified bombs fell on Bunički Potok and Alekse Šantić Streets in Hrasnica. According to the testimonies of Zejna Šljivo, W-95, and Fikreta Pačariz, as well as the reports of the BiH police, the explosion on Bunički Potok Street injured 13 civilians, two of whom were injured seriously. The Trial Chamber concluded that the modified aerial bombs were fired by the SRK from the area of Ilidža which was under their control.¹¹⁴

Due to the obstruction of the convoys, UNPROFOR and UNHCR again had to resort to using the Igman mountain pass **in early July 1995** to deliver aid, mainly flour, to Sarajevo. A unit of the SRK Ilidža Brigade regularly attacked convoys moving along that route. **On 15 July 1995**, UNPROFOR reported that civilians in Sarajevo were surviving on whatever food they had stockpiled, what they were able grow in vegetable gardens, and whatever goods managed to reach Sarajevo through the tunnel.¹¹⁵

March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1385.

112 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1385.

113 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević”, December 2007, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragomir_milosevic/tjug/en/071212.pdf, p. 148.

114 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević”, December 2007, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragomir_milosevic/tjug/en/071212.pdf, p. 211/2.

115 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1386.

During a meeting with General Rupert Smith **in July 1995**, Mladić agreed to allow UNPROFOR and UNHCR to bring convoys into Sarajevo along a route from Kiseljak. Later that month however, Mladić informed Smith that Bosnian Muslims had attacked convoys coming from the direction of Kiseljak **on 29 July**, making the road unusable and the leaving the Igman mountain pass as the only alternative. Mladić also characterized the ARBiH’s use of the mountain pass as “illegal” and something which the Bosnian Serbs would “never accept.”¹¹⁶

A modified aerial bomb exploded **on 23 July 1995** on Bjelašnička Street in Sokolović Kolonija, killing two civilians and wounding 11 more, some of them seriously. The Milošević judgement states:

“The Trial Chamber also recalls its earlier finding that the ABiH did not have or use modified air bombs; only the SRK possessed and used them.”¹¹⁷

During a meeting with Mladić **on 31 July 1995**, General Smith emphasized the necessity of opening the Sarajevo airport for the delivery of humanitarian aid. Mladić replied that the airport could not be opened until ABiH forces withdraw from Mt. Igman, adding that the procedure for checking convoys would be simplified given the growing mutual trust between UNPROFOR and the VRS.

On 8 August 1995, the VRS Main Staff issued an urgent order instructing units to preserve as much ammunition of all calibers as possible.¹¹⁸

Ten days later, **on 18 August**, Milošević ordered all SRK units to use “all means to prevent a new offensive to lift the blockade of Sarajevo.”

The shellings of the BITAS building **on 22 August 22** and the Markale market **on 28 August** were not carried out on Milošević’s orders, as he was hospitalized in Belgrade at the time. The court judgments established that the orders were issued by Chief of Staff Čedomir Sladoje, who was in charge of the SRK command during the commander’s absence. In the summary of the Appeals Chamber’s judgement against Milošević, it states:

“The Appeals Chamber quashes the Trial Chamber’s findings in this regard and acquits Milošević of the crimes related to the shelling of the BITAS building on 22 August 1995 and that of the Markale Market **on 28 August 1995**.”¹¹⁹

116 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1386.

117 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević”, December 2007, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragomir_milosevic/tjug/en/071212.pdf, p. 216.

118 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1387.

119 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević”, December

On 22 August 1995, a modified aerial bomb was dropped on the BITAS building at 64 Zmaja od Bosne Street. One civilian was killed in the explosion and another sustained minor injuries. The Milošević judgement states: "The Trial Chamber also recalls its earlier finding that the ABiH did not have or use modified air bombs; only the SRK possessed and used them."¹²⁰

2007, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragomir_milosevic/acjug/en/091112_summary_en.pdf, p. 6/7.

120 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević", December 2007, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragomir_milosevic/tjug/en/071212.pdf, p. 220.

photo by Alem Bajramović



The second massacre at the Markale market occurred on 28 August 1995, when a mortar shell was fired at the market from an SRK position, killing at least 43 civilians and wounding an additional 88. In response to the attack, NATO launched a series of targeted airstrikes. According to the judgement against Mladić:

"On 28 August 1995, at 11:10 a.m., there was an explosion just outside the Markale Market which was full of people. At least 35 people died and at least 88 people were wounded, many of them seriously. The great majority of wounded were civilians. Only one of the deceased was a soldier of the ABiH. The grenade was fired by SRK members. There were no military facilities near the market."¹²¹

On the same day, four more shells fell 200-300 meters south of the Markale market, near the business center of the UPI (Agricultural Processing Complex) and the building of the Bosniak Cultural Center (BKC). The Mladić judgement states:

"The direction of fire of these rounds was approximately 220 to 240 degrees. Six to seven people were injured. Considering that these rounds impacted very close to the round impacting at the Markale Market and all five rounds exploded between 11 and 11:30 a.m., the Trial Chamber finds that the four rounds, just like the one that hit the market, were fired by members of the SRK."¹²²

A UNPROFOR report states that on 28 August 1995, there was ongoing military operation in several places in and around Sarajevo which included a total of 1,746 shootings as well as a large number of explosions.¹²³

September and October 1995

On 2 September 1995, Harland and Smith decided to open the airport. When they informed Krajišnik of this decision, he threatened to open fire on any vehicle that passed through the airport without the permission of the Bosnian Serbs. UNPROFOR ignored the threat, which was never acted upon. For the first time since 1992, vehicles began to travel in and out of Sarajevo.

After Karadžić agreed to a framework for a cease-fire agreement during negotiations with Richard Holbrooke, the former undersecretary of the US Secretary of State who played

121 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić: VOLUME II of V", November 2017, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/mladic/tjug/en/171122-2of5_1.pdf, p. 1101.

122 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić: VOLUME II of V", November 2017, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/mladic/tjug/en/171122-2of5_1.pdf, p. 1114.

123 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević", December 2007, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragomir_milosevic/tjug/en/071212.pdf, p. 230.

a leading role in US foreign policy towards the Balkans and the drafting of the Dayton Peace Agreement. The terms of the agreement stipulated that the NATO would suspend its airstrikes after both the ARBiH and VRS terminated all military operations in Sarajevo. After these steps were implemented, the framework agreement would be followed by an agreement on the cessation of hostilities to be signed first in Sarajevo, and then in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

General Smith informed Dragomir Milošević that as part of the ceasefire, UNPROFOR needed complete and unhindered freedom of movement, which entailed the removal of Bosnian Serb checkpoints on the roads leading to Sarajevo. Sarajevo trams started running **on 25 September 1995**.

At meetings **on 6 and 8 October**, Krajišnik, Milošević, and Inđić, the SRK's liaison officer for UNPROFOR, among others, proposed the opening of several routes into Sarajevo for the delivery of humanitarian aid. The situation subsequently improved, and a cease-fire was agreed upon on **12 October**. Fighting subsided two days later.¹²⁴

124 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1388.

For crimes committed in the Sarajevo municipalities of **Novo Sarajevo, Novi Grad, Ilidža, Vogošća, Ilijaš, Pale, and Hadžići**, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) convicted high-ranking members of the Serb high political and military leadership, while BiH courts sentenced **29** people, mainly members of Serb military and paramilitary formations, to a total of **232 years and six months in prison**.

After Serb forces occupied these Sarajevo municipalities, they committed **crimes against humanity, war crimes against civilians, and war crimes against prisoners of war**.

These crimes were judicially determined to have been committed as part of a joint criminal enterprise with the **aim of implementing a policy of persecuting Bosniaks and Croats** in Vogošća, Ilijaš, Centar, and other municipalities in the City of Sarajevo.

The verdicts found that in Vogošća and Ilidža, Serb forces took a number of detainees from their places of detention and forced them to work on the front lines, where they were used as human shields or killed outright.

According to the court verdicts, women and girls were **raped** in their own homes, other houses and apartments, the **Šoping** facility and the former **Digitron Buje** facility in Grbavica, near the Coca-Cola factory, and at the Krivoglavci (Vogošća) bus station.

In addition to **Veselin Vlahović**, the following individuals were convicted of raping women and girls in Kovačići, Grbavica, and Vraca: **Saša Baričanin, Zoran Dragičević, Predrag Mišković, Zoran Knežević, Milorad Rodić, Duško Dabetić, Predrag Đurović, Nemanja Jovičić, Ratko Gašović, Slavko Savić i Dragan Damjanović** were convicted of rapes in Hadžići and Vogošća.

According to court rulings, in Vogošća, power was first taken over from the Crisis Staff of the Serbian Municipality of Vogošća. This entailed **occupying the Municipal Building and Public Security Service (SJB) and dismissing all non-Serb staff members**, before carrying out armed attacks on Muslim civilians in the village of Svrače.

SARAJEVO MUNICIPALITIES UNDER SERBIAN CONTROL

During the first months of 1991 the SDS began to organize Serb-majority municipalities in BiH into communities of municipalities, in some cases severing ties with pre-existing communities of municipalities. SDS party leaders justified the associations of municipalities in terms of economic necessity.¹²⁵

On 11 December 1991, the Bosnian Serb Assembly adopted a recommendation that SDS deputies in BiH municipal assemblies where the SDS did not have a majority establish “municipal assemblies of the Serbian people”. The recommendation was directed to groups of SDS deputies in municipal assemblies in BiH “on whom decisions contrary to the interests of the Serbian people are imposed.”¹²⁶

The Main Board of the SDS issued instructions dated **19 December 1991** regarding Serb-dominated municipalities, designated Variant A, and Serb-minority municipalities, designated Variant B.¹²⁷

The first phase of the Variant A/B Instructions called for convening and proclaiming an assembly of the Serbian people in both variants and preparing to establish municipal state or government organs. According to the instructions, the tasks laid out were to be implemented throughout the entire territory of the SRBiH or in every municipality where the Serbian people live – in their entirety in Variant A municipalities, and partially in Variant B municipalities. The instructions addressed the formation of Crisis Staffs in Variant A and B municipalities as part of the first phase. In the second phase in both Variant A and B municipalities, the Instructions called for, among other things, convening a session of the Serb municipal assembly, establishing a municipal executive board and municipal state or government organs, mobilizing and resubordinating all Serb police forces in co-ordination with JNA command and staff, and ensuring the implementation of the order for mobilization of JNA reserve and territorial defense units.¹²⁸

On 24 March 1992, the Bosnian Serb Assembly verified the decisions of numerous municipal assemblies on the proclamation of newly established Serbian municipalities, including Vogošća, Srebrenica, Bratunac, Prijedor, Višegrad, Foča, Brčko, and Zvornik. Earlier in the

Assembly session, Karadžić stated: “Newly established municipalities must establish their organs as soon as possible, have their stamps made and start to work. The police, that is, our organs must be positioned at the border.”¹²⁹

From late 1991 onwards, municipalities had a Crisis Staff (some were re-established or re-formed around April or May 1992), a War Presidency, a War Commission, and/or a republican commissioner.

In the judgements for the area of Sarajevo, the municipalities (Hadžići, Ilidža, Novi Grad, Novo Sarajevo, Pale, Vogošća, Ilijaš, and Trnovo) are listed, which together with other ARK municipalities and municipalities in Eastern Bosnia, were determined to be under the leadership Karadžić and the Bosnian Serb leadership. Civil, military, and paramilitary authorities cooperated in seizing power and in areas throughout BiH, in order to establish Serbian control and, by force or the threat of force, permanently remove non-Serbs. The Karadžić judgement states:

The physical takeover of power in the municipalities began, according to the allegations, **at the end of March 1992**, and during and after the takeover, Serbian forces and authorities, acting under the leadership of the accused, killed and abused thousands of people and expelled hundreds of thousands of people, while others fled fearing for their life.¹³⁰

In those municipalities, a widespread and systematic campaign of violence was conducted against the Muslim and Croat civilian population which included criminal acts of murder and forced relocation. Acts of violence and crimes committed against these populations in BiH included killing, cruel and inhuman treatment such as torture and rape, creating and maintaining inhumane living conditions, illegal detention, forced labor on the front lines and using people as human shields, looting of property, reckless destruction of private and public property, as well as the introduction of restrictive and discriminatory measures. The judgement against Karadžić reads:

“While the Chamber finds differences in each of the Municipalities, it is satisfied that there was a generally similar pattern of co-ordinated violence during and after the take-over of these Municipalities and in detention facilities throughout. Indeed, in twenty municipalities in Eastern BiH, the ARK, and the Sarajevo area, and in detention facilities therein, Serb Forces committed acts of murder, persecution, and forcible displacement, which resulted in a vast number of Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat victims.”¹³¹

125 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić: VOLUME I of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 27.

126 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić: VOLUME I of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 45.

127 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić: VOLUME I of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 46;

128 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić: VOLUME I of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 46/7.

129 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić: VOLUME I of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 47.

130 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić: VOLUME I of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1162.

131 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić: VOLUME II of IV”,


In the Sarajevo municipalities occupied by Serbian forces, Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were detained in various facilities. These camps included: Planjo's House, Naka's Garage, the Bunker, Sonja's Place (KonTiki motel), Slaviša Vajner Čiča Barracks, Kula Prison, the Pale Gym, the premises of the former company Digitron Buje, the ground floor of the Šoping building, the Serbian barracks in Nedžarići, Hadžići Culture and Sports Center, the Elementary School in Hadžići, the Hadžići Municipal Assembly building, facilities in Gornja Bioča and Podlugovi, the Rajlovac barracks, and private houses.

Some detainees were transferred from one detention facility to another, regardless of the fact that they were in the territory of another municipality. Some detainees did not survive captivity, and some were also killed while performing forced labor.

Numerous rapes took place in private apartments in Grbavica, Vrace, and Kovačići, on the ground floor of the Šoping building in detention facilities in Vogošća and Hadžići where men were raped as well as women, and in other facilities in Serb-controlled municipalities.

March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 955.

(Source: ICTY)



NOVO SARAJEVO MUNICIPALITY

Novo Sarajevo, one of the ten municipalities of Sarajevo, is located in the eastern part of the city between Novi Grad and Ilidža on one side and Centar, Stari Grad, and Pale on the other. According to the 1991 census, Novo Sarajevo had a population of 95,089 people. Of these, 35.7% were Bosnian Muslims, 34.6% were Bosnian Serbs, 15.9% identified as Yugoslavs, 9.3% were Bosnian Croats, and 4.6% were others or unknown. Among other territories, the municipality included Grbavica, south of the Miljacka River; Vraca, 600 to 800 meters to the southwest of Grbavica; Pofalići in the north; and Lukavica in the southwest.¹³²

The Crisis Staff of Novo Sarajevo Municipality was established in accordance with the instructions of the Main Board of the SDS dated 19 December 1991. This was followed by general mobilization, a session of the Serbian Municipal Assembly, and the deployment of Serbian police forces.

At the beginning of March 1992, Serbs set up barricades in strategic locations. In the area of Grbavica, barricades were set up on the Vrbanja and Bratstvo Jedinstvo Bridges. People in black ski masks stood at the barricades, and vehicles without license plates carrying armed men arrived every half hour.

On 26 March 1992, SDS deputies of Novo Sarajevo, the presidents of SDS town boards, and deputies of the Sarajevo SDS passed a decision to establish the Serb Municipal Assembly of the Novo Sarajevo Municipality "as the highest representative and legislative body of the Serbian people of Novo Sarajevo municipality."¹³³

According to a report of the Command of the JNA 2nd Military District **from March 1992**, at that time, 2,800 "volunteers" who were not from the JNA or the Serb TO had been recruited in Novo Sarajevo.¹³⁴

At the beginning of April 1992, a unit was organized comprising Serbian members of the TO Novo Sarajevo headquarters. The Serb TO set up a line of defense that stretched in front of the areas with a majority Serbian population. Momir Garić, aka "Momo," was the commander of the Serb TO in Grbavica. Members of the Serb TO organized and distributed weapons among the local Serbs.

¹³² United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 887.

¹³³ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 890.

¹³⁴ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 893.

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On 4 April 1992, there were clashes between Serb and Muslim police forces in the BiH Police Academy in Vraca. After several hours of fighting, Serb forces gained control of the facility. A few hours after the clashes, in Miljevići village in Vraca, a vehicle arrived from the military barracks in Lukavica with automatic and semi-automatic weapons, which were distributed to local members of the TO and other people from the surrounding area. Weapons also arrived from Pale.¹³⁵

By mid-May 1992, Serb forces occupied Grbavica following an operation to move the confrontation line. The line was established on the bank of the Miljacka River, including near the Vrbanja and Bratstvo Jedinstvo Bridges, extending west toward Hrasno and east toward Skenderija. Serb forces took Grbavica with little fighting, and afterwards, it was no longer possible to cross the Miljacka River.¹³⁶

In a report from **5 June 1992**, the Novo Sarajevo Crisis Staff informed the President of the Bosnian Serb Presidency that it had mobilized about 900 people over the previous two months, including about 700 in the Lukavica and Tilava area and about 200 in Grbavica. Pursuant to an order of the SRK Command **on 22 May 1992**, the Novo Sarajevo TO comprising locals from Grbavica, Hrasno, Vrace, and Kovačići became part of the SRK.¹³⁷

Raids, Beatings and Murders

During the seizure of power, members of the Serbian forces, including the VRS, the police and the Šešelji's people, searched the houses of Bosnian Muslims and Croats in the settlement of Grbavica.

A group of seven or eight armed soldiers came to the house of Smajš, a Bosnian Muslim, in Vrace to search for weapons. Although they did not find any, they ordered Smajš to go with them. Outside, a soldier ordered him to walk, with his head down, toward the Golf car, in front of which a group of ten soldiers stood. He was ordered to strip to the waist and was then beaten with rifle butts, punched, and kicked for about 15 to 20 minutes. He was then transported, along with his neighbour Mirsad Dedić, in a military vehicle to the Police Academy in Vrace. The soldiers continued to beat them during the ride, and one fired his unloaded automatic rifle at Smajš' temple three times. They were beaten again at the Police Academy. Smajš, blindfolded and with his hands tied behind his back, was then transported, along with Dedić, to Kula Prison.¹³⁸

¹³⁵ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 894.

¹³⁶ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 896.

¹³⁷ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 895.

¹³⁸ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV",

Soldiers in JNA uniforms sexually abused, raped, and killed Bosnian Muslims and Croats. Non-Serbs lived under the duress and constant fear of being taken away or beaten. The judgment notes that widespread robberies began upon the soldiers' arrival in Grbavica. Although the robberies were not committed based on any order, they were not prevented and the perpetrators were not held accountable.

Veselin Vlahović, aka "Batko," committed numerous crimes in the area of Novo Sarajevo, including murder, harassment, imprisonment, beatings, rape, enslavement, and looting of property. Vlahović, as a member of the paramilitary forces of the so-called Serb Republic of BiH, was sentenced to 42 years in prison by the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 896/7.



In the settlement of Grbavica **in May 1992**, Vlahović abused the witness S-35 in his apartment, hitting him in the head and chest with a rifle butt and kicking him repeatedly. Vlahović also threatened to rape S-35's wife and hit her one time in the face, breaking two of her teeth. He then took them both to Trebević, where he led S-35 to a hill, holding him by the neck, and threatening to kill him with his bayonet. He then returned them to Grbavica where he took their money and gold. Then, according to the judgement against Vlahović,¹³⁹ "...when the accused was convinced that the victim had given him all their money and gold, he grabbed him by the neck, choking him with his hands, and threatened him not to say anything to anyone."¹⁴⁰

Vlahović also beat witness S-13 in the settlement of Grbavica, before taking him to the premises of the Digitron-Buje company. Here, he continued to beat him and demanded that S-13 hand over the keys to his vehicle that was in the garage. Vlahović took the vehicle and drove away in an unknown direction, after which S-13 was released. At the Digitron-Buje premises, Vlahović also hit witness S-47 in the head and proceeded to beat him, together with two other guards, until he lost consciousness several times. The Vlahović judgment describes:

"[A]t one point, they took him into a room where they pushed his head into a barrel full of water, and then into the toilet, where they pushed his head violently into the toilet bowl. After the abuse stopped, the Accused took the victim from the premises and drove him in a Golf model vehicle to the vicinity of Mt. Trebević, where he showed him the dead bodies of murdered civilians which were scattered in that vicinity, telling him that he had killed all those people. When the victim told him that he would give him all the money and the gold he had, he shoved him into the vehicle and, with the intention of robbing his property, and drove him to the building."¹⁴¹

A memo of the Novo Sarajevo SJB and Vraca Reserve Police Station dated **31 May 1992** identified Vlahović as a member of the military police unit of the Novo Sarajevo Battalion which were "undertaking certain operations on their own without any authority," including conducting searches of apartments and vehicles and taking "private and socially-owned property, securities and gold coins."¹⁴²

139 NOTE: In the absence of an official English translation of the "JUDGEMENT," the relevant passages in this section have been translated by the Post-Conflict Research Center.

140 NOTE: In the absence of an official English translation of the "JUDGEMENT," the relevant passages in this section have been translated by the Post-Conflict Research Center)

141 NOTE: In the absence of an official English translation of the "JUDGEMENT," the relevant passages in this section have been translated by the Post-Conflict Research Center.

142 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 899.

Vlahović was convicted of 59 counts of the indictment, which included physical and mental abuse, imprisonment, robbery, enslavement, rape, and murder.

In mid-June 1992, Vlahović came armed to the apartment of Husnija Ćerimagić, at number 2 Rava Jankovića Street in the Grbavica neighborhood, where he found Ćerimagić. Immediately upon entering the apartment, he ordered Ćerimagić to go with him, taking him out of the apartment at gun point. At that moment, Goran Čengiđ arrived with the intention of protecting Ćerimagić. Čengiđ asked Vlahović where he was taking Ćerimagić. Vlahović asked for Čengiđ's name and surname before ordering him at gunpoint to come with them as well, intending to kill both victims. Vlahović the men in a vehicle and drove them to an unspecified location where he shot both of them. The judgment against Vlahović reads:

“The subsequent exhumation of the remains of the victims confirmed that their deaths were violent and resulted from injuries sustained from projectiles fired from firearms, in the case of the victim Husnija Ćerimagić, in the form of a bullet fracture of the VII rib on the right half of the chest, with external and internal bleeding. In the case of the victim Goran Čengiđ, the death was caused by multiple fractures to the right knee, a multiple gunshot fracture of the ulna and thumb bone of the right hand, and a gunshot wound to the left scapula with external and internal bleeding.”¹⁴³

On the evening of **14 June 1992**, Vlahović and another man came to the house of the Pecar family at 46 Trebevićka Street. They forced 13 members of the Pecar family out of the house, telling them to go one by one” and forcing them towards the Jewish cemetery, while he and the other man walked behind the column. They reached the intersection of Trebevićka and Soukbunar Streets, near the Bosut barracks and firing lines. Knowing that Soukbunar Street was mined, he ordered Omer, Sead, and Ejub Pecar to run across the street, threatening to shoot them. They started to run, and the other family members slowly followed them. Vlahović and the other man fired rounds, intentionally provoking open fire from the firing lines. The minors Azra and Diša Pecar were killed, while Mubera, Sena, and the minor Alma Pecar were injured. Vlahović and the other man fled the scene.¹⁴⁴

Rapes in Grbavica, Vraca, and Kovačići

Vlahović and other members of the VRS raped women at their apartments or after taking them to other facilities in Grbavica, Vraca, and Kovačići.

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According to the judgement, Vlahović came armed to the apartment of victim S-3, located at 28 Lenjinova Street in the Grbavica neighborhood, with the intention of raping her. He approached her, groped her breasts, and ordered her to lie down. When she resisted, he threatened to kill her at knife and gun point, tore her clothes off, and pushed her onto a couch. The judgement states:

“...He took off his shirt and pants, keeping only his undershirt on, and then lay down on top of the victim. Even though she was menstruating heavily, he raped her. Afterwards, he got up and went to the bathroom to wash himself because he was covered in blood. He then got dressed and left the apartment.”¹⁴⁵

Vlahović and three or four others went to the apartment of the Barleci family in the Grbavica settlement, where he found Mehmed Barleci and his wife Ćima. Upon entering their apartment, he demanded that they hand over all the money and gold they had. Everyone from the group started rummaging around the apartment, taking what valuables they found. The Accused was beating the victims throughout the search. The Vlahović judgement describes:

“At one point, with the intention of having forced sexual intercourse with the wounded Ćima, he took her to a room, where he forcibly raped her. Then someone from the group tied Mehmed’s hands behind his back, and then they forcibly took him out of the apartment, leaving the victim Ćima locked in the apartment. They put Mehmed in a vehicle in front of the building and drove him in an unknown direction. The fate of the victim remains unknown to this day, and it can thus be reasonably assumed that he was killed.”¹⁴⁶

Vlahović came armed to victim S4’s apartment in the Grbavica neighborhood, and removed her forcibly from the apartment, with the intention of raping her. He took her to a garage located on the ground floor of the Šoping building in Grbavica. There, he took off her blouse with a knife, and he cut into her chest. He then ordered her to undress and lie down on a mat on the concrete floor. He tied her hands and feet to the straps of the mat, took off her pants, and raped her. According to the judgement, “four or five more soldiers raped the victim, and then he let her go, telling her that he was going home and that he would come again. After that, in a short period of a few days, he came two or three more times to the victim’s apartment. He would take the victim to the same garage, rape her, and allow other soldiers to rape her as well. On one occasion, he even kept the victim in the garage for a couple of hours, until people came and raped her.”¹⁴⁷

145 NOTE: In the absence of an official English translation of the “JUDGEMENT,” the relevant passages in this section have been translated by the Post-Conflict Research Center.

146 NOTE: In the absence of an official English translation of the “JUDGEMENT,” the relevant passages in this section have been translated by the Post-Conflict Research Center.

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On 11 June 1992, Vlahović came to the apartment of victim S-6 in the settlement of Grbavica. He beat her and her mother with the rifle butt, then forcibly took them out of the apartment. He brought them to a building in the Vraca neighborhood and took them into an apartment where he tied up the mother in one room and ordered the victim S-6 to undress. When she refused, he began to beat her and rip her clothes off. Once she was completely undressed, he forced her to put on a pair of leopard print leggings, pushed her onto the bed, removed the leggings, and raped her while beating her on the head and ribs. The judgement against Vlahović states:

“After that, he left and brought her mother from the other room, whom he had previously forced to undress. He then raped her, which victim S-6 had to watch as he did not allow her to cover her eyes with her hands. He kept both of them in that apartment that night, during which time he raped the victim S-6 again. At one point, he asked her to satisfy him orally, which she refused, but when he fired one bullet from his gun, she had to do it. He raped her mother again in the morning. After the all-night abuse, intending to rob them, he asked them if they had anything to buy their lives, and when they said they had gold, he drove them to their apartment.”¹⁴⁸

On June 14, 1992, Vlahović came armed to victim S-7’s apartment in Grbavica, where he found the victim and her husband, who was lying immobile in one room due to illness. He forced the victim to enter the kitchen and ordered her to undress. She initially refused but was forced to comply after he threatened to kill her. He then knocked her to the floor, unbuttoned her pants, lay on top of her, and raped her. The Vlahović judgement continues:

“...He then stood up and demanded that the victim satisfy him orally, which she refused, after which he buttoned up his pants, and with the intention of robbing their property, he demanded that she hand over all the money and gold she had. She took off her gold rings as well as a gold necklace and a watch, the exact value of which was not determined. He then threatened the victim that if she told anyone anything about what had happened, he would kill her and her husband. He then took his weapon and left the apartment.”¹⁴⁹

In June 1992, Vlahović and another man went to the apartment of victim S-8 in Grbavica and told the victim and her father that they had to go with them to a garage in Vraca. There, they beat her father severely, put him in a vehicle, drove him to an unknown location, and shot him. Back at the garage, according to the judgement against Vlahović:

translated by the Post-Conflict Research Center.

148 NOTE: In the absence of an official English translation of the “JUDGEMENT,” the relevant passages in this section have been translated by the Post-Conflict Research Center.

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“...With the intention of raping the victim, he grabbed her by hand and led her up a flight of stairs to a nearby building, hitting her constantly in the head and other parts of her body along the way. He took her to a room and told her to undress, to which the victim replied that she was menstruating. When he confirmed that she was indeed menstruating, he said that it didn’t matter and took her to a room, where she had to undress and lie down on a bed. He then took off his clothes, got on top of the victim, and raped her.”¹⁵⁰

On 28 and 29 June 1992, Vlahović and an unidentified person came to the apartment of the victim S-23 in Grbavica, where he found the victim and his wife, S-9. He took S-9 to another room, and tore off her nightgown, underwear, and bra, out of which fell around 3,000 German marks which the victim had previously hidden there. Vlahović took the money and, as the judgement describes:

¹⁵⁰ NOTE: In the absence of an official English translation of the “JUDGEMENT,” the relevant passages in this section have been translated by the Post-Conflict Research Center.

“With the intention of forcibly raping the victim, swearing and threatening her, he picked up the victim, who was naked, and pushed her against a wall, turning her face towards the wall. He ordered her to lean on the wall with both hands and then raped her. He and the other person then left the victim’s apartment, threatening them not to say anything to anyone.”¹⁵¹

Vlahović and another unidentified person came to the apartment of the victim S-10 in Grbavica, where she was with her father-in-law and daughter. Vlahović insulted her father-in-law and cursed his Turkish mother before taking victim S-10, who was seven months pregnant and was holding her young daughter, violently by the arm. He pushed her into the kitchen and put a knife to her daughter’s throat, whereupon the victim took an unspecified amount of money from under the rug and gave it to him. He then yelled at her to get into position and take off her underwear. The judgement describes:

“After the victim managed to set her young daughter on an armchair with one hand, under duress, she took off her underclothes and lifted her skirt. The Accused approached her from behind, constantly holding a knife to the neck of her daughter, who was screaming and crying, as was the victim herself. He raped the victim, after which he exited the kitchen and left the apartment with the other person.”¹⁵²

Vlahović and another person came to the house of the Balvanović family in Grbavica, where he found Otilija, Amir, Emir, and victims S-1 and S-2. They forcibly took Amir and Emir from the house to an abandoned apartment in Vraca, where they tied them up and gagged them. Then they returned for Otilija, S-1, and S-2 and took them to the same apartment. They took Otilija into the room where Amir and Emir were and took them all out to an unspecified location and killed them. Afterwards, the judgement reads:

“They returned to the apartment, from which the other person took victim S-2 to another apartment where he repeatedly raped her, while the accused intended to rape the victim S-1. He brought victim S-1 into a room where he told the victim to take off her clothes, which she had to do. He then also took off his clothes and pushed the victim down on the bed and forcibly raped her, before forcing the victim to satisfy him orally. In the morning he got up and left the apartment, leaving victim S-1 locked in the apartment, threatening her not to look out the window. He returned to the apartment that evening and raped her again. He left the victim locked in the apartment again the next morning, after which she decided to escape through the window.”¹⁵³

¹⁵¹ NOTE: In the absence of an official English translation of the “JUDGEMENT,” the relevant passages in this section have been translated by the Post-Conflict Research Center.

¹⁵² NOTE: In the absence of an official English translation of the “JUDGEMENT,” the relevant passages in this section have been translated by the Post-Conflict Research Center.

¹⁵³ NOTE: In the absence of an official English translation of the “JUDGEMENT,” the relevant passages in this section have been

The Court of BiH convicted Sasa Baričanin, a member of the military, paramilitary, and police forces of the so-called Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and then of the RS, to 18 years in prison for murder, enslavement, and rape which he carried out at the Balvanović home together with Vlahović. The first-instance verdict against Baričanin states:

“Intending to rape victim S-2, the defendant Saša Baričanin, took her from one apartment and to another apartment where he repeatedly raped her with force and threats. He kept her imprisoned in the apartment for several days, locking the door while he was away. During this period, he repeatedly raped the victim as well as allowed an unidentified person to enter the apartment and rape her, after which the victim, with the help of others, managed to get out of that apartment and run away.”¹⁵⁴

In July 1992, Vlahović ordered victim S-11 to undress and lie down on a crib in her Grbavica apartment. He took off his clothes, got on top of the victim, and raped her, before getting dressed and leaving the apartment. He came back to the apartment and raped her on three or four occasions afterwards.¹⁵⁵

Vlahović and two unidentified men came to the apartment of protected witness S-12 in Grbavica, armed with an automatic rifle and a knife. They antagonized the victim and one of the men threatened to kill her with a knife. He then tore the victim’s clothes off, threw her on the floor, and raped her. The Accused then raped her while she lay on the floor, hitting her and cutting her thigh with the knife. The victim resisted and almost lost consciousness.¹⁵⁶

The Court of BiH sentenced Zoran Dragičević, a member of the military, paramilitary, and police forces, of the so-called Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, then of the RS, to 11 years in prison for participating with Vlahović in inhuman acts, murders, imprisonment, torture, looting, and the rape of victim A-1. The judgement against Dragičević states:

“...In the month of July 1993, he came to the apartment of the witness A-1, which was located at 26 Bane Šurbata Street. There he found the victim and told her she had to come with him to clean his apartment, which was located in a building in the same street. The victim was forced to go with him. When they got to that apartment, he told her to take off her clothes, which she did, after which the Accused, taking advantage of her helplessness, raped her on the couch of the apartment. Shortly thereafter, he told her to go take a shower, which she

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had to do fearing for her life. He then raped the victim again before letting her return to her apartment.”¹⁵⁷

The Supreme Court of the FBiH sentenced Predrag Mišković, a member of the VRS, to seven years in prison for rape. In Grbavica **in September 1992**, he and another soldier entered the apartment of a Muslim woman, ordered her to undress, and raped her. Mišković raped the same person again in the same apartment in 1993.¹⁵⁸

Mišković and Duško Dabetić, a member of the VRS, raped a Muslim woman, whom Dabetić continued to rape on several occasions **during 1992 and 1993**. He took the victim to his apartment where he abused and raped her. The Supreme Court of FBiH sentenced him to six years in prison.

The FBiH Supreme Court sentenced Zoran Knežević, a member of the VRS, to eight years in prison for raping a Muslim woman in Grbavica **in the second half of 1992**, as well as for raping another Muslim woman **in the second half of 1994**.

Serbian military member Milorad Rodić pleaded guilty before the Cantonal Court in Sarajevo for among other things, the rape of a Muslim woman in Grbavica. He was sentenced to five years in prison.

Predrag Đurović, a civilian, was sentenced to six years in prison before the Supreme Court of FBiH. During the **winter of 1992**, he came to the apartment of a Bosniak family in Vraca and abducted a woman and her underage daughter. Threatening to kill her daughter, he put a bomb in the victim’s mouth, before taking the victim to an abandoned building and raping her.

157 NOTE: In the absence of an official English translation of the “JUDGEMENT,” the relevant passages in this section have been translated by the Post-Conflict Research Center.

158 OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, “The BiH War Crimes Case Map”, first-instance judgment Mišković, Predrag, <https://maparz.pravosudje.ba/case/mi%C5%A1kovi%C4%87-predrag>, www.pravosudje.ba.

Forced Labor

Bosnian Muslims and Croats were consigned to forced labor by VRS platoon and company commanders in Novo Sarajevo. Several people were killed by sniper fire on these assignments.

Željko Mitrović pleaded guilty before the Cantonal Court in Sarajevo that as a member of the 2nd Battalion of the 1st Sarajevo Mechanized Brigade, carrying out the orders of the 2nd Battalion Command, as the commander of the work platoon formed at the brigade, he assigned and controlled the forced labor carried out by the non-Serb population from May 1992 to the end of 1995. Mitrović assigned them regularly, against their will, to carry out heavy and demeaning physical labor without compensation or fixed working hours. Željko Mitrović physically abused them causing many to fear for their lives. The forced labor consisted of working on the front lines, even during battles, which resulted in the wounding of one person and the deaths of eight people. Mitrović was sentenced to two years in prison.¹⁵⁹

The Supreme Court of FBiH sentenced Milan Šešelj, a member of the VRS, to three years in prison for crimes against the civilian population, organizing and supervising forced labor in Grbavica carried out by non-Serb male civilians during 1992 and 1993, whereby they were exposed to shooting and shelling that resulted in several of them being wounded.¹⁶⁰

Momir Glišić was sentenced to two years and six months in prison for crimes committed as the commander of a female forced labor unit. He organized and oversaw the forced labor of Muslim women, in Grbavica during the war. He forced these women to clean apartments used by Serbian soldiers every day, against their will, without compensation and for a certain amount of time, with full knowledge that many of the women were raped on these assignments.¹⁶¹



159 OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, "The BiH War Crimes Case Map", first-instance verdict Mitrović, Željko, 2009, <https://maparz.pravosudje.ba/case/mitrovi%C4%87-%C5%BEeljko>, www.pravosudje.ba.

160 OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, "The BiH War Crimes Case Map", Šešelj judgment, Milan, <https://maparz.pravosudje.ba/case/%C5%A1e%C5%A1elj-milan>, www.pravosudje.ba.

161 OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, "The BiH War Crimes Case Map", Judgment Momir Glišić, <https://maparz.pravosudje.ba/case/gli%C5%A1i%C4%87-momir>, www.pravosudje.ba.

For beatings, mental and physical abuse, as well as confiscation of property in Grbavica, the Supreme Court of FBiH sentenced members of the Serbian military police forces, Slobodan Bogdanović and Goran Sladoje, to two years in prison each.

Lords of Life and Death

On 20 October 1992, Defense Minister Bogdan Subotić proposed to the Accused the introduction of military rule in parts of the territory of RS, including the municipality of Novo Sarajevo. Subotić justified this action by “the fact that the political and security situation in some [RS] municipalities has become more tense due to the increasingly active paramilitary formations, quasi-state organs and institutions (...).”¹⁶²

On 15 November 1992, at a meeting of the SRK Command where then-President of Novo Sarajevo Municipality, Milivoje Prijić, was present, it was noted that among the goals of the operations was “genocide on other nations”. The meeting also noted: “[t]he understanding and practice of individuals and groups that they are masters of life and death to every individual of different ethnicity, resulted in cases of unnecessary mistreatment and killing of members of other ethnicities, especially Muslims. Such people see the Geneva and other conventions as obsolete and unnecessary in this war.”¹⁶³

Bosnian Muslims and Croats were forced to leave the municipality of Novo Sarajevo. “The Chamber notes that in some instances people requested to leave; however, the Chamber finds that this was still involuntary considering the surrounding circumstances in which the departures occurred. Consequently, the Chamber is satisfied that Bosnian Muslims and Croats were forced to leave the Serb-controlled parts of Novo Sarajevo municipality,” according to the judgement against Karadžić.¹⁶⁴

Witness KDZ310 at the Karadžić trial testified that he could see from the expressions of those relocating that they were not going of their own free will. People were crying and did not want to leave their property behind to be looted. Serb soldiers were kicking and hitting the Bosnian Croats and Muslims. Soldiers as well as military police officers and civilians took part in the expulsion of non-Serbs from Grbavica, using threats and intimidation to get people to leave.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶² United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 901.

¹⁶³ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 901.

¹⁶⁴ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 907.

¹⁶⁵ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 905.

Witness KDZ079 stated that in early 1992 Serb soldiers would come, sometimes several times in one day, to the apartment where she lived with her husband and children, which made her and her family fear for their lives. After her husband left to get food, Serb soldiers repeatedly came to the apartment asking for him and a photograph of him and his identity card. The soldiers said they would take the witness and her daughter if her husband did not return. Because Bosnian Croats and Muslims could not get bread and Serb soldiers were breaking into apartments and taking private possessions, on 26 May 1992, the witness and her children left the apartment and all their belongings.

Soldiers entered buildings and made statements such as, “[i]n 10 minutes all Ustašas and Balijas out!”¹⁶⁶ In one instance where civilians were being expelled from Grbavica, KDZ310 talked to a platoon member who agreed to go to the MP headquarters to ask for an explanation for the expulsions, but the member did not receive an answer.

The **5 June 1992** report of the Novo Sarajevo Crisis Staff to the Bosnian Serb Presidency stated that it had provided “empty and deserted Croatian and Muslim flats” as accommodation for Serb fighters from other areas who joined the regular units.

On 19 July 1992, the Accused sent a memorandum to several municipalities, including Novo Sarajevo, requesting an inventory of all housing facilities “that are vacant following the voluntary departure of Muslims,” explaining that vacant homes would be used to temporarily house Bosnian Serbs from the Muslim parts of Sarajevo. A UN report from 30 September 1992 confirmed that approximately 300 Bosnian Muslim civilians were expelled by Serbs that day from the area of Grbavica and travelled on foot across either the Vrbanja Bridge or the bridge behind the Bristol Hotel. People were seen carrying bags and bundles as they walked, flanked by armed soldiers.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁶ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 905.

¹⁶⁷ Ujedinjene nacije, Međunarodni krivični sud za bivšu Jugoslaviju, “Tužilac protiv Radovana Karadžića: TOM II od IV”, mart 2016. godine, <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/bcs/160324-presuda-2od4.pdf>, str. 908.



NOVI GRAD MUNICIPALITY

The municipality of Novi Grad, one of the ten constitutive municipalities of Sarajevo, is bordered in the south and in the west by Ilidža, in the north by Vogošća and Ilijaš, and in the east by Novo Sarajevo. It was established in 1977, encompassing the areas which had hitherto constituted the western parts of Novo Sarajevo. These areas included, among others, the local community of Dobroševići which was comprised of the villages of Ahatovići, Bojnik, Dobroševići, and Mihaljevići; the local commune of Rajlovac; and Dobrinja, a community with large, high-rise residential complexes which housed around 40,000 people before the war. According to the 1991 census, Novi Grad's population was 136,616, of which 50.8% were Muslim, 27.5% were Serb, and 6.5% were Croat.¹⁶⁸

There were several important commercial, industrial, and military installations, including the Rajlovac Barracks, the Butile Barracks, and Orao (a military industrial factory for overhauling aircraft engines). **Near the end of 1991**, members of the SDS municipal board from Novi Grad began contemplating the creation of the Serb municipality of Rajlovac on territory which belonged, in large parts, to the municipality of Novi Grad, in order to prevent Serbs being outvoted in the Novi Grad government and Municipal Assembly.

On 9 February 1992, Krajišnik informed Karadžić of a meeting he had recently attended in the Novi Grad village of Reljevo, where he had discussed the creation of Rajlovac Municipality. A few days later, on 11 February, Jovan Tintor told a certain Prodanović that a new municipality called Rajlovac was being created.¹⁶⁹ **On 11 May 1992**, the Bosnian Serb Assembly adopted a law according to which the municipality of Rajlovac included Ahatovići, Bojnik, Dobroševići, Rajlovac, Reljevo-Dvor, Zabrđe, and Žuč, among other territories. Jovo Božić assumed the role of the President of the Rajlovac Municipality. Sometime after Rajlovac was declared a new municipality, the Rajlovac Municipality Crisis Staff was established and Jovo Božić was appointed as its President.¹⁷⁰

From March 1992 onwards, local Serbs came to the Butile and Rajlovac Barracks in order to be issued uniforms and weapons, including sniper rifles, and to undergo military training. Two Bosnian Serbs employed at the Orao factory, Stevo Petričević and Mirko Mirković, established and maintained connections between local Serbs and the officers in the Rajlovac Barracks, and were involved in the distribution of arms to the local Serbs. At the same

¹⁶⁸ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 860.

¹⁶⁹ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 861.

¹⁷⁰ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 862.

time, reserve troops, including Serbs from surrounding areas, started arriving at the Butile Barracks.¹⁷¹

According to Karadžić's judgement, Orao accommodated a Serb "paramilitary unit" which consisted of SDS members from the surrounding villages. According to the judgement against Karadžić, "insignias on the uniforms worn by this unit bore four Cyrillic 'S' symbols and some of its members wore 'kokarda' caps."¹⁷²

By March 1992, Bosnian Serbs established a check-point on the bridge across the Bosna River in the Reljevo settlement near the Butile Barracks, and gradually blocked the passage of Bosnian Muslims.

On 22 May 1992, SRK Commander Tomislav Šipčić ordered the formation of the Rajlovac Territorial Defense (*BOSNIAN: TO*) Brigade, thus subordinating the Rajlovac TO to the SRK, and appointed the Rajlovac Crisis Staff president, who at that time was Jovo Božić, to the post of the Brigade Commander. On 28 May 1992, Božić reported to the Bosnian Serb government that the "Serbian Army of the Serbian Municipality of Rajlovac" included 1,280 conscripts.¹⁷³

Ahatovići village

In May 1992, the Bosnian Serbs threatened to attack the village if the villagers did not leave. The Bosnian Muslims refused to comply with the demand and the local crisis staff of the Bosnian Muslims led by Hasan Mujkić set up barricades, organized village guards, and armed them with infantry weapons. The Muslim TO numbered some 200 men.¹⁷⁴

On 25 May 1992, the inhabitants of the village of Ahatovići received an ultimatum from Serb Forces to surrender their men along with their weapons. On 24 or 25 May 1992, women, children, and the elderly attempted to leave Ahatovići for the nearby municipality of Visoko, but were prevented from doing so by Bosnian Serbs who fired at them.

Serbs in both JNA and other uniforms arrived on the hills around Ahatovići from the direction of Rajlovac with tanks and armored vehicles. Using megaphones, they urged the villagers to surrender. They threatened: "*Balijas*, surrender, or we kill your children."¹⁷⁵ When the

171 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 862/3.

172 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 863.

173 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 864.

174 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 864/5.

175 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 866.

villagers refused, at around 11 p.m. Serb Forces launched an attack, which was eventually repelled.

On 29 May 1992, a final attack was launched on Ahatovići and Dobroševići, with heavy artillery. The shells were fired from all directions, including the Butile and Rajlovac Barracks. At this time, the women, children, and the elderly were moved to basements of several houses in the center of the village. The shelling lasted **until 1 or 2 June 1992**, resulting in the destruction and damage of nearly 130 houses in Ahatovići and the deaths of 15 to 20 Bosnian Muslims.

After the shelling stopped, Tintor as well as the local Serbs and members of paramilitary groups mounted an infantry attack against Ahatovići.

As determined in the judgments, Ramiza Mujkić and her daughter Elma Bešić, who was only 15 years old at the time, were killed during shelling or an infantry attack. The houses of Bosnian Muslims were looted and set on fire. The Karadžić states: "The Serbs captured about 400 women and children and 80 men, in addition to the 150 women and children who had been captured in Dobroševići, Bojnik, and Mihaljevići prior to the attack on Ahatovići. Those captured in Ahatovići were subsequently taken in the direction of Rajlovac."¹⁷⁶

176 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 868.



After 30 Bosnian Muslims attempting to break through enemy lines and escape towards Visoko were hit by the artillery fire described above, the Bosnian Muslims surrendered to Serbs. After they surrendered, those who were able to walk were taken to a nearby road and made to sit down. According to the Karadžić judgement, “Koprivica and Arnautović then proceeded to shoot the 15 remaining men who were unable to walk, killing them all. At that point, Tintor, armed with a pistol and an automatic rifle and wearing a JNA uniform, along with a number of paramilitaries, appeared on the scene. Tintor then ordered that the men be lined up in pairs and taken to the Butile Barracks.”¹⁷⁷

On the way to the barracks, they were threatened, physically abused, and insulted. At the supermarket located about 200 meters from the barracks in Butile, they encountered around a hundred well-armed members of the White Eagles who were harassing several locals who had been captured in Dobroševići and the surrounding villages. As described in the Karadžić judgement:

“The White Eagles and some local Serbs then beat the detained men with iron bars, rifle butts, and wooden batons. At one point, one of the men was told that Arkan’s men would soon take custody of the detainees. Soon afterwards, the Bosnian Muslim detainees were forced to run the gauntlet and board a military bus.”¹⁷⁸

The Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina sentenced Goran Damjanović to six years and six months in prison, and Zoran Damjanović to six years in prison, for their participation, along with other VRS soldiers and Serb paramilitaries, in the beating of a group of about 20 to 30 male Bosniak prisoners in front of the supermarket. “All the victims had been captured earlier by the Serbian army that occupied the settlement of Ahatovići; some had surrendered, and some were injured. They were beaten and abused before being transferred to the camp in Rajlovac.”¹⁷⁹

Detention in the Cistern in Rajlovac

The detainees were taken by bus to the military fuel depot in Rajlovac, where they were ordered to lie down on the grass. They were then beaten with sticks and two dogs were let loose on them. Some detainees were then put on a truck and taken to Orao where their wounds were bandaged. Afterwards, they were taken back to Rajlovac Barracks and placed

177 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 869.

178 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 871.

179 OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, “The BiH War Crimes Case Map”, judgment Damjanović, Goran, <https://maparz.pravosudje.ba/case/damjanovi%C4%87-and-damjanovi%C4%87-goran-damjanovi%C4%87-and-zoran-damjanovi%C4%87>, www.pravosudje.ba.

in a cistern, which contained approximately 90 detainees by that time. Adjoining this cistern was a bigger cistern housing approximately 130 Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from Dobroševići, Mihaljevići, Bojnik, Kobiljska, and Bioča.¹⁸⁰

“On the morning of 2 June 1992, Mile Stojanović arrived and introduced himself as the commander of the ‘camp’” according to the Karadžić judgement.¹⁸¹

Stojanović was accompanied by an individual named Šok and four others. “Šok took two or three prisoners in front of the cisterns and subjected them to beatings. On one occasion, he and his men took out two men, beat them and broke the latter’s arms.”¹⁸²

Due to the deposit of rainwater in the cisterns, the detainees were forced to stand for the entire duration of their detention. They received no food or water during the first three days of their detention and afterwards received very little food and water.

During the first week of June 1992, three new prisoners, namely Hajro Delić, his son, and Džemail Sačić were brought to the smaller cistern. A few days into his detention, Delić was taken away and brought back the following day seriously injured. He told the other prisoners that he had been severely beaten and abused by Šok on orders from Nikola Stanišić and that during questioning, Stanišić had asked for one million German Marks as the price for releasing him. Soon after that, Delić succumbed to his injuries and died.¹⁸³

The Chamber also finds that sometime during the first week of June 1992, Serb Forces killed two Bosnian Muslim detainees in or near the cisterns. During the first half of June 1992, Serb Forces removed nine Bosnian Muslim men from the cisterns in the Rajlovac Barracks and subsequently killed them.¹⁸⁴

On 14 June 1992, around 7:00 a.m., 47 men were ordered to board a bus under the pretense of going to a prisoner exchange at Kobilja Glava. After they entered the bus, a guard started hitting them and ordered them to lie down on the floor with their hands on the back of their heads. Since there were so many of them, they had to lie on top of each other in order to fit on the bus. The bus went to the barricade near Srednje, where the driver asked how to get to the village of Sokolina. They continued for ten minutes and stopped again. When the driver

180 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 872.

181 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 872.

182 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 873.

183 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 873/4.

184 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 876.

and the guards got off the bus, it was fired upon from all directions for around 15 minutes with automatic rifles, machine guns, and assault rifles. Hand grenades were also thrown under the bus. The Karadžić judgement states:

“Six of the Bosnian Muslims who had survived the attack, including KDZ041, managed to get out and walk towards a nearby forest. However, due to the serious injuries which they had sustained, two of the survivors, namely Nedžib Gačanović and Safet Rizvanović, died shortly after. The four remaining survivors walked all night and eventually made their way to Vukašovići, a village under the control of Bosnian Muslim TO.”¹⁸⁵

The judgement also states that Serbian forces forced the non-Serb population to leave those parts of Novi Grad that were under Serbian control.¹⁸⁶

Prisoners of War in the Barracks in Nedžarići

In the period **between September and December 1992**, members of ABiH being held as prisoners at the Serb paramilitary barracks in Nedžarići in Novi Grad municipality suffered extreme physical abuse by the members of Serb paramilitary units. Goran Vasić, Commander Radivoje Grković, Grković’s bodyguard called ‘Kruško,’ a man named Radovan (‘Raca’), and a man named Milorad are known to have taken part in the beatings along with several other unidentified paramilitary formation members. The prisoners were beaten all over with fists as well as wooden and rubber batons. Vasić repeatedly hit a prisoner engaged in physical labor on the head with a pistol. The judgement against Vasić, who was sentenced to six years in prison by the Supreme Court of FBiH, states:

“**In October 1992**, together with two other members of the Serb paramilitary formations, Vasić ordered the prisoners of war of the BiH Army to load coal into carts, and they tied them with belts ‘like horses’ and forced them to pull the cart, hitting them with a claw and inciting the dog to bites them. After unloading the coal, they forced the prisoners to load a pool table onto a cart and drag it along with equal suffering and humiliation, using them as draft cattle.”¹⁸⁷

185 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 877/8.

186 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 881.

187 OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, “The BiH War Crimes Case Map”, judgement Vasić, Goran, <https://maparz.pravosudje.ba/case/vasi%C4%87-goran>, www.pravosudje.ba.




photo by Benisa Bibuljica

ILIDŽA MUNICIPALITY

Ilidža is one of the ten constitutive municipalities of Sarajevo and is located to the west of Novo Sarajevo, southwest of Novi Grad, and to the northeast of Hadžići. According to the 1991 census, the population of Ilidža municipality was 43.2% Muslim, 36.8% Serb, 10.2% Croat, 7.6% Yugoslav, and 2.1% identified as other. Prior to the conflict, the populations of the local communes of Hrasnica, Butmir, Stupsko Brdo, part of Donji Kotorac, and Sokolović Kolonija were predominantly Muslim, and those of Otes, Bare, and Stup were predominantly Croat. The populations of the other local communes were predominantly Serb.¹⁸⁸

In accordance with the Variant A/B Instructions, the SDS established a Crisis Staff in Ilidža **on 2 January 1992**, and Radomir Kezunović established the Assembly of the Serb Municipality of Ilidža (“Ilidža Serb Assembly”) the following day.¹⁸⁹

On the same day, the Ilidža Serb Assembly made a proposal to the Bosnian Serb Assembly to, among other things, regulate the status of members of TO units and military-aged men as well as to adopt measures to protect the interests of Serbs in the territory of Ilidža Municipality.¹⁹⁰

Starting in **the beginning of March 1992**, local Serbs organized and held neighborhood watches in front of their houses. In March and April 1992, Serb Forces distributed weapons seized from MUP storage units to Bosnian Serb civilians and members of the Serb TO. Bosnian Serbs in Ilidža were also armed with weapons from JNA warehouses.¹⁹¹

The Ilidža MUP was divided **in March 1992**, when Bosnian Muslim police officers were dismissed from the Public Security Station (SJB), leaving only the Bosnian Serb officers at the Ilidža police station. Edin Mlivić, then Chief of the Ilidža SJB, and Tomislav Kovač, then Ilidža police commander, agreed that the Bosnian Serb police would function in the parts of Ilidža that had a Serb majority, and the Bosnian Muslim police would function in those parts with a Muslim majority.¹⁹²

188 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 834.

189 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 840.

190 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 840.

191 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 840/1.

192 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 841.

On 5 April 1992, the Ilidža Serb Assembly established the Serb Municipality of Ilidža, to include the settlements with a majority Serbian population in Ilidža and parts of Novi Grad, Kiseljak, and Trnovo. **After 6 April 1992**, the Ilidža Serb Assembly became a War Presidency, pursuant to an instruction from the Bosnian Serb Assembly. On the same day, the Ilidža Crisis Staff ordered general mobilization.¹⁹³

The Serb TO staff organized defense in Ilidža. At that point, the TO defence units became part of the VRS, first as part of the Ilidža Brigade and then as part of the Igman Brigade.

Around 3 or 4 April 1992, barricades were erected around Ilidža. From April 1992 onward, there was an escalation in combat activity, and Ilidža was constantly under fire. The eastern and western parts of Ilidža were controlled by the Serbs but divided in the middle by Muslim held territory. The eastern and western parts of Ilidža were shelled by Bosnian Muslim forces from Mt. Mojnilo and Mt. Igman, respectively. **By the end of April 1992**, Bosnian Serbs shelled various neighborhoods in Sarajevo, including Butmir and Hrasnica in Ilidža Municipality. By 8 May 1992, Serb Forces were in control of the territories comprising the Serb Municipality of Ilidža.¹⁹⁴

On 19 May 1992, Ranko Boljak, a member of the VRS, together with other soldiers, stopped a convoy transporting civilians, mostly women and children. He then proceeded to single out several men. He took money from one of the men and knocked him to the ground, threatening his life. He hit another man several times. He then locked the men in a refrigerated truck. The next day, he and another soldier got into the truck and physically abused a prisoner. After leaving them in cold storage for three days, he took them to the police station in Ilidža, where they stayed for almost 20 days together with other detainees. Boljak came several times to harass and beat them.¹⁹⁵

Neđeljko Prstojević, military commander and president of the Ilidža Crisis Staff, brought in irregular forces and allowed some groups to loot behind the front line and drive Bosnian Muslims out of their homes. In a conversation with Dragan Despotović about the combat operations in Kasindolsko Polje on 14 June 1992, Prstojević asked: “What shall we do? Would it be good if we gave it a thought and if we organised people from aside/outside to expel them all. Nobody needs to be shot or killed. Everyone expelled.” Despotović responded: “That would be the right move.”¹⁹⁶

193 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 841/2.

194 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 842/3.

195 OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, “The BiH War Crimes Case Map”, Judgment Boljak, Ranko, <https://maparz.pravosudje.ba/case/boljak-ranko>, www.pravosudje.ba.

196 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV”,

Several armed groups were present in Ilidža **during 1992**. Most notably, Brne Gavrilović and his group of Šešelj's men, arrived in Ilidža **on 9 July 1992**. On several occasions in 1992 and 1993, members of Gavrilović's group looted and expelled Bosnian Muslims from their homes. Other armed groups also engaged in looting. When confronted by security forces, members of these groups sometimes issued threats. However, at times, members of the MUP tolerated the looting and even participated themselves.¹⁹⁷

At the end of January or the beginning of February 1993, Boljak singled out a dozen civilian inmates from the Planjo's house camp in Semizovac, where civilians of non-Serb nationality were detained. He ordered them to get on the bus. During the ride, he insulted them and threatened that he was going to kill them. He physically abused two prisoners, after which they were all taken to the premises of the Ilidža Military Police and detained. Boljak occasionally took them illegally to dig trenches on the front lines.

In **the fall of 1993**, Boljak and two other VRS soldiers came to the apartment of a family in Ilidža. He knocked one family member to the floor and, putting a knife to his throat, threatened to take him away and kill him. A woman managed to call the neighbors for help. Before the Cantonal Court in Sarajevo, Boljak pleaded guilty and was sentenced to three years in prison.

There were combat operations on Ilidža throughout the war. Municipal leaders continued to discuss how to establish control over the wider territory.

The Supreme Court of the FBiH sentenced Borislav Berjan, the commander of the VRS company, to seven years in prison. **In the period from April 1992 to the end of 1993**, he personally participated in the arming of the Serb population in the settlement of Doglodi, from which he created an armed military formation. As a company commander, he issued orders and participated in the arrest, expulsion, torture, inhumane treatment, and looting of the property of the non-Serb population in the settlement of Doglodi and Bare in the municipality of Ilidža.

Berjan took part in the capture of twenty civilians of Croatian nationality, one off-duty member of the ABiH, as well as four members of the reserve MUP of the RBiH. The captives were all mistreated, and one reserve policeman was killed. According to the factual description in the charge against Berjan:

March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 845.

¹⁹⁷ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 844.

"The other policemen were detained for 3 months and during their detention they were abused. They were later exchanged. Croat civilians were returned to Bare and Doglodi after being detained for approximately 20 days. Borislav Berjan later ordered them to move to Kiseljak and leave all their property behind that was later pillaged."¹⁹⁸

Berjan commanded his unit to search a house, during which members of his unit physically and psychologically abused the family living there. Borislav Berjan personally ordered two brothers to be taken to a camp for non-Serbs in Rajlovac, after which they were not seen again.

During the attack on Doglodi, members of his unit killed two women, one Croat and one Muslim. During the attack on Bare, which was predominantly populated by Croats, in a house where 40 Croat civilians were hiding, soldiers separated the men from the women and children. They proceeded to abuse the men, killing three of them. Subsequently, Serb soldiers expelled civilians to Kiseljak in vehicles that had been personally provided by Borislav Berjan. The soldiers then looted the properties of the civilians. In the course of this attack, one family was forced from their house and abused. Soldiers took away one family member who was not seen again.

Capture of Dobrinja

From mid-April 1992, there was intense fighting around Dobrinja where the territories controlled by the Serbs were severed from Lukavica, Pale, and Kotorac on one side, and Ilidža, Rajlovac, and Vogošća on the other. While the Bosnian Serbs tried to establish a corridor to connect these neighborhoods, the Bosnian Muslims sought to link Sarajevo's historic center with neighborhoods such as Hrasnica and Sokolović Kolonija.¹⁹⁹

Rumors were circulating that the SRK wanted to occupy Dobrinja because Serbs made up the majority of the population there. **On 21 May 1992**, Prstojević had a telephone conversation with Colonel Gagović about Bosnian Muslims fleeing Dobrinja. Gagović told him that he had ordered a press center to release information that they were only allowing Muslims to leave Dobrinja as entire families because they did not want the men to be left behind.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁸ OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, "The BiH War Crimes Case Map", judgment Berjan, Borislav, <https://maparz.pravosudje.ba/case/berjan-borislav>, www.pravosudje.ba.

¹⁹⁹ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 845.

²⁰⁰ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 845.



Around 14 June 1992, the Serb forces took control of Dobrinja 1 and Dobrinja 4. “Prstojević had a meeting with the Accused, Mladić, and other members of the Bosnian Serb leadership on 15 June 1992, in which it was concluded that they would “clear the Serbian territory”, starting with Mojmiilo and Dobrinja,” the judgement against Karadžić states.²⁰¹

Around 17 June 1992, SRK units took civilians out of Dobrinja to the Lukavica barracks, where the MUP separated them according to their ethnicities. Bosnian Muslims were then sent to Kula Prison.²⁰²

On or about 26 June 1992, approximately 400 Bosnian Muslim women and children from Dobrinja who were at Kula Prison were transferred to the border between Serb and Muslim controlled Sarajevo. Mandić assisted in the transfer.²⁰³

On 25 June 1992, Prstojević spoke with Rade Ristić, a member of the Crisis Staff, and gave him permission to transfer Bosnian Muslim apartments in Dobrinja to Serbs who were involved in the fighting there. He informed Ristić that he had printed the requisite forms for such transfers. The Karadžić judgement states:

“During this conversation, Prstojević learned that Serbs Forces were holding their ground in the Kasindol area and told Ristić: ‘All right. But have them hold on to it tightly and have them all killed there, please. [...] All that is Muslim to be killed, like Alija [...] I don’t want to see one military aged Muslim alive there.’”²⁰⁴

From September 1992, there was a confrontation line on the eastern side of Dobrinja, separating the SRK-controlled areas of Dobrinja 1 and 4 from ABiH-controlled areas of Dobrinja 2 and 3B.

201 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 846.

202 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 846.

203 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 856.

204 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 846.

Kula Prison

Kula Prison was located close to the Sarajevo airport, on a compound with other buildings including a police station, the Ministry of Justice, and the military prosecutor's office. The compound had a large warehouse for goods and food supplies. It also had its own farming facilities.

Prior to the war, Kula Prison served as a medium security prison for persons serving sentences of less than six months. **On 6 April 1992**, all convicts were released on the orders of the warden. Kula Prison was under the jurisdiction of the MUP from at least May 1992 until the beginning of August 1992, when it was taken over by the RS Ministry of Justice.²⁰⁵

As of 1 August 1992, Radoje Lalović was appointed as the first warden of Kula Prison. Soniboj Škiljević served as the acting warden **from 16 December 1992 until 1 January 1994**. Lalović and Škiljević were acquitted for war crimes committed in the Kula Penitentiary by the Court of BiH in 2011 due to lack of evidence.²⁰⁶

The commander of the guards was Neđo Pandurević. The police chief at Kula was Milenko Tepavčević and the police commander was Radenko Vujičić. **After August 1992**, Kula Prison continued to be secured by the MUP, with a police officer guarding the entrance to the premises. The guards were responsible for the administration of the premises and were regulated by Tepavčević. The JNA and later the VRS were present at Kula Prison, controlling, such matters as the coming and going of detainees and the military commission for exchanges at the SRK.²⁰⁷ The judgement against Karadžić notes:

"Detainees were brought to Kula by soldiers, members of the police, paramilitary forces, as well as special purpose units of the JNA. Members of paramilitary units, including the White Eagles, Arkan's men, and Oljača's Chetniks ate their meals at Kula Prison."²⁰⁸

The Chamber in the case against Karadžić found that Serb forces held non-Serbs from Ilidža and neighboring municipalities, including civilians, in custody in Kula prison **from May 1992 until at least October 28, 1994**.

205 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 847/8.

206 Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, "Case of the Prosecutor's Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina against Radoje Lalović and Soniboj Škiljević", second-instance verdict, 2011, <https://sudbih.gov.ba/Post/Read/17719-radoje-lalovic-i-soniboj-skiljevic-oglaseni-krivim>.

207 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 848.

208 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 849.

"The Chamber further finds that the detainees were held in poor conditions characterized by inadequate space, bedding, and sanitary facilities. The Chamber also finds that detainees were provided insufficient food. The Chamber further finds that male detainees were subjected to forced labour and beatings while detained at Kula Prison."²⁰⁹

At various times, some rooms in Kula Prison were so crowded that there was barely enough room for detainees to sit or lie down. Access to toilets was so limited that detainees defecated and urinated in the room, creating an over-powering stench. The ground floor was damp, without any heating. Lice infestation was widespread. Other rooms provided slightly better accommodation with mattresses on the floor or beds. Detainees also had access to water and to the toilet at least three times per day.

According to information from the Public Security Station of Ilidža, **on 20 May 1992**, they wrote to the MUP and Ministry of Justice, informing them of the inadequate conditions in terms of accommodation, food, hygiene, and health for the 156 detainees who had been at Kula Prison since 12 May 1992.²¹⁰ As the judgement against Karadžić describes:

"During the war, the Kula Prison compound also housed civilians from the surrounding areas while they awaited transfer to Muslim held territory. They stayed in a separate part of the prison from the detainees. At least 10,000 Bosnian Muslim civilians were accommodated at Kula Prison for periods ranging from a few days to several months."²¹¹


On 7 May 1992, five detainees who had just arrived at Kula Prison from Grbavica were beaten so badly that one died immediately and another detainee, Zlatan Salčinović, died the next morning. The judgement against Karadžić states: "Mirsad Smajš and at least one other detainee took the bodies of these individuals to a van after which they were transported elsewhere. The Chamber received forensic evidence that the body of an individual identified as Zlatan 'Salčin' was discovered in a grave in Sarajevo."²¹²

209 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 853.

210 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 851.

211 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 850.

212 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 854.



According to the judgements, detainees from the Kula prison were sent to the frontlines to perform labor such as de-mining, transporting materials for barricades, digging trenches, and removing the bodies of Serbian fighters. Several prisoners consigned to forced labor were killed or wounded by sniper fire or grenades. Detainees were also assigned to work around the prison, including agricultural work not far from the frontline, during which some of them were killed by grenades.

The VRS decided which detainees would perform work outside of Kula Prison. Mandić was also involved in providing detainees for forced labor. The detainees could not refuse to work, however some were not forced to work if they were unwell. Detainees in work platoons were provided additional food by the prison staff and were sometimes given food or cigarettes by soldiers and locals in the locations where they worked.²¹³ The judgement against Karadžić states:

“Adem Balić was detained at Kula Prison from 23 June to 24 November 1992. After approximately a month in detention there, he was detailed to a work platoon and witnessed the death and wounding of detainees who were forced to work on or near the frontlines. Vahid Gačanović was killed by incoming fire at Ozrenska Street; Ramic Smajić and Zido Nizić were killed by incoming fire in the Kula Prison agricultural complex. The Chamber also received forensic evidence that the bodies of Gačanović and Smajić were found in a mass grave at Vrangeš, which was a wartime cemetery located close to Kula Prison.”²¹⁴

213 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 852/3.

214 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 854.

VOGOŠĆA MUNICIPALITY

Vogošća, one of the ten municipalities which make up Sarajevo, is located to the north of the city, between the municipalities of Novi Grad and Ilijaš. It includes, among others, the largely Muslim inhabited settlements of Barice, Kiše, Tihovići, Svrake, Hotonj, Kobilja Glava, and Ugorsko as well as the mainly Serb inhabited settlements of Krivoglavci, Kotorovići, Blagovac, Paljevo Brdo, and Semizovac.

According to the 1991 census, Vogošća municipality had approximately 24,700 inhabitants, of whom 51% were Bosnian Muslims, 36% were Bosnian Serbs, and 4% were Bosnian Croats.²¹⁵

Vogošća was one of the most industrialized municipalities in the SFRY, hosting several large factories including the Pretis factory for the manufacturing of artillery and ammunition. It was also the site of the Semizovac JNA Barracks which was used to store the weaponry and equipment of the JNA, as well as the Vogošća and Ilijaš territorial defense units.

In the 1990 elections, the SDA won 18 seats in the Municipal Assembly. The SDS secured 15 seats, while the remaining 18 seats went to other parties. Subsequently, the SDA and SDS formed a coalition and divided the positions of authority in Vogošća amongst themselves.

215 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 929.

Bilal Hasanović from the SDA became the President of the Vogošća Municipal Assembly, and Rajko Koprivica, who was the President of the SDS in the municipality, became the President of the Executive Board. Vehid Hodžić, a Bosnian Muslim, became the Chief of the Vogošća SJB.

At times, Koprivica and Jovan Tintor, a high-ranking SDS official in Vogošća, met with Momčilo Krajišnik in Hotonj. Before the war, Karadžić also visited Vogošća municipality on one or two occasions.

In March 1992, the SDS delegates, led by Koprivica, announced at an assembly session that they were establishing the Serb Municipality of Vogošća and threatened that any Bosnian Muslims who did not pledge loyalty to this new municipality would be expelled. Koprivica stated that "Muslims were simply going to disappear." After making this announcement, the SDS delegates walked out of the assembly session. **On 24 March 1992**, the Bosnian Serb Assembly unanimously verified the decision to establish the Serb municipality of Vogošća along with 34 other Serb municipalities. The Serb Municipality of Vogošća was established **in March or April 1992**. Svetozar Stanić was appointed the municipality's President, a position he would hold until November 1992. Koprivica was appointed President of the Serb Municipal Assembly.²¹⁶ **At the beginning of 1992**, the Serb Crisis Staff was also established under the leadership of Tintor.²¹⁷

216 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 931.

217 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV",



(Source: Vogošća municipality)

In early March 1992, both Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs erected barricades in the areas where they formed a majority. After the erection of barricades around Svrake, the JNA began supplying local Serbs with large quantities of weapons which belonged to the Vogošća TO and had been stored in the Semizovac Barracks. The JNA also trained local Serbs to use the weapons. All the weapons from the Pretis Factory were also brought to the Semizovac Barracks. On 14 May 1992, the Semizovac Barracks came under the command of Vogošća Crisis Staff.

Sometime between 29 February and 1 March 1992, a Bosnian Muslim family was attacked in the predominantly Serb village of Krivoglavci. On that same day, Svrake came under heavy fire.

In April 1992, a series of meetings between SDS and SDA representatives were held in Vogošća. At those meetings, Tintor insisted that Vogošća is Serb land and should therefore be under Serbian rule. Tintor, Koprivica, Slavko Jovanović, Svetozar Stanić, and other leaders from the local SDS then insisted that the municipality of Vogošća be divided on the basis of nationality. The division which they had in mind would give Serbs the city center, all industrial territory, and all the residential communities apart from the villages of Gornje and Donje Ugorsko, Kobilja Glava, and Hotonj. The Bosnian Muslims rejected that proposal.²¹⁸

Between 4 and 7 April 1992, Serb forces occupied most of Vogošća Municipality. The municipal building was surrounded by TO members, and Tintor raised the Serbian flag over it.²¹⁹

The Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina convicted Tintor, a member of the Main Board of the SDS and the president of the Vogošća Crisis Staff, for his participation in preparing, organizing, and executing attacks on the civilian population; his participation in a joint criminal enterprise with the intention of implementing the strategic objectives of the Serb people and the planning of operations at the municipal level in Vogošća; and undertaking operations for the complete take over of Vogošća municipal institutions according to the instructions on organizing the Serb people in extraordinary circumstances from December 19, 1991. He was sentenced to ten years in prison.²²⁰

March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 933.

218 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 931.

219 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 935.

220 NOTE: In the absence of an official English translation of the "JUDGEMENT," the relevant passages in this section have been translated by the Post-Conflict Research Center.



(Source: Vogošća municipality)

On 14 November 1992, Momčilo Krajišnik attended a session of the Vogošća Municipality Serb Assembly. The takeover of the municipality was declared successful, but it was also decided that the area up to the village of Kobilja Glava, with a predominantly Muslim population, needed to be cleared.

After the take-over of Svrake, Serb forces continued to expel non-Serbs from their homes throughout the municipality, particularly in Svrake and Bioča. Non-Serb workers at the Vogošća Medical Center were fired from their jobs. Alongside official Bosnian Serb forces, several Serb paramilitary and volunteer groups participated in combat operations, including Šešelj's Men led by Vaske Vidović, a paramilitary group led by Boro Radić, and the Šoša Detachment under the command of Major Jovo Ostojić. Vogošća municipal authorities allocated resources to these paramilitary formations, including Radić's group, and even remunerated them for their services.²²¹ As the judgement against Karadžić describes:

"... On 4 May 1992, after the take-over of Svrake, a large group of Bosnian Muslim villagers was apprehended by Serb forces and taken to the Semizovac Barracks. There, the Bosnian Muslim men, women and children were placed in a hangar which had been previously used

221 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 936.

for storing tanks. After two days, the women and children were separated from the men and taken back to Magpies. Approximately 150 able-bodied men were taken to a place called Naka's Garage whereas a few individuals, including Muračević, were taken to the Bunker by Predrag Žarković and Nebojša Lazić, a paramilitary from Serbia."²²²

There were several detention facilities in Vogošća, including a World War II bunker known as the Bunker, and a detention site known as Planjo's House. All detention facilities in Vogošća were run by a reserve police unit under the command of Branko Vlačo. Vlačo answered to the Crisis Staff and determined who entered or exited the Bunker and Planjo's House. Nebojša Špirić was Vlačo's deputy and was formally appointed as commander of the guards for the Vogošća detention facilities. Špirić later replaced Vlačo and became the warden of all detention facilities in Vogošća.²²³

The Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina convicted Vlačo for managing Planjo's House and the Bunker, as well as another detention site in Vogošća known as Naka's Garage, from May to October of 1992. They also determined that he was aware of and contributed to the widescale and systematic attack by Serbian forces on non-Serb civilians, and acted with the intention of implementing the state policy to persecute the Bosniak and Croat populations in Vogošća, Ilijaš, Centar, and other Sarajevo municipalities. The judgement against Vlačo states:

"He committed and aided persecution by participating in establishing and organizing the work of the civilian camps Planjo's house, Nako's garage, Sonja and Bunker. He personally participated in the transfer of civilians from other facilities to the aforementioned facilities, took over the management of the camps in by which he established and maintained a system of abuse of captured civilians in such a way that they were kept in inhumane conditions without the possibility of satisfying basic hygiene needs, where they were killed, tortured and forced to do forced labor, and used as human shields, during which they died, were wounded or survived psychological trauma."²²⁴

The Bunker Detention Facility

The Bunker was a concrete facility of around 36 square meters that had been built during World War II. It had concrete floors, one door, and a small window with metal bars. It was situated in close proximity to a river and a local restaurant and motel called "Kon Tiki," also

²²² United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 940/1.

²²³ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 939.

²²⁴ NOTE: In the absence of an official English translation of the "JUDGEMENT," the relevant passages in this section have been translated by the Post-Conflict Research Center.

known as "Kod Sonja." "Kod Sonja" served as the headquarters of the Vogošća Crisis Staff.²²⁵

There were 30 to 70 people detained in the Bunker on average. Initially, four women were held in the Bunker and the adjoining buildings. Later on, more women were also brought to Kod Sonja.

According to the judgment of the Trial Chamber in the case against Karadžić, there were holes in the roof of the Bunker through which rain fell. As described in the Karadžić judgement, "Inside the Bunker, it was very dark, cold and wet. Detainees slept on a dirty concrete floor. On or about 16 May 1992, the guards brought gym mats but these mats became soaked with rainwater. All the garbage and leftovers from Kod Sonja were thrown downhill and accumulated around the Bunker."²²⁶

Detainees were given little to eat. The guards decided who got food and who didn't, and sometimes gave the detainees' rations to dogs. At other times, they forced detainees to eat out of the same bowls as were used to feed the dogs. Initially, guards took detainees outside to relieve themselves. As the number of detainees increased later on, however, guards forced them to use a bucket inside the compound which often would not be emptied for days.²²⁷

Slobodan Avlijaš, who joined the SrBiH Commission for the Inspection of Collection Centers **in August 1992**, testified that during an official visit to the Bunker, he observed the detainees' conditions and found them to be so inhumane that he was left "feeling horror."²²⁸

On the first day of his stay in the Bunker, Eset Muračević was forced to run a gauntlet. Later that same day, he was blindfolded and taken to a bridge where he was interrogated, threatened, and beaten by Predrag Jovanović, Lazić, and Žarković.²²⁹

In early May 1992, detainees at the Bunker were taken out on a daily basis for interrogations, during which they were beaten. The guards as well as members of Šešelj's Men threw smoke grenades, tear gas, and stink bombs into the Bunker in Vlačo's presence.²³⁰

²²⁵ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 939.

²²⁶ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 941.

²²⁷ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 941.

²²⁸ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 941/2.

²²⁹ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 942.

²³⁰ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 942.

On one occasion, six members of Šešelji's Men separated Ahmet Hido and Hasan Abaz and proceeded to punch, kick, and beat them with rifle butts in the presence of Vlačo and other guards. According to the Karadžić judgement, "Afterwards, they forced the two Bosnian Muslim men to have oral sex and sexual intercourse,"²³¹

According to the verdict of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dragan Damjanović, who was sentenced to 20 years in prison, took about 20 civilians from the Bunker to the Reljevo locality near Žuč Hill for forced labor, which consisted of building a road for the Serb army. He then singled out five civilians and drove them in a truck towards the frontlines on Žuč.²³²

Between June and July 1992, Mladen Milanović, a guard at the Bunker camp, beat a prisoner in the camp as well as allowed military and paramilitary soldiers, who were prohibited from entering the camp, to come into the camp while he was on duty, whereupon they subjected prisoners to myriad forms of physical and mental abuse.²³³

According to the judgement against Karadžić, "women who were detained in the Bunker were subjected to sexual abuse in the Bunker, the surrounding facilities, and at the Serb positions on the front."²³⁴

The Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina convicted Dragan Damjanović of rape, among other charges. **In late September 1992**, he came to the ground floor of the house where the victim lived in Semizovac. He ordered her to undress and lay on the couch where he raped her.²³⁵

In May 1993, Slavko Savić, a member of the VRS Vogošća Light Infantry Brigade, came to the front of a family home in Semizovac and forced a woman to get into his car at gunpoint. He took her to the Krivoglavci bus station where he ordered her to undress. After removing his pants, he grabbed the victim by the hair and forced her to perform fellatio on him. He then lowered the seat of the car and raped her. Savić was later sentenced to eight years in prison by the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina.²³⁶

231 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 942/3.

232 NOTE: In the absence of an official English translation of the "JUDGEMENT," the relevant passages in this section have been translated by the Post-Conflict Research Center.

233 OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, "The BiH War Crimes Case Map", Judgment Milanović, Mladen, <https://maparz.pravosudje.ba/case/milanovi%C4%87-mladen>, www.pravosudje.ba.

234 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 944.

235 NOTE: In the absence of an official English translation of the "JUDGEMENT," the relevant passages in this section have been translated by the Post-Conflict Research Center.

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At the end of May 1992, Muračević was told that he would be sent back to Svrake and that he would be killed there by Muslims. He was then blindfolded and taken to Naka's garage for one night, where he saw around 150 people being detained, many of whom were from Svrake.

Planjo's House

Planjo's house, which served as a detention facility **between July 1992 and February 1993**, was located between Svrake and Semizovac, some 200 metres from the Sarajevo-Zenica road. The spacious three-floor facility also included a garage, an attic, and a basement. The house was originally a private property owned by two Muslims, Almas and Miralem Planjo.

On 11 August 1992, Vlačo and several guards moved Muračević and about 30 of the approximately 40 detainees who remained in the Bunker to Planjo's house, which was empty at the time. The prisoners, including women and children, were detained in the basement.

On 17 August 1992, the Ilijaš SJB brought 91 Bosnian Muslims who had been detained in Ilijaš to Planjo's House. **On 22 August 1992**, Ramiz Mujkić who had been detained in the Rajlovac Barracks, in Novi Grad Municipality, was also transferred to Planjo's House. **In late September or October 1992**, about 70 Bosnian Muslim men who had been detained in the Hadžići Culture and Sport Centre were transferred to Planjo's House. Other detainees were brought to the location from various places around Vogošća municipality, such as Visoko, Sokolac, Hadžići, Bioča, Doglodi, and Nahorevo.

In December 1992, four girls between the ages of 16 and 22 were brought to Planjo's House.²³⁷ **From 22 August to mid-October 1992**, there were between 100 and 150 detainees in the facility. **Between late August and late January 1993**, Serbian forces took the non-Serb detainees from Planjo's house to the frontlines and forced them to build bunkers for Serb soldiers, dig trenches, carry ammunition, cut wood, search for land mines, carry dead bodies, dig graves, or serve as human shields.

Detainees at the facility were poorly fed. Some slept on beds when available, while most slept on the floor or on the stairs. Detainees were given blankets, and they could go to the toilet located on the ground floor. As detailed in the Karadžić judgement:

"In Planjo's House, some detainees were placed in a small isolation room. Siniša Đurđić and Nikola Jovanović, Tintor's personal driver, beat and abused the detainees and brought their

237 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 945.

friends to watch. After one such beating as a result of which one of the detainees was left unconscious, one of Đurđić's friends drew out his gun and placed it in the mouths of several detainees, threatening to kill everybody."²³⁸

From August 1992 to February 1993, Damjanović repeatedly came to the Planjo's house with other guards to beat the prisoners. He was particularly abusive towards two prisoners, Professor Zahid Baručija and Eset Muračević. He took the detainees for forced labor on the frontlines, where he continued to physically and verbally abuse them. He also used some detainees as human shields, as a result of which many were wounded and killed.²³⁹

In January 1993, Damjanović took several prisoners from the camp to perform forced labor, including Baručija who had been severely beaten and was in very poor condition. health, and took several other prisoners to forced labor. He tortured Baručija, carving a cross into his forehead with a bayonet as he lay in the snow. Damjanović then took the prisoners to the house of Rajko Bunjevac's, where he killed Baručija.²⁴⁰

As stated in the judgement against Karadžić, sometimes on weekends, drunken volunteers from Serbia came to Planjo's house to beat and abuse the detainees. The guards referred to these individuals as "weekend Chetniks." The judgement against Karadžić states:

"On one occasion, one of these 'weekend Chetniks' entered Planjo's House and ordered Mirsad Šehić to eat cigarette butts. Šehić proceeded to chew the cigarette butts but when he proved unable to swallow them, he was ordered to perform oral sex with another man in front of his own father."²⁴¹

The Chamber at the Karadžić trial concluded that **in August and September 1992**, at least 16 detainees from Planjo's house were killed and several others were injured as a result of Serb forces forcing them to perform labor on the frontlines or using them as human shields.²⁴²

Forced Relocation

According to Muračević, **from May 1992 to mid-June 1993**, approximately 13,000 people

238 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 947.

239 NOTE: In the absence of an official English translation of the "JUDGEMENT," the relevant passages in this section have been translated by the Post-Conflict Research Center.

240 NOTE: In the absence of an official English translation of the "JUDGEMENT," the relevant passages in this section have been translated by the Post-Conflict Research Center.

241 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 948.

242 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 952.

left parts of the Vogošća municipality that were under Serbian control, the vast majority of which were Bosnian Muslims,

Bosnian Muslims who left Vogošća had to ask for certificates of departure and were forced to hand over their property to the municipal authorities or exchange it for Serbian property in other municipalities of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Chamber at the Karadžić trial determined that the non-Serb population from the Serb-controlled parts of Vogošća were forced to leave.²⁴³

HADŽIĆI MUNICIPALITY

Hadžići is a municipality in central BiH, located about 12 kilometres southwest of Sarajevo. The municipality is bordered to the northeast by Ilidža; to the north by Kiseljak; to the northwest by Kreševo; to the west and southwest by Konjic; and to the south and southeast by Trnovo. Before the conflict, the population of Hadžići municipality was about 24,000 inhabitants with the demographic breakdown of approximately 63.6% Bosnian Muslim, 26.3% Serb, and 3.1% Croat. The town of Hadžići, however, had a Serb majority. Tarčin, Binježevo, and Pazarić were large settlements within the Hadžići municipality, each of which was composed of a number of villages.²⁴⁴

The municipality was strategically important because of its geographical position, as well as the fact that it contained a large engineering factory run by the JNA, called the TRZ, and a sizeable weapons depot in Žunovnica. There was also a JNA military barracks in Žunovnica, as well as in Ušivak and Pazarić.²⁴⁵

During the course of 1991, the number of military personnel and the amount of weapons in the municipality increased. Around mid-1991, tanks appeared in the hills around Hadžići, and mortar positions were established around the village of Bare. Several tanks were also positioned in Binježevo. "During the last week of August and the first week of September, Bosnian Serb reserve soldiers in JNA uniforms who appeared to be mapping the area arrived at a barracks located in the village of Blažuj. Around the same time, Mehmed Musić saw men unloading boxes of ammunition, and Zijad Okić noticed weapons were taken up to trenches built on Tinovo Hill," the judgement against Karadžić states.²⁴⁶

243 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 953.

244 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 814.

245 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 814/5.

246 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 816.



photo by Benisa Bibuljica

By the beginning of February 1992, residents of the Hadžići municipality had begun to organize nightly patrols and guards in the local areas where each ethnic group was prominent. Around the same time, Bosnian Serbs began to leave the regular and reserve police units, and the JNA began distributing firearms to the Serb population at night. According to the Karadžić judgement:

“In late March 1992, the police warehouse in Rakovica, which was full of weapons, was broken into during a time when Bosnian Muslim officers were on duty. Machine-guns, police gear, and some transportation devices all went missing. By the end of the month, Bosnian Muslim formations in Hadžići were well-organised and armed.”²⁴⁷

During the first half of April 1992, the SDS stopped participating in the work of the Municipal Defense Council, and Bosnian Serbs attended the session of the Municipal Assembly for the last time. Referring to the “extremely difficult political and security situation,” the SDS held a Serb Assembly session at the Hadžići Culture and Sport Center, where they declared the Serb Municipality of Hadžići. At the same session, Nevenko Samouković was “given a mandate to form the municipal government.” The SDS selected Drago Milošević as President of the Serb Municipality of Hadžići as well as President of the Hadžići Assembly of the Serbian People, but he was soon replaced by Ratko Radić, who remained President of the Municipality until the end of the war.²⁴⁸

During the proclamation session, an anti-aircraft artillery weapon was positioned outside of the Culture and Sport Centre and was manned by members of the Serb TO. Thereafter, the Serb police began arresting “Muslim terrorists” who were transporting arms.²⁴⁹

Immediately after the proclamation session, the Hadžići Crisis Staff was established as the highest organ of authority for the Serb municipality, taking over the functions of the Serb Municipal Assembly. The first task of the Crisis Staff was to “organise the defence of the Serb territory of Hadžići and to take care of, feed and organise the citizens as much as war circumstances allow.”²⁵⁰

247 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 817/8.

248 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 819.

249 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 822.

250 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 821.



“That night, between roughly 2,000 and 3,000 Muslim and Croat men, women, and children withdrew from Hadžići town, leaving only 200 or 300 behind. **By 9 May**, the Serbs had taken control of parts of the municipality of Hadžići and had encircled the TRZ. Over the following few days, Serb reservists began setting up check-points around Hadžići town, thereby restricting residents’ movements. Serb women and children were put on buses headed toward Montenegro, and the Serb Forces began to arrest, expel, or kill people who remained in the municipality. The Serb police went around to homes, instructing people to stay inside.”²⁵²

Between 10 and 12 May 1992, Serb forces and the Bosnian Muslim TO engaged in a “heavy exchange of fire” in Hadžići. **By 12 May**, Serb forces in the Krupačka Rijeka area, near Tinovo Hill, and the JNA complex at Žunovnica were all surrounded by Bosnian Muslim forces; however, the Serb Forces maintained control over the situation and the area. Fighting in and around Hadžići town continued **throughout May and into June 1992**.

252 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 823.

Beginning around 10 April, the co-operation between the SDS and the JNA commanders at the barracks located throughout Hadžići became more overt, and reserve units from Serbia and Montenegro began to arrive in the municipality to be deployed at the TRZ. Military preparations also began in the Serb-majority villages of Bare and Miševići.

On 7 May 1992, a group of armed Serb reservists and policemen took over the municipal building in Hadžići and expelled all the workers. The building was then locked and guarded. On the following day, “small-scale hostilities” broke out between the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Muslim police. The Serbs took control of the health center next to the municipal building and took positions in the hills. High-ranking members of the SDA and SDS met to discuss the security situation. Approximately 30 minutes later, the police station came under artillery attack. The SDS had issued an order demanding that the Muslim members of the police, TO Headquarters, and other municipal authorities leave Hadžići by 6 p.m.²⁵¹ The judgement against Karadžić describes:

251 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 822/3.



Attacks on Surrounding Villages

Villages surrounding Hadžići had also come under attack. **On 7 or 8 May 1992**, using weapons stationed in front of the Culture and Sport Center, Serb Forces opened fire on the village of Kovačevići. The Serb Forces took control of Kovačevići **on 11 May 1992**. Some inhabitants were killed.²⁵³

After the attack on Kovačevići, the residents of Musići, a Muslim settlement within the Serb village of Ušivak came under fire from the Serb forces. Aware that they would not be able to put up resistance, the residents of Musići started taking women and children out of the village **from 7 to 9 May 1992**. Around 15 May, Serbian forces shelled houses and other buildings in Musići from their position in Ušivak. Two days later, two Bosnian Serbs came to Musići and called on the residents to surrender. When they refused, the shelling continued for the next three days. Based on a decision of the Crisis Staff, **on 20 May 1992**, about 50 to 60 members of the Serbian forces entered Musići from various sides.

Mehmed Musić was arrested in his house and taken with 14 other men to Alija Musić's house, where he saw three corpses. Serb soldiers took the men to the elementary school building in Hadžići, where the guards threatened to kill them and cursed at them, saying and said "there would be no *balija* state soon."²⁵⁴ The Karadžić judgement further describes:

"The guards spat on the detainees and told them that they were finished. After approximately 30 minutes, the detainees were taken out of the school and marched to the garage of the Municipal Assembly building, which was located approximately 150 metres away."²⁵⁵

The Hadžići Crisis Staff had decided to arrest and detain all Bosnian Muslim men of military age from areas in the municipality such as Binježevo, Žunovnica, and Kučice. According to Tihomir Glavaš, this decision was made because the Serbs had information that Muslims were arresting military-aged Serbs and were preparing to attack. The Serbs also claimed to be arresting Bosnian Muslims for possession of illegal weapons. The arrests were carried out by the Serb police and the Serb TO.²⁵⁶

In the Hadžići village of Breza, Momir Tomaš, a member of the VRS, came to the house of a Bosniak family together with Predrag Matić **in November 1992**, demanding that they give

253 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 824.

254 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 826.

255 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 826.

256 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 826/7.

them gold and money. When the family said that they did not have any, he searched the entire house and took several items of gold that he found. Then he approached one member of the household and punched him in the chin, drawing blood. After that, he began punching and kicking another member of the household all over his body, cursing his 'Balija mother,' and threatening him, causing severe physical pain and suffering. Then he ordered this person to pour cleaning product and liquid starch for clothes over his head which produced sores on his face. He ordered the man to take a picture of Begova mosque from the wall and wipe his bottom with it as an ethnic and religious insult. He then ordered the two victims to take him to the house of another Bosniak family, firing an automatic rifle next to one of them. Upon arriving at the home of the second Bosniak family, he searched the house. Finding no gold or money, he took some other things and then ordered the victims to put them in his vehicle. He kicked one of the victims and ordered them to pull the vehicle out of the mud, threatening to kill them otherwise. The Supreme Court of FBiH sentenced Tomaš to one year and four months in prison.²⁵⁷

Near the village of Breza **in late 1992**, Rade Veselinović, a member of the Hadžići VRS Military Police, harassed a Bosniak woman named Hasnija Musić. He intercepted her during her commute, grabbed her breasts, and pushed her up against a tree. He then took out his pistol and fired several bullets above her head. Accepting the plea agreement, the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina sentenced Veselinović to seven years and six months in prison for the persecution of the non-Serb population from the Hadžići area, including murder, illegal imprisonment, torture, forced disappearance, and other inhumane acts intended to cause great suffering and severe physical harm.²⁵⁸

In 1992, Boro Krsmanović, a member of the VRS in the Hadžići area, entered a woman's apartment accompanied by two unknown soldiers, looking for her son, who was hiding there. After finding him, Krsmanović pointed a gun at him and threatened to kill him. His mother tried to intervene, after which Krsmanović fired a shot into the ceiling. He then searched the woman's apartment as well as her son's apartment which was located in the same building. Then Krsmanović and another soldier returned for the son and took him against his will to the Žunovnica barracks where they handed him over to the guards. From there he was transferred to the premises of the former TO warehouse, which was being used as a detention facility. The Supreme court of FBiH sentenced Krsmanović to three years in prison.²⁵⁹

257 OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, "The BiH War Crimes Case Map", judgement Momir Tomaš, <https://maparz.pravosudje.ba/case/toma%C5%A1-momir>, www.pravosudje.ba.

258 Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, "Prosecution of Bosnia and Herzegovina against Rade Veselinović", 2009, <https://sudbih.gov.ba/Post/Read/16889-potvrdjena-optuznica-u-predmetu-rade-veselinovic>.

259 OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, "The BiH War Crimes Case Map, judgement Boro Krsmanović, <https://maparz.pravosudje.ba/case/krsmanovi%C4%87-boro>, www.pravosudje.ba.



In the area of Hadžići **in June and July 1992**, Nemanja Jovičić raped two Bosniak women and threatening to kill them. Jovičić, a member of the VRS Hadžići Battalion, was sentenced by the Supreme Court of FBiH to ten years in prison for war crimes against the civilian population, including rape, intimidation, illegal abduction, abuse, and robbery.²⁶⁰

Ratko Gašović was also convicted of raping a woman near the Coca-Cola factory in Hadžići **in late 1992**. He made the woman and her sister do forced labor every day, while subjecting them to physical and mental abuse. As a civilian, the Supreme Court of FBiH sentenced Gašović to eight years in prison.²⁶¹

On 16 May 1992, Veselinović shot Musa 'Pepo' Stjepan in the face with an automatic rifle on the street in front of the Hadžići Cultural Center, wounding him.²⁶²

In the village of Donji Hadžići, **in June 1992**, Veselinović and a group of unidentified VRS soldiers found a man named Mujesira Piknjač and killed him.²⁶³

On or around 4 July 1992, Veselinović came to the front of the building at 8 JNA Street in Hadžići with members of the local military police. Veselinović went in and took a man named Safet Hrvat from the building, put him in a Pincgauer vehicle, and drove him in an unknown direction. The man was never heard from again.²⁶⁴

Hadžići Municipal Assembly Building

Bosnian Muslims were arrested between **between 12 May 12 and early June 1992** and detained in the garage of the Hadžići Municipal Assembly "for interrogation." As the judgement against Karadžić states: "When the 14 men from Musići arrived on 20 May, one Croat and one Muslim prisoner were already inside the garage. Mehmed Musić spent six days in the garage with about 47 other men. The detainees were only fed one slice of bread once or twice a day, as well as some watery soup, and were given only one or two bottles of water for the entire group. One by one, each detainee was called out and taken up into the Hadžići Municipal Assembly Building to be interrogated by members of the Serb Forces about the supply of weapons to Bosnian Muslims."²⁶⁵

260 OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, "The BiH War Crimes Case Map", judgement Nemanja Jovičić, <https://maparz.pravosudje.ba/case/jovi%C4%87i%C4%87-nemanja>, www.pravosudje.ba.

261 OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, "The BiH War Crimes Case Map", judgement Ratko Gašović, <https://maparz.pravosudje.ba/case/ga%C5%A1ovi%C4%87-ratko>, www.pravosudje.ba.

262 Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, "Prosecution of Bosnia and Herzegovina against Rada Veselinović", 2009, <https://sudbih.gov.ba/Post/Read/16889-potvrdjena-optuznica-u-predmetu-rade-veselinovic>.

263 Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, "Prosecution of Bosnia and Herzegovina against Rada Veselinović", 2009, <https://sudbih.gov.ba/Post/Read/16889-potvrdjena-optuznica-u-predmetu-rade-veselinovic>.

264 Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, "Prosecution of Bosnia and Herzegovina against Rada Veselinović", 2009, <https://sudbih.gov.ba/Post/Read/16889-potvrdjena-optuznica-u-predmetu-rade-veselinovic>.

265 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 828.

On their third day in the garage, the group of men from Musići were taken to the weapons storage facility in Žunovnica to load ammunition. **On 25 May 1992**, all but three of the men from Musići were moved to the Culture and Sport Center. The other detainees remained behind in the Municipal Assembly Building garage **until 22 June**, when they were transferred to the Slaviša Čiča Barracks in Lukavica.

In mid-May 1992, Jovičić and two other members of the VRS stole property during a search of a civilian's apartment. Jovičić then took the owner of the apartment and several other residents to the municipal garage, where he and another soldier beat them. The apartment owner's father, who had visibly been abused, was brought in, and the beatings continued. Afterwards, the son was assigned to a work detail in which he was forced to perform hard physical labor.

The Trial Chamber in the case against Karadžić confirmed that from **20 May until at least the end of June 1992**, Serb forces detained around fifty Bosnian Muslims, including several civilians and two women, in a garage under the Hadžići Municipal Assembly building. Throughout their detention, the prisoners were kept in poor conditions without sufficient food or water. On one occasion, they were made to engage in forced labor.²⁶⁶

Hadžići Culture and Sports Centre

The Crisis Staff decided to detain Bosnian Muslims of military age in the Cultural and Sports Center, which they placed under the control of the VRS. **On 25 May 1992**, twelve men from Musići were transferred from the garage of the Hadžići Municipal Assembly building to the Cultural and Sports Center. According to the Karadžić judgement: "By that time, about 60 men—as well as a woman—were already being detained in two locker rooms of the Culture and Sport Centre. The facility was first guarded by members of the Serb TO; although the Serb police began to provide security along with members of the military after approximately August 1992."²⁶⁷

Because the locker room was too small to accommodate the men from Musići, they were taken to the main sports hall. Here, they slept on the floor without blankets and often received as little as one slice of bread to eat per day. Only two toilets were available to the detainees.

266 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 835.

267 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 829.



The detainees at the Culture and Sports Center were frequently beaten and sexually abused by members of the paramilitary units. In one incident on or around **25 May**, prisoners were beaten and humiliated by three fighters from the unit Arkan's Men in black uniforms. **Around 15 June**, members of another unit, Šešelj's Men, also came to the facility. As the judgement against Karadžić describes: "The men wore gloves with the fingertips cut off, painted their faces black, wore camouflage uniforms, and carried big knives. A woman with dyed blond hair named Ljiljia who was with Šešelj's men removed one man's pants and told another man to "suck the first man's sexual organ". She then removed her own pants and told the second man to lick her buttocks, threatening to slit the men's throats if they did not comply. Šešelj's men singled out certain detainees and beat them severely, while forcing other detainees to fight each other. These beatings took place in the presence of the Serb TO guards."²⁶⁸

By 22 June 1992, 282 people had been detained in the Hadžići Culture and Sport Center. Around that time, "a rather large group" of men, women, and children from the nearby settlement of Kučice arrived at the Culture and Sport Center. Shortly thereafter, the guards told the detainees that they were going to be exchanged. Around 10 p.m. that evening, in accordance with a decision of the Crisis Staff, the male detainees were loaded onto several buses which then left the facility. En route, one bus stopped first in front of the garage of the Hadžići Municipal Assembly building, where it picked up detainees before proceeding to Kula Prison. "There, 'Chetniks' boarded the bus, beat the detainees with rifle butts, and extinguished cigarettes on their faces," according to the judgement against Karadžić.²⁶⁹ The detainees were ultimately taken to the Slaviša Vajner Čiča Barracks in Lukavica.

268 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 831.

269 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 832.

On the morning of **7 September**, approximately 200 Bosnian Muslims from Binježevo, Garovići, Žunovnica, and Grivići were loaded onto five buses. These people – including men, women, children, and elderly – had been under “house arrest” in Hadžići since the outbreak of the war. They were taken for a prisoner exchange at the check-point in Kobiljača, where they remained until approximately 8 p.m., but the exchange fell through. The next day, around 500 detainees in eight buses were taken to another exchange. This exchange also did not take place, and the detainees were returned to the Culture and Sports Center. The Karadžić judgement states: “When the detainees arrived, they were given some food for the children, who at that point had not eaten for two days. Thereafter, the group spent approximately 12 days in the Culture and Sport Centre, receiving food every third day.”²⁷⁰

Around 18 September, Serb forces allowed all the women and children “to go home,” leaving about 100 male detainees out of the original 500.

Between 9 and 23 September, detainees at the Culture and Sports Center were assigned to a work detail digging trenches near Oštrik and at a mountain pass above the reservoir in Dupovci. The judgement against Karadžić states: “While there, the detainees were exposed to sporadic crossfire. The work platoon also built “machine-gun nests” in some buildings and “were taken by a certain Miki Šarenac to loot houses.”²⁷¹

During his second detention at the Culture and Sport Center, Mehmed Musić was interrogated twice by Rade Veselinović.

According to the judgement, **from the beginning of May 1992**, Veselinović and other members of the Hadžići VRS carried out illegal arrests in Hadžići, Žunovnica, Musići, Binježevo, Kućice, and surrounding villages. Veselinović was also involved in the transportation of captives to the Culture and Sports Center, where they were beaten and abused. Unidentified paramilitary members were also allowed to abuse detainees, which included beating them and forcing men to have sexual intercourse with one another. Detainees received little food and were often taken to the frontlines to dig trenches, chop wood, and perform other kinds of manual labor.²⁷²

270 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 833.

271 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 834.

272 Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, “Prosecution of Bosnia and Herzegovina against Rada Veselinović”, 2009, <https://sudbih.gov.ba/Post/Read/16889-potvrđjena-optuznica-u-predmetu-rade-veselinovic>.

Vlastimir Pušara, a member of VRS Hadžići Battalion, was convicted by the Supreme court to seven years in prison for participating in the illegal detention of 20 civilians. The civilians were physically abused and then taken to the Culture and Sports Center on a bus driven by Pušara.²⁷³

Pušara was also convicted for physically and mentally abusing around 30 civilians, mostly women and children who were trying to leave Hadžići **in June 1992**. He separated one man from the group and threatened to kill him before ordering the civilians to go to the Culture and Sports Center.

From May to June of 1992, Jovičić and other members of military and paramilitary units participated in the occupation of Hadžići. In the course of the attack, Jovičić illegally arrested Muslim civilians, including women and children, and took them to the Culture and Sports Center as well as the Municipal Assembly garage. There, Jovičić and other soldiers subjected the detainees to severe physical and mental abuse and forced labor, during which one captive disappeared.

In late May or early June 1992, two detained civilians, Đelal Ismailovski and a person nicknamed Maslo, were forced to transport a stove from Kućica by car. Veselinović stopped them on the way to Hadžići and pulled Ismailovski out of car. He yelled racial slurs at the man and started kicking and hitting him all over his body. He then hit him on the head with a gun, causing massive bleeding, the scars of which are still visible today. Veselinović then pulled the man called Maslo out of the car and beat him in the same manner, threatening him at gun point.

On 22 October 1992, RS Ministry of Justice representative Slobodan Avlijaš submitted a report to the Minister of Justice, Momčilo Mandić, stating that at the time, 90 Muslim “prisoners of war” were being held in the Culture and Sport Center, which was guarded by the Hadžići SJB. The report also stated that the Hadžići SJB did not have the authority to keep people in custody for longer than three days, and therefore was acting “without any authorisation or justification in law.” On the same day, Mandić ordered the Serb Municipality of Hadžići to transfer all of its detainees to the Butmir KPD Investigations Department in Svrake. The following day, all but 14 of the remaining men were transferred to Planjo’s house in Svrake.²⁷⁴

273 OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, “The BiH War Crimes Case Map”, judgement Vlastimir Pušara, www.pravosudje.ba.
274 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 835.

Slaviša Vajner Čiča Barracks

The Slaviša Vajner Čiča Barracks in Lukavica, located about three kilometers from the SRK-controlled territory of Kula, was also used as a detention facility.

On 22 June 1992, at about 9:00 pm, approximately 280 people who had been previously detained in the Hadžići Municipal garage and the Culture and Sports Center were taken to the Slaviša Vajner Čiča Barracks. They were transported on four buses, one of which was driven by Milan Aćimović. As detailed in the judgment against Karadžić:

“The buses first went to Kula prison, in front of which two Serb individuals in camouflage uniforms got on the buses and started beating the detainees badly; these beatings resulted in head injuries. One of the soldiers extinguished a cigarette butt on the face of one of the Bosnian Muslims. The soldiers threw bullets among the detainees and said, ‘[h]ey, balija, you have ammunition!’; they then used that as ‘a pretext’ to beat the detainees. The detainees were then taken to the Slaviša Vajner Čiča Barracks in Lukavica.”²⁷⁵

In the first few hours of detention, individuals were called by their names and beaten. All 280 detainees were taken to one room in another part of the barracks. Later, a uniformed man called 48 people from a list. After being called, the detainee had to pass through a corridor where guards stood on both sides, kicking and beating them with various objects.²⁷⁶

One of the detainees, Mehmed Musić, saw his brother lying on the ground covered in blood and was told to carry him. Musić carried his brother into the room at the end of the gauntlet as instructed. Here he saw the other detainees who had been called, lined up against three walls, and three officers at a desk in the middle of the room. They asked Musić his name, his father’s name, and where he worked. They then kicked and hit him, insulting him with racial slurs, before ordering him to get out. As he went through the hallway, he was hit again. Musić never saw any of the other 47 members of the group again.²⁷⁷

Soldiers later came and beat the prisoners, performing mock-baptisms on them and forcing them to sing Serbian songs. Later “regular JNA soldiers” arrived and told the detainees to stop singing. They said they wouldn’t be harmed any more, and even brought them some food. According to the Karadžić judgement, “The next day, the remaining approximately 233 men went back to the buses and were taken to Kula Prison.”²⁷⁸

275 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 902.

276 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 903.

277 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 903.

278 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 904.

PALE MUNICIPALITY

Pale, one of the ten constitutive municipalities of Sarajevo, is located to the east of Novo Sarajevo and Stari Grad and to the west of Rogatica. The municipality of Pale includes, among other places, the Muslim settlements of Bare, Donja Vinča, Prača, Podgrab, and Renovica, and the largely Serb inhabited settlements of Krivodoli, Lapišnica, Mokro, and Vrhprača. According to the 1991 census, Pale municipality had 16,119 inhabitants, of whom roughly 27% were Bosnian Muslims and 69% were Bosnian Serbs.²⁷⁹

There were several military facilities in Pale, including a barracks in the center of Renovica, a military warehouse in the village of Krivodoli, another warehouse in Jahorinski Potok and a radar facility in Jahorina. **In late March or early April 1992**, the Republic Communications Center was established in Pale and began providing secure lines of communication in the territory of SerBiH. **From April 1992 onwards**, Pale served as the seat of the government of the SerBiH and later of the RS. Between 1992 and 1995, Karadžić used the following three locations in Pale as his office: the Kikinda building, the Mali Dom building, situated in the Panorama Hotel, and the administrative building of the Famos factory. From April 1992 onwards, Karadžić and his family resided at a number of locations in Pale. Momčilo Krajišnik and Biljana Plavšić stayed in the Panorama Hotel complex.

279 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 909.

photo by Alem Bajramović



On 8 May 1991, at the initiative of the SDS Regional Board, the municipalities of Pale, Han Pijesak, and Sokolac declared that they would join together in order to create the Serb Municipal Assembly (SAO) of Romanija. **In November 1991**, Serbs from several army installations began secretly distributing arms to the local Serb population at night.²⁸⁰

At the beginning of 1992, Bosnian Serbs living in Pale were mobilized through written calls to arms. At that time, paramilitary groups began operating in Pale, including the unit commanded by Radomir Kojić, the special unit commanded by Rajko Kušić, and the Šešelj's Men. **In late April or early May 1992**, members of Arkan's Men, led by a man nicknamed "Čarli," also entered Pale and moved into the Panorama Hotel. **During May and June 1992**, a large amount of military equipment and many military personnel arrived in Pale, as did additional paramilitary forces.²⁸¹ The judgement against Karadžić states:

"They were mainly young Serbs; they had red ribbons on their arms and heads, and carried automatic rifles and knives. They often drove around in Pale and confiscated the cars and trucks that belonged to non-Serbs."²⁸²

In early March 1992, the Bosnian Serb municipal authorities called on non-Serbs to hand in their personal weapons. Subsequently, in local communes outside of Pale town, authorities designated special locations for the non-Serb population to bring in their weapons. The weapons collected at these locations were then brought to the SJB building in Pale. At the same time, men in camouflage uniforms who were not from the JNA conducted searches of Bosnian Muslim houses for weapons.

"**On or about 13 March 1992**, policemen and paramilitaries started advising non-Serbs to leave Pale municipality," according to the Karadžić judgement.²⁸³

The Crisis Staff in Pale was established **in March or April 1992**, with its headquarters located in the Pale SJB.²⁸⁴

By April, many Bosnian Muslims had been fired from their jobs and interethnic tensions escalated as large numbers of Bosnian Serb refugees from Sarajevo began arriving in Pale. **On 4 April 1992**, on the Pale-Sarajevo Road, Bosnian Muslims beat two Bosnian Serb bus drivers and some of their passengers.

280 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 911.

281 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 912.

282 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 912.

283 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 917.

284 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 913.

On 11 April 1992, the Pale Crisis Staff promised to provide full security to all residents of Pale. Later that month, however, members of paramilitary units in camouflage uniforms arrested some Bosnian Muslims between the ages of 20 and 30. They were kept in the SJB for several hours before being released. **In early May 1992**, pursuant to an order issued by the Pale Crisis Staff, the Post Office in Pale disconnected the telephone lines of Bosnian Muslims.²⁸⁵

On 22 May, the Bosnian Muslims in Prača, Bogovići, Gornja Vinča, and Podgrab handed over their weapons to Bosnian Serb forces, but the residents of Renovica refused to do so. That same day, members of the Pale MUP and the VRS carried out a military operation in Renovica, attacking the predominantly Muslim village of Donja Vinča, burning houses, and forcing people to flee the village. The judgement against Karadžić confirmed that "Policemen from Pale SJB detained approximately 30 Bosnian Muslims and took them to the Pale Gym."²⁸⁶

In late June and early July 1992, the Bosnian Serb authorities in Pale gave Bosnian Muslim property owners contracts on which their personal information was already written, requiring them to sign the documents before leaving Pale. The contracts provided for the exchange of their properties with Serb held properties in Sarajevo. The Karadžić judgement states that "Those who refused to sign such contracts were forced to surrender the keys to their houses to the Pale SJB."²⁸⁷ During the same period, Serb authorities in Pale organized a number of convoys for the deportation of non-Serbs from the area. The judgement further explains:

"Having considered the totality of the evidence and assessed the circumstances in which the departures occurred, the Chamber finds that Bosnian Muslims were forced to leave. The Chamber notes that in some instances, Bosnian Muslims requested to leave the municipality; however, the Chamber finds that even when the Bosnian Muslims did request to leave Pale, they were driven by the fear caused by all of the surrounding circumstances. Consequently, the Chamber is satisfied that Bosnian Muslims were forced to leave the Serb-controlled parts of Pale municipality."²⁸⁸

285 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 916.

286 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 916.

287 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 919.

288 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 922.

Pale Gym Detention Facility

The Pale Gym, which was located near the SJB, was a detention facility where detainees from Pale, Sarajevo, and Bratunac were held.

As established by the Council in the Karadžić case, **on 10 May 1992**, Mirsad Smajš and eight other detainees from the Sarajevo area were transferred from Kula Prison to Pale Gym. The judgement against Karadžić states that “at that point Pale Gym already held approximately 100 detainees, including some Serbs and Croats, and was guarded by SJB members.”²⁸⁹

A few days later, a group of about 400 badly beaten Bosnian Muslim men who had previously

289 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 922.



been detained at Vuk Karadžić School in Bratunac were brought to Pale Gym in several trucks. One by one, the detainees were taken off the trucks, registered, and placed in the gym.²⁹⁰

On 22 May, following a military operation in Renovica, Serb forces detained about 30 Bosnian Muslim men and took them to Pale Gym. **During the last week of May 1992**, Hajrudin Karić was arrested by two policemen, who then took him to Pale Gym. Karić saw that it was full of Bosnian Muslims, including a woman. The Serbs in camouflage uniforms who were driving police cars took Azem Omerović and three other men to the Pale Gym.

While detainees were provided with water, they were only given one sandwich with a little bologna per day. They became weak from hunger and often fainted. They slept on the floor and were only allowed to use the toilet with the guards’ permission.²⁹¹ The judgement against Karadžić describes:

“The detainees in Pale Gym were constantly subjected to maltreatment. The guards told them that they would be killed unless they were exchanged. The guards also warned them not to attempt to escape and indicated that guards had been posted near each window. The detainees were severely beaten with whatever the guards could have put their hands on and had to run the gauntlet when they asked to go to the toilet. Smajš observed a man in a police uniform use a curved knife to cut off the detainees’ hair.”²⁹²

The judgment against Karadžić notes that on one occasion, a light-haired man of approximately 40 years old entered the Pale Gym in a police uniform, introduced himself as a commander from Pale, and beat the detainees. At the same time, a soldier entered Pale Gym and announced that everyone would be killed unless the soldier’s brother, who had been captured by Bosnian Muslims, was released. Sometime after the Bosnian Muslim men from Bratunac had arrived, the guards had a disagreement with “army troops” who were at the door and wanted to enter the gym to beat the detainees.

The Karadžić judgement reads: “During Karić’s detention, the policemen guarding the door allowed members of the paramilitary units, including members of the units Rajko Kušić and Srđan Knežević, to enter the gymnasium in Pale several times during the day and severely beat the detainees with sticks and butts. Members of those paramilitary units also took detainees out of the gymnasium in Pale to beat them, and some of them never returned to

290 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 923.

291 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 924.

292 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 925.

the gymnasium.”²⁹³

The detainees who were brought from Bratunac were exchanged **on 16 or 17 May 1992**. Smajš and 64 other detainees were exchanged **on 18 May**.

On 6 July 1992, five members of Kušić’s unit entered the gym and beat three Muslim detainees unconscious with clubs and other instruments. Two detainees died approximately half an hour later, while the third died two days later.

Hajrudin Karić and 34 other detainees were transferred to Kula prison **on 11 July 1992**, accompanied by members of the reserve police.

ILIJAS MUNICIPALITY

“[T]omorrow in Ilijaš [...] Ah, no mercy there [...] Expel all and that without weapons and please don’t come back anymore [...] Go to Visoko and [...] our people are to be moved in and the buildings and position filled.” These were the words of RS Minister of Justice Momčilo Mandić during a phone conversation with his friend Milanko Mučion on 27 May 1992, the day before the attack on Gornja Bioča in Ilijaš Municipality.²⁹⁴

Ilijaš was one of the ten municipalities that made up the city of Sarajevo. According to the 1991 census, the population of Ilijaš was 20,718, the ethnic composition of which was 9,601 (46.3%) Serbs, 8,411 (40.6%) Muslims, 1,505 (7.3%) Croats, and 1,201 (5.8%) persons of other ethnicities.

The Prosecution’s Demographic Unit estimated that approximately 1,648 individuals of Muslim ethnicity and 1,075 persons of Croat ethnicity who had resided in the municipality of Ilijaš in 1991 were displaced persons or refugees in 1997.²⁹⁵



²⁹³ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 925.

²⁹⁴ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor against Mica Stanišić and Stojan Župljanin: VOLUME I of III”, March 2013, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/zupljanin_stanisicm/tjug/en/130327-1.pdf, p. 395/6.

²⁹⁵ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor against Mica Stanišić and Stojan Župljanin: VOLUME I of III”, March 2013, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/zupljanin_stanisicm/tjug/en/130327-1.pdf, p. 394.

Serbian flags were hung on the Ilijaš municipality building and the police station **in March 1992**. The SJB split apart by ethnicity, with the Serbian part calling itself the “Serb police” of the SAO of Romanija. Muslims and Croats employed in schools, banks, and hospitals were fired. The Serb Crisis Staff took control of all major military and civilian institutions and facilities in the municipality. **On 14 June 1992**, Ratko Adžić, president of the Municipal Crisis Headquarters and commander of the Serbian security forces in Ilijaš, invited Arkan’s Men to send at least one unit to Ilijaš to assist the crisis headquarters.²⁹⁶

“At least 22 Muslims were killed by Serb Forces in the municipality of Ilijaš **in May and June 1992**,” according to the judgment against Mićo Stanišić, Minister of Internal Affairs of the Republika Srpska from 1992 to 1995.²⁹⁷

Detention Facilities in Gornja Bioča and Podlugovi

The Serbs began their preparations to take over the majority-Muslim village of Lješevo **in March 1992**, erecting checkpoints, arming the local population, and positioning heavy artillery on the surrounding hills. **In April 1992**, the Muslims in the village organized village guards, and in May, they formed a Crisis Staff to oversee life and work in the village. **In May 1992**, Serbian forces ordered the Muslims to surrender their weapons, and most of them obeyed the order. **On 4 June 1992**, Lješevo came under heavy fire and shelling. The shells hit several houses in the Muslim part of the village. Serbian soldiers entered the village the next day and killed approximately 20 Muslim villagers, after capturing them and burning their identity documents. The Stanišić judgment states:

“The Serb soldiers forced other villagers from their homes and assembled them at the railway station. From there, the Serb police transported the village residents by bus to a building in the Podlugovi area of Ilijaš, where they were detained for two months.”²⁹⁸

According to witness ST004, **on 27 May 1992**, Serb forces began an attack on Gornja Bioča. The inhabitants of the village, including women and children, fled into the woods, where they stayed all night. The attack was paused around midnight when someone fired a flare, but it resumed the next morning around 5:00 am. Serb forces fired machine guns in the forest and set houses on fire. They opened fire on a garage and killed Uzeir Semović and his son and wounded a little girl.²⁹⁹

²⁹⁶ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor against Mica Stanišić and Stojan Župljanin: VOLUME I of III”, March 2013, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/zupljanin_stanisicm/tjug/en/130327-1.pdf, p. 394.

²⁹⁷ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor against Mica Stanišić and Stojan Župljanin: VOLUME I of III”, March 2013, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/zupljanin_stanisicm/tjug/en/130327-1.pdf, p. 395.

²⁹⁸ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor against Mica Stanišić and Stojan Župljanin: VOLUME I of III”, March 2013, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/zupljanin_stanisicm/tjug/en/130327-1.pdf, p. 395.

²⁹⁹ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor against Mica Stanišić and Stojan Župljanin: VOLUME I of III”, March 2013, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/zupljanin_stanisicm/tjug/en/130327-1.pdf, p. 396.

As described in the Stanišić judgment: “A group of 28 men and two boys tried to make it to the village of Visoko, but ran into machine gun fire, which killed two of them. They thus returned to Gornja Bioča, were taken into custody, and imprisoned in a garage and then the school in Gornja Bioča. There were 70 people detained at the school. In addition, women and children were kept in a neighboring house.”³⁰⁰

The men were interrogated by militiamen and the Ilijaš SJB commanders Srpsko Pustivuk and Neđo Ikonić. **On 3 June 1992**, witness ST0004 and Pačo Durmić were taken to the third floor of the Ilijaš SJB building. They were told to lie on their stomachs and put their hands on their heads, whereupon the guards beat them for 15 minutes with their legs, fists, and batons, and forced Durmić to sing a Serbian nationalist song. They were then moved to another room where there were five other abused detainees, four of whom were Muslims and one of whom had been arrested for speeding.

A day later, witness ST0004 and the others were loaded into an armored police vehicle and taken to the train station in Podlugovi. They were placed in the basement with about 80 other detainees from Gornja Bioča, Lješevo, and Stari Ilijaš. The basement was crowded and very hot. They slept on the floor and received very little food. The Stanišić judgement states:

“The Serb guards threw two poison gas canisters into the basement. ST004 gave evidence that his throat began to burn and that he felt as if he were on fire. The detainees managed to break open a door and escape the basement; once outside, the Serb soldiers ordered them to lie face down. T004 again recognized Savić. Some of the detainees were taken away; others, including ST004 remained in the basement for two days, during which they received no food or water. One of the guards told the detainees that they had been selected for execution.”³⁰¹

ST004 was transferred to a warehouse in Podlugovi where he met a man named Slavko who he later learned was the camp commander. There were more than 100 detainees from Ilijaš, Lješevo, Podlugovi, and Bioča in the warehouse.³⁰²

ST004 fell ill as a result of a chemical gas attack which killed another detainee named Zlatko Bečaj. For 70 days, detainees did not regularly receive food or water and only had access to two toilets.

³⁰⁰ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor against Mica Stanišić and Stojan Župljanin: VOLUME I of III”, March 2013, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/zupljanin_stanisicm/tjug/en/130327-1.pdf, p. 396.

³⁰¹ United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor against Mica Stanišić and Stojan Župljanin: VOLUME I of III”, March 2013, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/zupljanin_stanisicm/tjug/en/130327-1.pdf, p. 397/8.

³⁰² United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor against Mica Stanišić and Stojan Župljanin: VOLUME I of III”, March 2013, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/zupljanin_stanisicm/tjug/en/130327-1.pdf, p. 398;

Minister of Justice Momčilo Mandić testified that **from 19 May to November of 1992**, the detention facilities holding non-Serbs in Ilijaš were “irregular and illegal,” claiming that the Ministry of Justice had nothing to do with them and that they were “under the authority of the army.”

In mid-August 1992, the detainees were moved to the detention center known as Planjo’s House in Vogošća Municipality. They were transported in civilian buses by guards in camouflage uniforms with the insignia of the Serbian military police. ST004 recognized one of them as Srpko Pustivuk, militiaman and commander of the Ilijaš SJB. Pustivuk was acquitted in the final judgment of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, of the war crimes against the civilian population in Gornja Bioča in Ilijaš Municipality.³⁰³

TRNOVO MUNICIPALITY

According to the 1991 census, the ethnic composition of Trnovo Municipality was 4,790 (69%) Muslims, 2,059 (29%) Serbs, sixteen Croats, 72 Yugoslavs, and 54 persons of other or unknown ethnicity. **In March and April 1992**, Serbs and Muslims set up checkpoints in Trnovo and its surroundings. Serb policemen formed their own police force based in the local Cultural Center where they raised the Serb flag. Tanks and soldiers bearing Serbian insignia appeared in Trnovo around 25 May and dug trenches in the town. At the end of May, the Serb population, began to leave Trnovo, expecting an attack. Muslim homes were the main targets of shelling. One Serbian unit set fire to Muslim houses in the city and demolished the city mosque. Five Muslims died in the shelling, and 14 Muslims were captured.³⁰⁴

“About 2,500 Muslims left Trnovo as a result of this attack. Those who remained PT – mainly women, children, and the elderly – were taken for questioning before the crisis staff,” according to the verdict against Krajišnik.³⁰⁵

The Muslims were detained in two cottages in early July 1992. They were later released in a prisoner exchange.

The Krajišnik judgement reads: “The Chamber concludes that Serb forces attacked Trnovo town and deliberately destroyed houses owned by Muslims and the town mosque **at the end of May 1992**. More than half of the Muslim population left Trnovo municipality as a result of the attack and other restrictions imposed on them. Some Muslims left the municipality

303 Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, “S1 1 K 003345 10 Krž Pustivuk Srpko”, <http://sudbih.gov.ba/Court/Case/274>, www.sudbih.gov.ba.

304 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik”, September 2006, <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/krajisnik/tjug/en/kra-jud060927e.pdf>, p. 219.

305 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik”, September 2006, <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/krajisnik/tjug/en/kra-jud060927e.pdf>, p. 220.

after having being detained.”³⁰⁶

On 25 May 1992, Gliša Simanić, a member of the Trnovo Crisis Staff, informed Mladić about a convoy that was moving from the direction of Konjic through the village of Lukomir, towards Šabić and Trnovo. Mladić ordered him to form a unit of 10 to 20 soldiers to intercept the convoy, “enslave them” and chase them away. Simanić told Mladić that they had control of Trnovo and that it could be reached from the direction of Dobro Polje. Mladić said to tell the Muslims “that they better not start anything because they’ll go to hell,” and that he would come and talk to them whenever they wanted. Mladić also ordered Simanić to mobilize soldiers into larger units.³⁰⁷

According to the final judgments, Serbian forces persecuted, forcibly relocated, and committed other inhumane acts against the population in the municipality of Trnovo.

306 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik”, September 2006, <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/krajisnik/tjug/en/kra-jud060927e.pdf>, p. 220.

307 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić: VOLUME IV of V”, November 2017, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/mladic/tjug/en/171122-4of5_1.pdf, p. 2143.

CONVICTIONS FOR CRIMES COMMITTED IN SARAJEVO

As of May 2022, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the courts in Bosnia and Herzegovina have convicted a total of 36 individuals for crimes against the Sarajevans in the municipalities occupied by Serb forces during the siege. Among those convicted are former Republika Srpska political leadership, VRS and Serb paramilitary members, two SRK commanders, the warden of Planjo's House, Naka's Garage, Sonja's Place, and the Bunker detention camps in Vogošća, as well as two civilians.

ICTY Judgment (available on the official website)

Radovan Karadžić (Source: ICTY)



In 2013, the ICTY sentenced **Radovan Karadžić** to 40 years in prison. Karadžić was a founder and the president of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) until his resignation from the party on 19 July 1996. He also served as the Chairman of the National Security Council of the so-called Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following the creation of the RS on 12 May 1992, Karadžić was the president of the three-member presidency until 17 December 1992, whereafter he served as the sole President of RS and Supreme Commander of its armed forces

until July 1996. He was convicted, among other things, of participating in the comprehensive Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE) aimed at the permanent removal of Bosnian Muslims, Croats, and other non-Serbs from the territory of 20 municipalities. These included the Sarajevo municipalities of Novo Sarajevo, Novi Grad, Pale, Vogošća, Ilidža, and Hadžići, where he oversaw a campaign of sniping and shelling with the primary purpose of terrorizing Sarajevo civilians.

Momčilo Krajišnik (Source: ICTY)



In 2009, the ICTY sentenced **Momčilo Krajišnik** to 20 years in prison. Krajišnik had been a member of the SDS Main Board and president of the Bosnian Serb Assembly. He was convicted of persecution, deportation, and forced transfer of the population from the territory of several municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the Sarajevo municipality of Trnovo. The crimes for which Krajišnik was convicted included the forced displacement of thousands of Muslim and Croat civilians, including

women, children, and the elderly, in the period from April to December 1992.

Biljana Plavšić (Source: ICTY)



In 2003, the ICTY sentenced **Biljana Plavšić** to 11 years in prison, following a plea agreement. Plavšić was a leading Bosnian Serb political figure from 1990 until the end of the war, a Serbian representative to the collective Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a member of the collective and extended of the Serb Republic of BiH. She also had de facto authority over members of the Bosnian Serb armed forces. As the co-president of the Serbian leadership, acting as an individual and in agreement with other members

of the JCE, Plavšić planned, incited, and carried out the persecution of Bosnian Muslims, Croats, and other non-Serb populations in BiH, including in the Sarajevo municipalities of Novi Grad, Novo Sarajevo, Hadžići, Ilidža, Ilijaš, Trnovo, and Vogošća.

Ratko Mladić (Source: ICTY)



In 2021, the ICTY upheld the sentencing of **Ratko Mladić**, former Colonel General and Commander of the VRS Main Staff, to life imprisonment. He was convicted of having participated in four JCEs, including the campaign of terror against the civilian population of Sarajevo as well as the comprehensive JCE to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims and Croats from several areas, including the Sarajevo municipalities Ilidža, Novi Grad, and Pale.

Mičo Stanišić (Source: ICTY)



In 2016, the ICTY sentenced **Mica Stanišić**, former RS Minister of the Interior, to 22 years in prison. He was convicted as a member of the JCE for persecution as a crime against humanity, as well as murder and torture as violations of the laws or customs of war, in several areas, including the Sarajevo municipalities of Ilijaš, Pale, and Vogošća.

Stanislav Galić (Source: ICTY)



The ICTY sentenced **Stanislav Galić** to life imprisonment in 2006. He was the commander of the VRS Sarajevo-Romanija Corps (SRK) and held the rank of Major General since November 1992. He was convicted for his role in the sniping and shelling campaign aimed at terrorizing the civilian population of Sarajevo.

Dragomir Milošević (Source: ICTY)



In 2009, the ICTY sentenced **Dragomir Milošević** to 29 years in prison. He served as Stanislav Galić's chief of staff from March of 1993 until August 1994, when he became the commander of the SRK units surrounding Sarajevo. He was convicted of leading the sniping and shelling campaign which had the primary goal of spreading terror among the civilian population.

Final Judgments of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (available on the official website)

Dragan Damjanović (Source: Sud Bosne i Hercegovine)




In 2007, the Court of BiH sentenced VRS member **Dragan Damjanović** to 20 years in prison for crimes against humanity, including murder, torture, rape, enforced disappearance, and other inhumane acts committed in the area of Vogošća.

Rade Veselinović (Source: Sud BiH)



Following a plea agreement, the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina sentenced **Rade Veselinović** to seven years and six months in prison in 2009. As a former member of the VRS Military Police, he was convicted of crimes against humanity committed in the territory of Hadžići Municipality, including inciting and aiding in the persecution of the non-Serb population through murder, illegal imprisonment, torture, enforced disappearance, inflicting great suffering and harm, and other inhumane acts.

Saša Baričanin (Source: Sud BiH)



In 2012, the Court of BiH sentenced **Saša Baričanin**, a member of the RS military, paramilitary, and police forces to 18 years in prison. He was found guilty of crimes against humanity including murder, rape, and enslavement in the settlements of Vraca and Grbavica in Novo Sarajevo Municipality.

Veselin Vlahović (Source: Sud BiH)



In 2014, the Court of BiH sentenced **Veselin Vlahović**, a member of Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces, to 42 years in prison for crimes against humanity committed in the Sarajevo settlements of Grbavica, Vraca, and Kovačići in Novo Sarajevo municipality. He was found guilty of persecution, murder, enforced disappearances, enslavement, rape, illegal imprisonment, physical and psychological torture, looting, and other inhuman acts.

Goran Damjanović (Source: Sud BiH)



Zoran Damjanović (Source: Sud BiH)



In 2014, the Court of BiH convicted two brothers, **Zoran and Goran Damjanović**, former soldiers of the so-called Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, for war crimes against the civilian population in the Bojnik settlement of Novi Grad municipality. Zoran was sentenced to six years in prison, while Zoran's sentence was six years and six months.

Zoran Dragičević (Source: Sud BiH)



The Court of BiH sentenced **Zoran Dragičević**, a member of military, paramilitary, and police forces of the so-called Republika Srpska BiH in 2014 to 11 years in prison. He was convicted of crimes against humanity in the Grbavica settlement of Novo Sarajevo municipality, including the persecution of the non-Serb population, rape, torture, imprisonment, the looting of property, and other inhumane acts.

In 2015, the Court of BiH sentenced **Slavko Savić**, a member of the VRS Vogošća Light Infantry Brigade, to eight years in prison for the war crime of rape in the Vogošća area.

Branko Vlačo (Source: Sud BiH)



In 2015, the Court of BiH sentenced **Branko Vlačo** to 13 years in prison. As the warden of the Planjo's House, Naka's Garage, Sonja's Place, and Bunker detention facilities in Vogošća, he was found guilty of the crime against humanity of persecution. More specifically, he was convicted of acting with discriminatory intent to implement the state policy of persecuting the Bosniak and Croat population. He played an active role in the establishment and management of the aforementioned detention camps as well as transferring civilians to other facilities. At the facilities under his supervision, he maintained a system in which captured civilians were kept in inhumane conditions, abused, tortured, and killed.

Jovan Tintor (Source: Sud BiH)



In 2019, the Court of BiH sentenced **Jovan Tintor**, a member of the SDS BiH Main Board and the president of the Crisis Staff of the Serbian Municipality of Vogošća, to ten years in prison. He was convicted of crimes against humanity committed in the territory of Vogošća Municipality. He was found to have been part of the JCE wherein he participated in the persecution of civilians, including acts of imprisonment or severe deprivation of physical autonomy, forced transfer, murder, torture, enforced disappearance, and other inhumane acts.

The Supreme Court of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Cantonal Court in Sarajevo (data available on the OSCE BiH War Crimes Case Map)

In 2004, the Supreme Court of the Federation of BiH (FBiH) sentenced Ratko Gašović, a civilian, to eight years in prison for war crimes against the civilian population, including rape, inhuman treatment, and forced labor in the Sarajevo settlement of Hadžići.

In 2004, the Supreme Court of the FBiH sentenced Vlastimir Pušara, a member of the VRS Hadžići Battalion, to seven years in prison for war crimes against civilians, including illegal imprisonment, mental and physical torture, and violent confiscation of property in the Sarajevo settlement of Hadžići.

In 2005, the Supreme Court of the FBiH sentenced Zoran Knežević, a member of the VRS, to eight years in prison for the war crime of rape in the Novo Sarajevo settlement of Grbavica.

In 2005, the Supreme Court of FBiH sentenced Goran Vasić, a member of Serb paramilitary formations, to six years in prison for war crimes against prisoners of war and participation in physical torture and beatings in the Nedžarići settlement of Novi Grad Municipality.

In 2006, the Supreme Court of the FBiH sentenced Boro Krsmanović, a member of the VRS, to three years in prison for war crimes against the civilian population, including intimidation and the looting of property in the Sarajevo settlement of Hadžići.

In 2007, the Supreme Court of FBiH sentenced Milan Šešelj, a member of the VRS, to three years in prison for crimes against the civilian population and organizing and supervising forced labor in the Grbavica settlement of Novo Sarajevo municipality.

In 2007, the FBiH Supreme Court sentenced Predrag Mišković, a member of the VRS, to seven years in prison for rape as a war crime against civilians in the Grbavica settlement of Novo Sarajevo municipality.

In 2007, the Supreme Court of FBiH sentenced Momir Glišić, a member of the VRS, to two years and six months in prison for war crimes, including intimidation, inhumane treatment, abuse, and mandating the forced labor of civilians in the Grbavica settlement of Novo Sarajevo municipality.

In 2008, the Supreme Court of FBiH sentenced Borislav Berjan, a VRS company commander, to seven years in prison for his responsibility for war crimes against civilians and war crimes against prisoners of war carried out by units under his command in the Sarajevo settlement of Ilidža. These crimes included illegal deprivation of liberty, expulsion, torture and inhumane treatment, looting of the property of the non-Serb population, and the liquidation of civilians and prisoners of war.

In 2010, the Supreme Court of the FBiH sentenced Nemanja Jovičić, a member of the VRS Hadžići Battalion, to ten years in prison for the war crimes of intimidation, rape, illegal abduction, abuse, and looting, carried out against the civilian population in Hadžići.

In 2013, the Supreme Court of FBiH sentenced Mladen Milanović, a member of the VRS, to one year and four months in prison for war crimes against the civilian population, including

inhumane treatment and abuse of civilians in the Bunker detention facility in Semizovac, Vogošća Municipality.

In 2017, the FBiH Supreme Court sentenced Predrag Đurović, a civilian, to six years in prison for rape as a war crime against civilians//OR//war crimes against the civilian population including rape in the Novo Sarajevo settlement of Vraca.

In 2017, the Supreme Court of FBiH sentenced Duško Dabetić, a member of the VRS, to six years in prison rape as a war crime against civilians//OR//war crimes against the civilian population including rape in the Grbavica settlement of Novo Sarajevo Municipality.

In 2017, the Supreme Court of the FBiH sentenced Momir Tomaš, a member of the VRS, to one year and four months in prison for war crimes against the civilian population including inflicting severe physical and mental suffering, looting, and inhumane treatment in the Hadžići village of Breza.

In 2020, the Supreme Court of the FBiH sentenced Slobodan Bogdanović, a member of the Serbian military and police forces, to two years in prison for crimes against the civilian population committed in the Grbavica settlement of Novo Sarajevo Municipality. He was found guilty of beating two civilians and confiscating a motor vehicle.

In 2020, the Supreme Court of the FBiH sentenced Goran Sladoja, a member of the Serbian military and police forces, to two years in prison for crimes against the civilian population committed in the Grbavica settlement of Novo Sarajevo Municipality. He was found guilty of beating two civilians and confiscating a motor vehicle.

In 2004, the Cantonal Court in Sarajevo accepted the plea agreement of Milorad Rodić, a member of the Serbian military, sentencing him to five years in prison for rape as a war crime against civilians in the Grbavica settlement of Novo Sarajevo Municipality

In 2009, the Cantonal Court in Sarajevo accepted the plea agreement of Željko Mitrović, a member of the 2nd Battalion of the First Sarajevo Mechanized Brigade of the VRS. He was sentenced to two years in prison for war crimes against the civilian population in the Grbavica settlement of Novo Sarajevo Municipality, including inhuman treatment, abuse, intimidation, and ordering the forced labor of non-Serb civilians.

In 2012, the Cantonal Court in Sarajevo accepted the plea agreement of Ranko Boljak, a member of the VRS, sentencing him to three years in prison for war crimes against civilians, including the infliction of severe physical and mental harm, the looting of property, inhuman treatment, and illegal imprisonment of civilians around the Sarajevo settlement of Ilidža.

JOINT CRIMINAL ENTERPRISES

From 1992 to the end of 1995, crimes were committed against the citizens of the capital of BiH as part of two Joint Criminal Enterprises (JCE). The first was a comprehensive JCE with the objective of permanently removing Bosnian Muslims, Croats, and other non-Serbs from municipalities in Eastern Bosnia, the Autonomous Region of Krajina, and Sarajevo (the municipalities of Novi Grad, Novo Sarajevo, Pale, Vogošća, Ilidža, Hadžići, Trnovo, and Ilijaš). The other JCE was carried out during the Sarajevo siege and consisted of a sniping and shelling campaign with the primary purpose of terrorizing the city's civilian population.

While the ICTY Trial Chamber found differences in each of the municipalities, it was “satisfied that there was a generally similar pattern of coordinated violence during and after the takeover of these Municipalities and in detention facilities throughout.”³⁰⁸ The judgment against Karadžić states:

“The Chamber recalls its finding that in Vogošća and Ilidža a number of detainees were taken from their place of detention by Serb Forces and killed while carrying out work on the frontlines or while being used as human shields.”³⁰⁹

The comprehensive JCE was achieved through criminal and inhumane acts of deportation, forced population transfer, and persecution. As determined in the first-instance judgement against Karadžić:

“The Chamber found that Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were displaced as a result of, or following physical force, threat of force, or coercion, or that they fled out of fear. This fear was caused by ongoing violence and various crimes committed against non-Serbs including inter alia killings, cruel and inhumane treatment, unlawful detention, rape and other acts of sexual violence, discriminatory measures, and wanton destruction of villages, houses and cultural monuments.”³¹⁰

In the Sarajevo municipalities covered by the comprehensive JCE, civilians were imprisoned in various facilities such as the Hadžići Cultural and Sports Center, the Hadžići Municipal garage, Kula Prison, the Bunker camp, Planjo's House, Sonja's Place and Naka's Garage in Vogošća, the former Digitron Buje and Šoping buildings in Grbavica, and the Pale Gym. These will be dealt with individually in the second part of this publication.

308 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 955.

309 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 958.

310 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1297.



photo by Benisa Bibuljica

The members of the comprehensive JCE included Karadžić, Krajišnik, Plavšić, Mladić, and Mićo Stanišić, who were sentenced by the ICTY, as well as Nikola Koljević, Momčilo Mandić, and Velibor Ostojić, who were not tried or were acquitted. Other participants in the comprehensive JCE included prominent members of the Bosnian Serb leadership, the SDS at the republic, regional, and municipal levels, the JNA and VRS, the Security Services and Public Security Services, regional and municipal crisis headquarters, and other civil bodies.

According to judicial evidence, former Serbian President Slobodan Milošević also participated in the JCE, however he died before the conclusion of his trial at the ICTY. Vojislav Šešelj, the president of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) in February 1991 who was elected as a member of the Assembly of the Republic of Serbia in June 1991, was also tried for his participation in the comprehensive JCE. He was sentenced to ten years in prison for persecution, deportation, and inhumane acts in BiH, Croatia, and the Vojvodina village of Hrtkovci, but not as a member of the JCE. Željko Ražnatović, aka "Arkan," was also a part of the JCE. As the commander of the Serbian paramilitary group Arkan's Men, he participated in operations in Bijeljina, Bratunac, Brčko and Rogatica, in Sokolac, Vlasenica, Zvornik, Ilidža, and Pale in 1992. He was killed in Belgrade in 2000.

According to the first-instance judgment against Karadžić, the members of the JCE acted in accordance with a common plan that was in place between October 1991 and 30 November 1995.³¹¹

Achieving the goal of the JCE entailed various international crimes which were perpetrated by members of the Serbian forces, which collectively included members of the RS MUP, VRS, JNA, Yugoslav Army, TO, MIO of Serbia and crisis headquarters, members of Serb paramilitary forces and volunteer units from Serbia and BiH, as well as local Bosnian Serbs who acted on their instructions or in accordance with directives.³¹²

The first-instance judgment against Karadžić states: "Karadžić and other members of the JCE used their authority and influence over Crisis Staffs, TO, VRS, Bosnian Serb MUP, and paramilitaries to carry out the crimes envisaged by the common plan of the Overarching JCE. Furthermore, at times, paramilitaries, local Serbs, JNA, MUP, TO, and VRS units acted at the behest of the Crisis Staffs, which were under the Accused's authority and influence, to commit crimes in furtherance of the common plan. Therefore, the Chamber finds that the crimes that were found to be committed by Serb Forces in the Municipalities are imputed to

311 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1298.

312 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor against Mićo Stanišić and Stojan Župljanin", March 2013, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/zupljanin_stanisicm/tjug/en/130327-2.pdf, p. 46.

the JCE members or to the Accused."³¹³

On 15 May 1992, Mićo Stanišić issued an order formalizing the cooperation of the Bosnian Serb MUP and the VRS, so that MUP personnel would be organized into "war units" and reassigned to the VRS during combat operations.³¹⁴

Koljević acknowledged that the process of re-organizing municipalities was done with the intent of creating "homogeneity of certain areas." He repeatedly called for the expulsion of Bosnian Muslims and the creation of homogeneous territories, claiming that Serbs could not live with anyone else. As described in the Karadžić judgement:

"Koljević was particularly extreme in his views and continued to repeat at important meetings that it was impossible for Bosnian Serbs, Muslims, and Croats to live together. Koljević also made a statement at the 34th session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly in 1993 about the aim being the spiritual and moral revitalisation of Serbhood."³¹⁵

Koljević, vice president of the RS under Karadžić and one of the founders of the SDS, died in 1997 and was never prosecuted at the ICTY.

In 2009, the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina acquitted Momčilo Mandić, former Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the Republika Srpska BiH, of responsibility for an attack carried out on 5 April 1992 by the police forces of the Republika Srpska BiH with the support of military and paramilitary formations. This attack targeted the Personnel Training Center of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of BiH, which is located in Vraca. He was also acquitted for having planned, ordered, committed, and encouraged the persecution of non-Serbs on political, national, ethnic and religious grounds in his capacity as the Minister of Justice of the Republika Srpska BiH. The indictment referred to the specific crimes of killing, inhumane treatment, violations of physical integrity and health, illegal imprisonment, forced labor, and forced disappearances. It also alleged that as someone in a position of leadership, he failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the commission of the aforementioned acts and to punish the perpetrators.³¹⁶

313 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1324.

314 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić", November 2017, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/mladic/tjug/en/171122-4of5_1.pdf p. 1921.

315 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, "Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV", March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1228/9.

316 Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, "X-KRŽ-05/58 Momčilo Mandić", first instance verdict, 2007, <https://sudbih.gov.ba/Court/Case/22>, www.sudbih.gov.ba.

Momčilo Mandić (Source: Sud BiH)



During his testimony at the ICTY, **Mandić** said that Plavšić was an advocate of having all paramilitary units from territories where Serbs lived outside BiH come to assist them and was the “bridge” between Bosnian Serbs and the people who came from other states to assist in the conflict.³¹⁷ The judgement against Karadžić reads:

“Biljana Plavšić acknowledged during a session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, in November 1992, in the presence of the Accused, 10307 that following the call of the “president of the Republic” for volunteers,

she sent letters in order to gather anyone who wanted to fight for the Serb cause in RS, and that she sent letters, inter alios, to Šešelj and Arkan.”³¹⁸

The second JCE began with a campaign of sniping and shelling of Sarajevo, whose citizens endured the longest siege of a capital city in modern history. The first-instance judgment of the prosecutor against Ratko Mladić reads:

“The Trial Chamber concludes that in the period from 12 May 1992 to November 1995, the JCE existed with the primary objective of spreading terror among the civilian population through a campaign of sniping and shelling. In this regard, the Trial Chamber considers that the policy of the Bosnian Serb leadership regarding Sarajevo was defined at the 16th session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, held on 12 May 1992. Approximately two days later [...] the SRK (Sarajevo-Romanija Corps) began a fierce shelling of Sarajevo which, together with regular and frequent sniper activity [...] continued during the entire period covered by the Indictment.”³¹⁹

The international courts concluded that the JCE encompassed crimes such as terrorism, illegal attacks on civilians, and murders.

“The infliction of terror among the civilian population was used to gain strategic military advantages and done out of ethnical vengeance,” according to the judgment against Mladić.³²⁰

317 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1221.

318 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1212.

319 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić: VOLUME IV of V”, November 2017, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/mladic/tjug/en/171122-4of5_1.pdf, p. 2335.

320 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić: VOLUME IV of V”, November 2017, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/mladic/tjug/en/171122-4of5_1.pdf, p. 2279.

Members of the Bosnian Serb military and political leadership worked towards the realization of the common goal of the JCE. This leadership included Karadžić, Galić, Dragomir Milošević, Krajišnik, Biljana Plavšić, and Nikola Koljević.

In its conclusion, the Chamber in the case against Mladić took into account the evidence presented by the witnesses regarding the frequent communication of the Bosnian Serb military and political leadership and the views they expressed at joint meetings with representatives of the international community. This evidence demonstrated that the leadership was informed about the crimes being committed on the ground and the campaign of sniping and shelling which continued with unrelenting intensity for almost four years.³²¹

Karadžić was at the head of the JCE, providing support to Mladić for a strategy that included increasing the intensity of the sniping and shelling campaign. He also issued or approved military directives that prolonged the siege of Sarajevo.

As stated in the final judgment of the ICTY, Karadžić issued orders at both the strategic and operational level, and in several cases, he rewarded Mladić, Galić, and Milošević, even though he had knowledge that they were involved in attacks against civilians.³²²

Several SRK units participated in the sniping and shelling campaign, requiring considerable military resources, weapons, and organization.

The Karadžić judgment explains: “The only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the evidence relating to the sniping and shelling of civilians in Sarajevo is that Mladić, Galić, and Dragomir Milošević were willing participants in the Sarajevo JCE and that they intended to shell and snipe the civilians in the city.”³²³

The ICTY judges determined that Mladić, Galić, and Dragomir Milošević intentionally targeted Sarajevo civilians based upon a multitude of evidence. This included a speech given by Mladić on 12 May 1992 at a session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, in which he openly spoke about his intentions for Sarajevo, saying that the “dragon’s head” should be placed in a ring and that the city should be surrounded with 300 mortars and artillery weapons. He also spoke about the procurement and use of modified aerial bombs, and orders to shell Bašaršija, Pofalići, and Velešići. In his directives, he continually ordered the forces under his command to tighten the blockade around Sarajevo and advocated for a “persistent”

321 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić: VOLUME IV of V”, November 2017, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/mladic/tjug/en/171122-4of5_1.pdf, p. 2279.

322 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME II of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1920.

323 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1909.

or “active” defense, which meant shelling and sniping. Galić and Dragomir Milošević implemented these directives, with Milošević ordering the use of modified aerial bombs.



For Krajišnik, Koljević, and Plavšić, the judges at the ICTY determined that they had defensive views about the importance of Sarajevo for the goals of the Bosnian Serbs. The judgment against Karadžić states:

“The Chamber is convinced that Mladić, Galić, Dragomir Milošević, Krajišnik, Koljević, and Plavšić were all fully aware, throughout the conflict, that civilians in Sarajevo were being exposed to deliberate sniping and shelling by the SRK units and to indiscriminate and/or disproportionate attacks. However not one of them made an effort to stop or prevent this practice, other than when it was in their political interest to do so and/or when they were pressured by the international community. Instead, the evidence shows that they actively sought and encouraged the practice of sniping and shelling in order to achieve their military and political goals, retaliate against the Bosnian Muslim side, and use it as a bargaining chip in their dealings with the international community.”³²⁴

ARMY OF THE REPUBLIKA SRPSKA: SARAJEVO-ROMANIJA CORPS

On 12 May 1992, the Assembly of the RS ordered the establishment of the VRS, which, as stated in the judgment against Galić, was composed of parts of the JNA, TO, and volunteer units. The JNA units were renamed but kept most of their personnel and weapons. As stated in the judgment against Mladić: “The VRS inherited both officers and men from the JNA and also substantial arms and equipment, including over 300 tanks, 800 APCs, and over 800 pieces of heavy artillery.”³²⁵

Mladić was appointed commander of the Main Staff of the newly formed VRS, and Karadžić, as president of the RS, was supreme commander of its armed forces. The Mladić judgement describes:

“When it was formed, the VRS consisted of a Main Staff, the subordinated corps and independent units. The VRS Main Staff operated under the direction of the Supreme Command of the Bosnian-Serb Republic and in concert with both the MoD and MUP.”³²⁶

The Chamber in the case against Mladić concluded that “the VRS was informed about the Strategic Goals, which represented the basic goals of the Bosnian Serb leadership and that the Strategic Goals were a key element of the military strategy. They were the basis for military operations that were formalized in seven main military directives of the VRS issued in the period from June 1992 to March 1993. Those directives represented the ‘highest level of military-political management’ for the conduct of the war. They were ‘act(s) of command using the highest level of command’ through which long-term tasks are given.”³²⁷ The directives would be issued in the course of the sniping and shelling campaign against Sarajevo.

On 27 December 1993, Mladić noted in his diary that he held a meeting in Belgrade with the Commander of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army, Momčilo Perišić. Perišić told Mladić that “the Supreme Council of Defense made a decision that ‘everyone’ should return to the republic of the Bosnian Serbs and the RSK (Republika Srpska Krajina) and that the offensive on Sarajevo should be of general proportions.”

325 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić: VOLUME I of V”, November 2017, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/mladic/tjug/en/171122-1of5_1.pdf, p. 59.

326 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić: VOLUME I of V”, November 2017, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/mladic/tjug/en/171122-1of5_1.pdf, p. 64.

327 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić: VOLUME III of V”, November 2017, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/mladic/tjug/en/171122-3of5_1.pdf, p. 1190.

324 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1922.

The Mladić judgement further recounts: “Approximately 19,000 conscripts and 3,500 recruits would be transferred to Han Pijesak and should be deployed from there to war units. Perišić was told that he and Mladić should make an assessment of Sarajevo, as the politicians would come to a decision on this regard.”³²⁸

Perišić informed the Council, “You should know, and this is not contained in the report, that in Republika Srpska we support and pay for 4,173 persons, or 7,42% from the VJ, and in the Republic of Serbian Krajina 1,474 persons or 2.62% from the VJ; that’s a total of 5,647 persons. We allot around 14 million for them each year and we need the same amount for next year, and that’s just for their salaries. That’s a great help to them.”³²⁹

Perišić was acquitted by the ICTY in 2013 for crimes committed in BiH and Croatia, and he was sentenced to 27 years in prison by the first-instance judgment.

The VRS consisted of six corps. Almost all of the soldiers were Serbs and most of them lived in BiH. There is evidence that many VRS officers were former JNA officers. The SRK, with its headquarters in Lukavica, was created from the Fourth Corps of the JNA that had had its headquarters in Sarajevo. On 19 May 1992, Tomislav Šipčić was appointed SRK commander,³³⁰ a position which he held until approximately 10 September that year.

The judgment against Mladić reads: “The structure of the VRS corps included three Assistant Commanders to manage the specialized branches on behalf of the Corps Commander: the Assistant Commander for Security; the Assistant Commander for Morale and Legal and Religious Affairs; and the Assistant Commander for Rear (or Logistics) Services.”³³¹

Šipčić, the first commander of the SRK, was not found responsible for the campaign of sniping and shelling against the citizens of Sarajevo. From around 10 September 1992 until 10 August 1994, Galić served as the SRK commander, followed by Dragomir Milošević, who had been his chief of staff.

“The SRK comprised overall about 18,000 soldiers divided into ten to thirteen brigades, ranging from a few dozen troops to several thousands, themselves divided into battalions and companies.”³³²

328 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić: VOLUME IV of V”, November 2017, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/mladic/tjug/en/171122-4of5_1.pdf, p. 1907.

329 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić: VOLUME IV of V”, November 2017, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/mladic/tjug/en/171122-4of5_1.pdf, p. 1909.

330 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1336.

331 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić: VOLUME I of V”, November 2017, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/mladic/tjug/en/171122-1of5_1.pdf, p. 65;

332 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić”, December 2003, <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj031205e.pdf>, p. 71.

The main forces of the SRK were deployed around the so-called inner circle of Sarajevo, especially in the areas of Ilidža, Nedžarići, and Grbavica. The Karadžić judgment states: “The inner ring extended from the northern bank of Miljacka River in Marin Dvor, across the river and westward to Dobrinja, then upwards to the neighbourhood of Alipašino Polje, nearing the Stupska Petlja in the west of city of Sarajevo, northward to the areas of Sokolja Dol and Zuca, and following eastward to complete the circle near Grdonj and Debelo Brdo near Grbavica.”³³³

By the end of 1992, seven SRK brigades were deployed on the frontlines that delineated the “inner circle,” which stretched about 55 kilometers. “Auxiliary forces of the Corps were positioned on the so called exterior ring of the Sarajevo front, which length was some 180 kilometers,” according to the judgment against Galić.³³⁴

Witness KDZ450 also testified that the command chain of the armed forces in Sarajevo was “very simple,” with Mladić being the “high command,” followed by the SRK Commander, and then the brigade commanders. The judgment against Karadžić explains: “Military structures worked in a ‘very typical manner’ in that responsibility was very entrenched and the room for individual initiative was very slim.”³³⁵

During the session of the Assembly of Bosnian Serbs on 12 May 1992, Mladić said that Sarajevo could not be taken by “spitting at it from a mortar or a howitzer.” The Karadžić judgment elaborates: “In order to make the Bosnian Muslims surrender they would have to densely plant 300 guns around Sarajevo, including rocket launchers. From early on, the SRK therefore had large quantities of artillery and heavy weapons, with most of those weapons pointing towards the city.”³³⁶

The evidence presented to the trial chamber in the case against Karadžić proves that “already in August 1992. The UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights reported back to the UN that the city was being shelled on a regular basis and that snipers are killing innocent civilians in what appears to be a deliberate attempt to spread terror among the civilian population.”³³⁷

333 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1345.

334 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić”, December 2003, <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj031205e.pdf>, p. 71.

335 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1938.

336 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1567.

337 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1863.

All SRK units had sniper rifles and marksmen. As the judgment against Karadžić describes: “They had various M48 rifles of 7.9 mm calibre in its arsenal.11731 These rifles had optical sights and were referred to as sniping rifles. In addition, they had M76 sniper rifles which also used 7.9 mm calibre ammunition, albeit different to the ammunition used for the M48 rifles. Finally, the SRK had semiautomatic 7.62 mm calibre rifles that could be equipped with optical sights, which meant that they could fire with precision from up to 400 metres away, with an overall range of 800 metres.”³³⁸

Protected witness D, an SRK soldier, was stationed in Grbavica, on Lenjinova Street near the Miljacka River. He remembers that during his shifts, soldiers from other sniper would join his platoon in the high-rise buildings. He testified:

“The snipers would occupy the upper floors. They were there every day. He often heard the sound of gunfire coming from those floors. He had the opportunity to speak to the snipers. They would usually say that they had hit someone. Their equipment consisted of ‘very long-barreled rifles’ with telescopic sights, some kind of binoculars with a rubber eyepiece on it. They had a separate telescope which was not mounted on the rifle. It was much broader, much wider, than the one on a rifle, and they were able to see the target better using this device. They also had infrared sights.”³³⁹

According to the witness, his platoon received orders from the platoon and company commanders to fire at anything that moved and that could jeopardize their positions. “They were never instructed not to fire at civilians.”³⁴⁰

The Chamber in the Karadžić case heard detailed descriptions of the constant sniping in Sarajevo throughout the conflict which killed many civilians. In an effort to protect themselves, citizens set up structures around the city to shield them from the sniper fire.³⁴¹

The Karadžić judgment recounts that on 29 October 1993, “Milošević issued an order on behalf of Galić to all the SRK brigades to intensify sniping against the ABi forces; the order also instructed each brigade to set up a platoon-strength ‘sniper group’ of 31 soldiers, each of whom should be supplied with sniper rifles and silencers.”³⁴²

338 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1394.

339 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić”, December 2003, <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj031205e.pdf>, p. 86/7.

340 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić”, December 2003, <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj031205e.pdf>, p. 87.

341 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1345.

342 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1395.

The judgments stated that Serb forces targeted civilians every day from late May 1992 to October 1995 with near constant intensity. Civilians were shot while they were fetching water, walking around the city, and riding public transport. Children were also targeted while playing in front of their houses, walking with their parents, going to and from school, and riding bicycles. SRK snipers fired from numerous notorious locations around the city where they had established professional sniper nests. Snipers would rarely fire just one shot at a time but would shoot multiple times at anything they saw moving.

The street in front of the Holiday Inn Hotel, which is about three kilometers long, was called “Sniper Alley.” There were no ARBiH positions there and it was used only by civilians and UN personnel. Yet, because of the intensity of sniper fire targeting civilians on the street, the UN formed a special operational group for that area.



David Fraser, a UNPROFOR representative in Sarajevo from April 1994 onwards, stated that “in the area of Sniper Alley, there were no military positions [...] just civilians walking along the street. They were the main targets of the shooting.”³⁴³

The judgement against Karadžić confirms that “the fire SRK opened on Sarajevo was deliberate fire, often used to directly target civilians and civilian objects in the city, including hospitals and trams.”³⁴⁴

The Chamber in the Karadžić case concluded that the victims were either deliberately targeted or were the target of indiscriminate and/or disproportionate attacks by the SRK. For this operation, the SRK used many heavy weapons, including 80- and 120-mm mortars, as well as artillery pieces, all of which were more or less permanently located in the hills around Sarajevo. Thousands of shells fell on the city, including residential areas, hospitals, markets, and other civilian infrastructure.

David Harland, a UNPROFOR Civil Affairs officer, estimated that about half a million shells were fired at Sarajevo during the war. He testified: “Sometimes we were able to determine very exactly where they came from and sometimes [we] weren’t. In nearly a hundred per cent of the cases, that is, with the exception of two or three, when we could confirm, we confirmed that they came from the Serb side. He also stated that during the period of 1993 to 1995, roughly 1,000 shells per day landed on Sarajevo, with a lull in 1994 due to the cease-fire of that year.”³⁴⁵

SRK units also dropped a number of modified aerial bombs on the city. These were exceptionally destructive weapons which had not been sufficiently tested and were thus indiscriminate.

According to the Karadžić judgement: “The Chamber recalls its finding that the SRK launched highly destructive modified air bombs on the city, the indiscriminate nature of which was known to the SRK units.”³⁴⁶

According to final judgments, the frequency of shelling and sniping varied from day to day, but no civilian in Sarajevo was safe. Unable to leave the city, its inhabitants lived in constant fear and insecurity. Many Sarajevans were killed or wounded, and many more suffered

343 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić”, December 2003, <https://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj031205e.pdf>, p. 83.

344 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p.1875.

345 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević”, December 2007, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragomir_milosevic/tjug/en/071212.pdf, p. 139.

346 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1888.

lasting psychological trauma. The Karadžić judgement states:

“The fire SRK opened on Sarajevo was deliberate fire, often used to directly target civilians and civilian objects in the city, including hospitals and trams. This is particularly the case with respect to the sniping incidents discussed earlier in the Judgement, which by their very nature could have been nothing but deliberate attacks on civilians. In addition, the shelling by the SRK forces was in most cases either indiscriminate or disproportionate and sometimes both, resulting in a high casualty count among the civilian population of Sarajevo.”³⁴⁷

Shelling and sniping were aimed at civilians who were working in gardens, waiting in line for bread, collecting water, attending funerals, shopping at markets, riding trams, collecting wood, or walking with children or friends, or in ambulances. The maternity ward, which was in the main civilian hospital with an intensive care unit, was also shelled. The building was completely bombed and had no electricity.

According to the judgement: “The Chamber was convinced that there was an established practice of sniping and shelling in the city carried out by the SRK, which entailed either directly targeting civilians or carrying out indiscriminate and/or disproportionate attacks on them [...] The best examples of this practice are the readiness of SRK units and their commanders to open sniper fire on Sarajevo civilians almost every day, and their premeditated use of indiscriminate and destructive weapons such as modified aerial bombs on the city.”³⁴⁸

347 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p. 1875.

348 United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic: VOLUME III of IV”, March 2016, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf, p.1395.

CONCLUSION

At the time of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the capital city of Sarajevo, comprised of ten municipalities, was renowned for its multi-ethnic character and rich history of cultural diversity. For the Serb military and political elite, Sarajevo was a significant target not only because of its symbolism and centrality to the functioning of BiH as an independent state, but also because Radovan Karadžić, the wartime president of the Republika Srpska, considered it his hometown. For these reasons, they sought to take control of Sarajevo, or at least parts of it. This was an aim to which they remained dedicated throughout the conflict, and which they pursued through a campaign of continuous sniping, shelling, and terrorizing of civilians.

As stated in the summary of the judgement against Karadžić, “The Chamber finds that from late May 1992 until October 1995, the civilian population of Sarajevo was shelled and sniped by members of the Bosnian Serb Forces, namely the Sarajevo Romanija Corps (SRK). Throughout this period the SRK units held positions on the hills around the city, thus encircling it and holding it under siege.”

Based on the evidence of the sniping and shelling, it is indisputable that their plan included murder, terror, and illegal attacks on civilians. Karadžić, Mladić, Galić, Milošević, Krajišnik, Koljević, and Plavšić acted collectively in pursuit of common objectives and in accordance with a common plan which included the deliberate perpetration of numerous international crimes.

The patterns of sniping and shelling and the high number of civilian casualties in the city, as the judgment against Karadžić confirmed, cannot be explained as a consequence of conventional warfare. The Chamber concluded that individual snipers and sniper units as well as mortar and artillery squads, were all under control of the SRK Command, and ultimately, the VRS Main Staff. As the judgement explains: “From the very beginning of the conflict in BiH, the political and military leadership of the Bosnian Serbs, particularly the Accused, Momčilo Krajišnik, Nikola Koljević, Biljana Plavšić, and Ratko Mladić, recognised and championed the importance of Sarajevo to the Bosnian Serb cause and the conflict in BiH.”

The judgment against Galić notes that attacks on civilians were mostly carried out during the day and were not in response to any military threat. In most cases, the attackers could clearly see that their victims were engaged in everyday civilian activities. The topography of Sarajevo, with its hills and tall buildings, provided SRK members with excellent views for targeting Sarajevo’s civilians. Some locations in the city became infamous as sniping positions and targets, with the main thoroughfare coming to be known as “sniper alley.” The judgment summary against Galić reads:

“Although civilians adapted to some extent to the frequent attacks, by closing schools, by living at night and hiding during the day, by moving around Sarajevo as little as possible, and by setting up steel containers to shield against sniper fire, they were still not safe. They were still seen and targeted. There was little effective protection against shelling.”

Andrei Demurenko, UNPROFOR Chief of Staff, said that “if you look at human suffering, it is a complete siege, like the siege of Leningrad during the Second World War.”

This was substantiated during the judicial proceedings by the description of BBC journalist Martin Bell: “Civilians inside the conflict lines looked exhausted, seemed haunted. Their only task was to survive every single day, stay alive. It was about survival. Those were truly desperate times.”

Sarajevans suffered severe hardships. Shortages of basic necessities such as food, water, gas, and electricity were a part of everyday life. They were forced to live in a state of constant fear. Every time they left their homes, they risked being shot by sniper or artillery fire. As stated in the Mladić judgment, “members of the SRK intended to spread terror among the population of Sarajevo and that the infliction of terror was the primary purpose of sniping and shelling.”

As the relevant chapter of this report, the ICTY judgments dealt chiefly with high-casualty incidents of shelling and sniping. Furthermore, the final number of injuries and deaths have yet to be established, because the Trial Chambers cited the minimum known to have been killed or wounded, which are also the numbers cited in this report. In addition to the thousands killed and wounded, the shelling and sniping campaign in Sarajevo also resulted in deep and permanent psychological scars for all the city’s inhabitants.

The Serb military and political leaders ordered the forces under their command to occupy territories in the Sarajevo of Novo Sarajevo, Novi Grad, Vogošća, Ilidža, Ilijaš, Pale, Hadžići, and Trnovo. This was part of a comprehensive plan to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from the area.

The judgment against Karadžić states: “The Chamber finds that beginning at the end of March 1992 and continuing through 1992, Serb Forces took control of municipalities in Bosnian Serb-claimed territory in BiH. During the course of these well-planned and coordinated take-overs and after, there was an organised and systematic pattern of crimes committed against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats who resided in the Municipalities.”

Karadžić and other members of the JCE used their power over the Crisis Headquarters, TO, VRS, MOI, and Bosnian Serb paramilitary formations to achieve crimes even beyond the initial scope of the comprehensive JCE. As the judgement against Karadžić explains:

“The Accused and the other members of the Overarching JCE were not only informed about the forcible take-over of towns by Serb Forces, but were also aware that this had led to massive demographic changes through the forcible displacement of non-Serb civilians and resulted in ethnic homogenisation, which they supported.”

According to the judgments, the Serb take-over of the municipalities included widespread illegal arrest and detention of thousands of non-Serbs before removing them from the territories.

Upon occupying these municipalities, Serb forces robbed, arrested, detained, enslaved, abused, raped, and murdered Sarajevo civilians. Thousands were forcibly displaced from their homes, either deported directly or forced to flee out of fear for their lives.

There were more than 15 detention facilities in Serb-occupied municipalities, including the Barracks in Rajlovac, Lukavica and Nedžarići, the camps known as Planjo’s House, the Bunker, and Kod Sonje, as well as the Kula Prison, Digitron Buje building, Šoping building, Pale Gym, Hadžići Municipal Assembly garage, and Hadžići Cultural and Sports Center.

Following the occupation of parts of Novo Sarajevo Municipality in May of 1992, Serb forces carried out a number of crimes against the civilian population including beatings, rapes, and enslavement. Civilians were detained in the Digitron Buje building and on the ground floor of the Šoping building. Serb forces drove Bosnian Muslims and Croats from their homes and looted their properties.

On 11 February 1992, Serbs formed the municipality of Rajlovac in Novi Grad. According to a resolution adopted by the Bosnian Serb Assembly on 11 May of that year, Rajlovac Municipality included the territories of Ahatovići, Bojnik, Dobroševići, Rajlovac, Reljevo-Dvor, Zabrdje, and Žuč, among others. Bosnian Serb forces carried out attacks on Ahatovići, Dobroševići, Bojnik, and Mihaljevići. The non-Serbs who were captured were taken to the Rajlovac Barracks, where they were abused and even killed. On one occasion, detainees were loaded onto a bus and told that they were going to a prisoner exchange. 41 detainees were killed on the bus, and of the six who managed to survive, two died of their injuries shortly afterwards. Members of Serbian paramilitary forces also abused captured ABiH soldiers in the Nedžarići Barracks.

The Serb Municipality of Ilidža was established on 8 May 1992. During the occupation of Ilidža, the non-Serb population was abused, enslaved, robbed, driven from their homes, and killed. According to the court judgments, about 10,000 Bosnian Muslims from several Sarajevo municipalities were detained in Kula Prison.

Beginning in March 1992, during and after the occupation of a large part of Vogošća

Municipality, the non-Serb population was subjected to restrictive and discriminatory measures. This included arbitrary arrest and imprisonment in detention facilities such as Planjo’s House, the Bunker, Sonja, and Naka’s Garage. There, men and women were kept in inhumane conditions, tortured, raped, killed, and transferred to other detention facilities. Some residents fled Vogošća out of fear while others were physically expelled. Their properties were destroyed.

The Assembly of the Serb People of the Municipality of Hadžići was established in the first week of April 1992, which was followed by fighting in Hadžići and its surroundings in May and June. Serb forces arrested and illegally imprisoned the non-Serb population in various facilities under inhumane conditions. Prisoners were beaten, raped, and subjected to forced labor. They were also transferred to other facilities in Lukavica as well as to the Kula Prison, where many were taken away and killed.

In the Spring of 1992, after the establishment of the Pale Crisis Staff, Bosnian Serb forces rounded up local Muslims and imprisoned them in the Pale Gym. Other prisoners were also brought the Gym from outside Pale.

During the takeover of Ilijaš in May and June of 1992, Serb forces killed 22 Muslims. They imprisoned many non-Serbs in a building in Podlugovi, a garage in Gornja Bioča, and a railway station, where the captives were chemically gassed. They were then taken to a warehouse in Podlugovi before being transferred to Planjo’s House.

In May 1992, Serb forces attacked Trnovo, forcing Bosnian Muslims to leave their homes. The Mladić judgement reads:

“Once the Accused assumed command of the VRS in May 1992, his ‘command was far-reaching,’ embracing paramilitaries. The MUP personnel cooperated with the VRS in the implementation of the JCE by participating, often in collaboration with or re-subordinated to VRS forces, in the commission of crimes. Regarding the SDB, the Prosecution submitted that it deployed units to Bosnia-Herzegovina, including the Red Berets, Skorpions, and Arkan’s men which, when participating in operations together with the VRS, were generally placed under VRS command.”

The Siege of Sarajevo
1992 - 1995



JU FOND MEMORIJALA
KANTONA SARAJEVO